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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
This thesis aims to vindicate the two tensions between the principle of social justice 
of the capabilities approach (the Principle) and compassion as the account of 
motivation (Compassion). 
Specifically, it aims to demonstrate that if the Principle is applied to all citizens, but 
some citizens (i) deserve to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities or (ii) 
they are not taken as a significant part of other citizens' life projects, other citizens 
would not be compassionate with these citizens. As a result, it is unreasonable to 
claim that they should have effective motivation to accept and comply with the 
Principle guaranteeing the central human capabilities at the threshold level as the 
basic entitlements of all citizens. In these circumstances, Compassion has tensions 
with the Principle. 
The implication is that the problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators from 
social justice (the Problem) in social contract theories, which is an important 
problem that the capabilities approach addresses to, is unable to be solved due to the 
incoherence between the Principle and Compassion. 
ii 
Against the background of the tensions between the Principle and Compassion, this 
thesis provides three possible ways forward, which include dissolving the tensions 
between the Compassion and the Principle, providing remedy to the Problem and 
dissolving the Problem. It also examines the difficulties of the first two ways forward, 

















Submitted by CHAN, Ka Ho 
for the degree ofMaster of Philosophy in Government and Public Administration 
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in July 2010 
iv 




Abstract ii - iv 
Table of Contents v — vi 
Acknowledgements vii - ix 
Text 
Introduction 1 — 14 
Purpose 1 
Background 2 - 7 
Significance 8 
Core Arguments 9 - 10 
Approach 11 - 12 
Implications 13 - 14 
Chapter 1 15 — 63 




Part I 17 一 29 
PartII 30 - 42 
Part III 43 - 61 
Conclusion 62 
Way Forward 63 
V 
Chapter2 6 4 - 1 0 4 
1st Tension: Denial of Desert and the Principle 
Purpose 64 - 65 
Structure 66 一 67 
PartI 68 - 77 
Part II 78 - 85 
Part III 86 - 103 
Conclusion 104 
Chapter3 105 - 1 4 4 
2nd Tension: Eudaimonistic Judgment and the Principle 
Purpose 105 - 106 
Structure 107 
Part I 108 - 114 
Part II 115 - 125 
Part III 126 - 137 
PartIV 138 - 143 
Conclusion 144 
Chapter 4 145 - 188 
Three Ways Forward 
Purpose 145 一 146 
Structure 147 
Part I 148 - 167 
Part II 168 - 178 
Part III 179 - 187 
Conclusion 188 
Conclusion 189 - 202 
Purpose 189 
Summary 190 - 197 
Implications 198 - 199 
Possible Directions 200 - 201 
Limitations 202 
Bibliography 203 - 208 
vi 
Acknowledgements 
My writings, probably like me, are always dry as I am too weak to express my 
feelings, if any, in words. However, I will try my best to express my most sincere 
gratitude to those who are the important parts of my life in the past 7 years. 
My immense gratitude is to my supervisor, Prof. Chow Po Chung. Prof Chow is the 
first teacher I met in undergraduate study — I met him in the first lesson of “Values in 
Public Affairs" at 8:30 a.m. in the first day of my first year in the university. It is an 
unforgettable lesson because as a student who could hardly spell "philosophy", it is 
rather surprising that the first thing I heard in the university was political philosophy. 
It is more unthinkable that I spent my following 7 years in reading it. In these years, 
Prof. Chow provides valuable guidance and inspirations for developing my ideas. He 
demonstrates the significance of philosophy and social justice in our life. Without 
him, the joumey of political philosophy cannot be so pleasant and influential to my 
life. 
I am also grateful to Prof. Ci Jiwei, Prof William Smith and Prof. Wu Fengshi for 
being my examiners. Prof. Wu taught me the Republic in the last year of 
undergraduate study. It was the first time I read a classic in philosophy word-by-word 
vii 
completely. Although I was not wise enough to understand the mastermind, the 
sophistication and insights of the Republic illustrated by Prof. Wu really opened my 
eyes. I should also like to thank Prof. Ci, Prof Smith and Prof Wu for providing 
invaluable comments on this thesis. I never think an author has the monopoly on 
interpretation of his works. From the comments of my examiners, I understand the 
ideas of this thesis, and probably the author himself, much better. 
I should also express my thanks to my teachers in the Department of Government 
and Public Administration, especially to Prof. Ma Shu Yun，Prof Li Lianjiang and 
Prof Ma Ngok. Prof Ma Shu Yun teaches me how to think out of the well-established 
systems of thought and discover the interesting dimensions of Politics. Prof Li 
demonstrates how a serious research should be done. Prof Ma Ngok is a vivid 
example that a "serious and wit scholar" is not a self-contradictory term. 
Although the life of academic is sometimes isolating and frustrating, I am so glad 
that I was never alone in these years. If I have never met Piera Chan, I might not read 
Politics; without the companion of the members of Ploughing reading group, 
especially Thomas Cham, Benny Chao, Mike Chow, Lee Siu Yau, Leung Cheuk 
Hang, Louis Lo and James Wong, thejoumey of political philosophy would be rather 
viii 
lonely; and I might have given up without the endless encouragements from Jambon 
Chan, Cheung Sze Ling, May Chu, Pat Tse, Felicity Wong, Wong Ho Yin and 
Raymond Yuen. I am also grateful to all my students when I was a tutor in the 
Department of Government and Public Administration. They have inspired me a lot. 
Acknowledgements are always “many words too less". I apologize to those who I 
forgot to thank. Any responsibility for errors in this thesis is, of course, entirely mine. 
July 201Qi 
1 Last but not least, I should also express my thanks to you. Yes, I mean YOU who are reading 
this thesis. It is my honour that you show your interest in reading, or at least opening, this thesis, for 
any kind of reason. Probably I am no longer here, physically or mentally, any more, but it is amazing 




The nature distribution (of natural talents and social circumstances) is neither just nor 
unjust; nor is it unjust that person bom into society at some particular position. These are 
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these 
facts. Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because they make these contingencies the 
ascriptive basis for belonging to more or less enclosed and privileged social classes. The 
basic structure of these societies incorporates the arbitrariness found in nature. But there is 
no necessity for men to resign themselves to these contingencies. The social system is not 
an unchangeable order beyond human control but a pattem of human action (Rawls, 
1999:87-88). 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
Purpose 
In this "Introduction", I shall provide an outline of my thesis, induding: 
(i) background of my research question on the tensions between the principle of 
social justice and compassion as the account of motivation in the capabilities 
approach; 
(ii) significance of this question; 
(iii) core arguments of this thesis; 
(iv) my approach to establish the arguments; and 




2. The least advantaged in our society is the necessary subject that all 
plausible theory of social justice must concern.^ A theory of social justice, no matter 
how comprehensive and sophisticated, must be rejected or revised if it excludes the 
least advantaged from the sphere of social justice. Although we may have different 
conceptions of the least advantaged according to different measurements, it is 
uncontroversial that some of our fellow citizens are always be classified as the least 
advantaged, like those who have serious psychical and/ or mental impairments that 
make them unable to participate in the economic activities. Therefore, these least 
advantaged should be the legitimate subject of socialjustice. 
3. For Nussbaum, social contract theories, including Rawls's theory of social 
justice, however, exclude these least advantaged from the sphere of social justice at 
the very beginning. This is because for social contract theories, 
(i) Society is understood as social cooperation; 
(ii) The primary goal of members to participate in social cooperation (= to 
1 This assumes that we take social justice concerns with impartiality instead of constraint on 
self-interested person participated in social cooperation (Gauthier, 1986:15, 1998:125) or ,as 
Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic says, "the advantages of the stronger" (Bloom, 1991:16). In 
particular, i fwe agree that social justice should be "the content of an agreement that would be reached 
by rational people under conditions that do not allow for bargaining power to translated into 
advantage", we may, at least prima facie, agree that the social justice must concem with the least 
advantaged (Barry, 1989:244, 1995:42-46; Dworkin，2000:6; Copp, 1991;216; Hampton, 1991:48-49-
O'Neill, 2000:144). ， 
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cooperate with other participants) is to try to achieve rational advantages in 
economic terms; 
(iii) Certain capabilities are required for effective participation; 
(iv) Social justice is understood as the problem of finding principles regulating the 
(re)distribution ofburdens and benefits in social cooperation among participants; 
(v) The principle of social justice is formulated and accepted by all participants. 
Since the least advantaged are unable to participant in social cooperation due to their 
disabilities, they are therefore classified as unqualified cooperators in social 
cooperation, and consequently they are excluded from the concem of justice at the 
stage of formulation of distributive principle. In other words, the least advantaged are 
not regarded as the proper subject of social justice in social contract theories due to 
their disabilities. For Nussbaum, this is morally unacceptable. 
4. The criticism, if correct, poses a serious challenge to social contract 
theories. These theories no doubt can demonstrate that the least advantaged in social 
cooperation is a legitimate subject, or even better, the first subject of social justice. 
However, for the least advantaged outside social cooperation, that is, those who they 
are unable to participate in social cooperation at all, they are excluded due to the 
understanding of society as social cooperation. These excluded persons are the real 
3 
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least advantaged as their situations are much worse than the least advantaged in 
social cooperation as the latter are as least able to participate in social cooperation. 
Our intuitive conviction tells us this is totally unacceptable. If a theory of social 
justice includes the less but not the least advantaged, it is reasonable to say that it is a 
deficit as those who really need our caring, or who we are truly responsible for, are 
excluded due to this kind of understanding of society. 
5. To include these real least advantaged in the subject of social justice, 
modification of the principle is required. The modification, of course, is on the 
subject of the principle applied to. In other words, all subjects of the principle of 
social justice, including the least advantaged and others, should be included in 
formulating the principle, and the principle should be acceptable to all. 
6. The modification of the subject has chain effects on other parts of the 
principle of social justice. A principle of social justice is at least composed by three 
parts, including the goods of distribution (= (re)distribution of what), the subject and 
target of distribution (= (re)distribute from who to whom) and the purpose of 
distribution (= (re)distribution for the sake of what). Since all subjects want to 
achieve their rational advantages when they participate in cooperation, the 
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modification of the subject may lead to modification of the goods because the 
original goods (re)distributed may not serve this purpose. 
7. The modification of the principle may also lead to the modification of the 
account of motivation. The account of motivation explains why the subject is 
motivated to accept and comply with the principle. In particular, it shows how the 
principles of social justice is psychologically suited to human inclinations in the 
sense that it is good or desirable for citizens to apply and act upon such principles 
(Rawls, 1999:399). As the content of the principle is modified, it is required to 
modify the corresponding account of motivation to ensure that the subject should 
• • 2 
also accept and comply with the principle. 
8. This is why the inclusion of the least advantaged leads to a different 
principle of social justice and the account of motivation in the capabilities approach. 
The capabilities approach is a theory of social justice that provides “an account of 
2 I shall bracket the disputes of intemalism and extemalism, that is, the dispute on the connection 
between sincerely making a moral judgment and being motivated to act in the manner prescribed by 
that judgment, and the disputes of Humeanism and Anti-Humeanism, that is, whether motivations 
involves both beliefs and desires (Miller, 2003:7), in moral psychology in the following discussion. 
This is not because these questions are not important. On the contrary, these questions, as I think, 
are very important on the relation between a principle of socialjustice and its account ofmotivation in 
a theory of social justice that worth serious examination. However, in the thesis of this length and 
scope that could not be helped. Therefore, as the reader may aware soon, I take Nussbaum's 
understanding of the relation between the principle of socialjustice of the capabilities approach and its 
account ofmotivation as the starting point of critique without examining its reasonableness. 
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core human entitlements that should be respected and implemented by the 
governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human dignity 
requires QSfussbaum, 2006:70).” These core human entitlements are central human 
capabilities, that is, the capabilities that are essential to for significant human 
functioning to lead a dignified life fMussbaum, 2000:70-75). The main features of the 
capabilities approach are as follows: 
(i) Conception ofPerson 
The subjects participating in social cooperation are understood as social and political 
animals having shared ends with others (^ussbaum, 2006:86). Thus, their rational 
advantages are to engage in our community and pursue the shared ends and lead a 
shared life with others, which are beyond economic advantages that social contract 
theories define. 
(ii) Principle and Motivation 
The principle is to ensure that the central human capabilities at a threshold level are 
the basic entitlements of all citizens fNussbaum, 2006:75); and the account of 
motivation sustaining the principle is compassion, which is defined as an agent X is 
compassionate with agent Y if X believes Y is suffering undeservedly, and he thinks 
Y’s undeserved suffering is important to his well being in some sense and to some 
6 
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extent QS[ussbaum, 2001:304-342). 
9. The relation between the principle and compassion is as follows. Lacking 
in central human capabilities, which are necessary conditions of a dignified life, will 
make a subject suffer undeservedly as these capabilities are the entitlements of all 
citizens. Thus, when all citizens takes others' well beings as a significant part oftheir 
life projects, they would be compassionate with those who suffer from lacking in 
central human capabilities undeservedly, and they are motivated to accept and 
comply with the principle because it can avoid this miserable situation happening. 
The principle, in retum, provides the guidance of actions of these compassionate 
citizens. A mutually supportive relation between the principle of social justice and 




10. The capabilities approach contributes to the solution of the problem of 
excluding the real least advantaged in social justice in two ways: 
(i) First, it explains why we should include the real least advantaged, who are 
unable to cooperate in ordinary sense, in our social cooperation. This is because they 
can contribute to others' rational advantage in terms of non-economic retums when 
they participate in social cooperation. 
(ii) Second, it provides an account of motivation that can sustain the principle 
applied to all citizens regardless they are economically productive or not. All citizens 
are motivated to accept and comply with the principle of social justke guaranteeing 
central human capabilities as the basic entitlements. This is because they would be 
compassionate with those who are suffering from lacking in central human 
capabilities undeservedly. Thus, whether a citizen is economically productive is 
irrelevant to their acceptance and compliance with the principle. 
Therefore, if the capabilities approach is vindicated, it complements the inadequacy 
of social contract theories revealed by the problem of excluding the unqualified 




11. In this thesis, however, I shall argue that the capabilities approach is unable 
to solve the problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators in social cooperation 
(the Problem) due to the problem of incoherence. This is because instead of being 
mutually supportive, there are two tensions between the principle of social justice of 
the capabilities approach (the Principle) and compassion as the account of 
motivation of the capabilities approach (Compassion). 
12. Tension exists when there is a subject whom the Principle is applied to (the 
Subject, = citizens living in the social institution regulated by the Principle) 
(i) deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities or 
(ii) is not taken as a significant part of one's life project. 
In these cases, as there is no good reason for all citizens to be compassionate with the 
Subject suffering from lacking in the central human capabilities, but the Principle 
guarantees that he should also have these capabilities at a threshold level, all citizens 
should not be motivated to accept and comply with the Principle. As a result, the 
mutually supportive relation no longer exists. 
13. Other ways forward to the Problem, thus, should be provided due to the 
9 
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incoherence of the capabilities approach. If the Principle and Compassion is 
incoherent in the capabilities approach, we cannot take the approach as the solution 
of the Problem. Instead we should try other possible ways forward. We can 
(i) dissolve the tensions between the Compassion and the Principle; or 
(ii) provide remedy to the Problem; or 
(iii) dissolve the Problem. 
14. I shall argue that the first two approaches would fail. The first one would 
fail because it is very difficult for us to find an alternative account of motivation that 
can sustain the Principle. The second, which is Freeman's argument on the 
distinction between social justice and remedial justice and inclusion of the 
unqualified cooperators in the latter, would fail because it justifies the exclusion 
instead of solving it. 
15. The third approach, which is to argue that the Problem does not really exist, 
is more plausible. In particular, I shall demonstrate that Rawls's understanding of 
moral person as qualified cooperator does not have to face the Problem indeed. In 
other words, the criticism of excluding the least advantaged in social cooperation is 





16. This thesis will be presented as follows. 
17. Chapter 1 provides the background of the thesis. I shall define the Problem 
and outline the solution provided by the capabilities approach, that is, how the 
capabilities approach can include the unqualified cooperators in social cooperation. 
To do so, I shall outline the principle of social justice and compassion as the account 
of motivation in the capabilities approach and demonstrate their mutually supportive 
relation. 
18. Chapter 2 demonstrates the tension between the denial of deserts as a 
component of compassion and the Principle applied to all citizens {lst Tension). That 
is, when a Subject deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities 
{D-Suhjecf), other citizens would not be compassionate with D-Subject. As a result, 
they should not be motivated to accept and comply with the principle applied to 
D-Subject. 
3 I shall make a note on the style of quotation in the following chapters. 
You will see that there are quotations in main texts and footnotes. Most of them are in the 
footnotes and some of them in the footnote are very long. 
Indeed I intend not to put quotations in the main texts to avoid distraction unless it is mandatory 
or self explanatory to illustrate my arguments. This is because I wish there is no difficulty for my 
reader to understand my arguments without referring to the footnotes, but still they can find textual 
evidences or further elaborations of my argument when they read the footnotes. 
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19. Chapter 3 illustrates the tension between eudaimonistic judgment as a 
component of compassion and commitments of the capabilities approach, including 
the idea of the fact of reasonable pluralism and overlapping consensus (2nd Tension). 
That is, when a Subject is not taken as a significant part of other citizens，life 
projects {N-Subject), other citizens would not be compassionate with N-Subject. As a 
result, other citizens should not be motivated to accept and comply with the principle 
applied to N-Subject. 
20. Chapter 2 and 3 shows the capabilities approach cannot solve the Problem 
as there are tensions between the Principle and Compassion. 
21. Chapter 4 provides three possible ways forward to the Problem, including 
dissolving the two tensions, providing remedy to the Problem and dissolving the 





22. There are two theoretical implications on the capabilities approach and the 
Problem that social contract theories may face. 
23. First, an alternative account of motivation is required if the capabilities 
approach aims to extend the scope of application of the Principle. Although the 
Problem revealed by Nussbaum is important, and the Principle can include the least 
advantaged as the Subject by extending its scope of application, her capabilities 
approach still fails to provide a solution to the Problem due to the incoherence 
between the Principle and Compassion. Thus, to reestablish the mutually supportive 
relation between the Principle and the account of motivation, a theoretical 
reconstruction may be required for the capabilities approach. I will provide 
preliminary examinations on the directions of reconstruction in Part I of chapter 4 
reveals the difficulties. 
24. Second, social contract theories do not necessarily exclude the least 
advantaged in social cooperation. The success of Rawls's theory of social justice to 
dissolve the Problem provides an example to other social contract theories. Although 
social contract theories share the conception of society as social cooperation, the 
13 
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difference in the goal of participating in social cooperation as the criterion of 
qualified cooperator is the crux explaining why Rawls's theory, unlike other social 
contract theories, does not have to face the Problem. It shows that it is possible for 
social contract theories to avoid the Problem to happen without forgoing their 




Unqualified Cooperators in Social Cooperation and the Capabilities approach 
The critical part of my argument will focus on Rawls, and, to a lesser extent, on other 
modem social contract thinkers. ... [W]hatever the subtleties and complexities of each 
individual thinker, the tradition has bequeathed to us a general image of society as a 
contract for mutual advantage (people getting something by living together that they could 
not get each on their own) among people who are "free, equal, and independent." It is this 
idea, deeply embedded in our political culture, that will be the target of my scrutiny 
OSfussbaum, 2006:13-14). 
Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice 
Purpose 
This chapter presents an overview of the capabilities approach. It outlines 
the core problem that the approach addresses to, and shows how the approach 
attempts to solve the problem. 
2. The overview of the capabilities approach provides a background for the 
arguments on the tensions between the principle of social justice of the capabilities 
approach (the Principle) and compassion as the account of motivation of the 




3. An important problem that the capabilities approach addresses to is the 
problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators from social justice (the Problem) in 
social contracts theories. I will elaborate Nussbaum's understanding of the Problem 
and its implications in Part I. 
4. The capabilities approach, as Nussbaum claims, does not have the Problem 
because the unqualified cooperators are included in the distributive scheme when the 
Principle formulates. Nussbaum's justifications on this and how the Principle 
considers the well beings of unqualified cooperators will be elaborated in Part II. 
5. Compassion is the account of motivation in justifying the Principle. 
Reasonable and rational beings are said to be effectively motivated to accept the 
Principle because they are compassionate with others. The Principle, in retum, guides 
their actions. Thus, a mutually supportive relation is established between 




6. In Part I, I shall define the problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators 
from social justice (the Problem) in social contracts theories, and elaborate why 
Nussbaum takes the exclusion as a problem. 
Definition 
7. The Problem is defined as follows: 
In social contracts theories, some members of the society (= participants in 
social cooperation) are not entitled to equal social justice due to their 
inabilities to make contribution to the social cooperation in terms of 
realizing the goal of participating in social cooperation. 
8. For example, if the goal of participating in social cooperation is to produce 
economic benefits as many as possible, the members of society who are 
economic-unproductive are not entitled to equal social justice because they cannot 
contribute to produce economic benefits. 
9. There are three premises of the Problem. They include: 
P1 Society is understood as a system of social cooperation. 
17 
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P2 Cooperative members have goal(s) to participate in society. 
P3 Social justice is an issue of guidance concerned with fair distribution of 
resources resulted from social cooperation. 
P1 Society as a system of fair social cooperation 
10. Following Rawls' theory of socialjustice, society is understood as a system 
of fair social cooperation in the capabilities approach fNfussbaum, 2006:89). Society 
as a system of fair social cooperation has the following elements (Rawls, 1996:16): 
(i) Society as cooperation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures 
that those cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct. 
(ii) Society as cooperation involves fair terms of cooperation specified by an idea of 
reciprocity, and each participant may reasonably accept these terms provided 
that everyone else likewise accepts them. 
(iii) Participants entering social cooperation are trying to achieve their rational 
advantage or good. 
In other words, society as a system of fair social cooperation is guided by the 
principle of social justice that every participant should accept and comply with. 
These principles are reciprocal in nature. Participants enter social cooperation 
because they want to be better-off and nevertheless they accept the constraints 
imposed by the principle of socialjustice. 
18 
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11. Rawls understands society as social cooperation consistently from A Theory 
of Justice {TJ) to Political Liberalism (PL) and Justice as Fairness: A restatement 
(JAF) despite the changes on wordings from "mutual advantage" to "reciprocity" as 
the description of social cooperation/ 
12. Society as social cooperation remains unchanged although there are 
changes of description of social cooperation. Rawls is reluctant to use the words 
"mutual advantage" in his later works because it sounds like that people as rational 
egoists choose to enter social cooperation simply for improving their narrow self 
interests by bargaining with each other (Barry, 1989:6; Rawls, 1996:17), he 
emphasizes in PL and JAF that the idea of society should be understood as a fair 
system of cooperation and the members are in a reciprocal relation (Rawls, 
1996:15-18, 2001:5-8).2 As Rawls says mPL and JAF, 
Cooperation involves the idea or fair terms of cooperation: these are terms that each 
1 In TJ, Rawls takes society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. As he says, 
… [ A ] society is a more or less sufficient association of persons who in their 
relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for 
the most part act in accordance with them. Suppose further that these rules specify a 
system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those taking part in it. Then 
although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically 
marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. ... A set of principles is 
required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this 
division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive 
shares (Rawls, 1999:4). 
2 Rawls also emphasizes this reciprocal relation in his papers, cf. Rawls, 1980:316, 1985:396, 
1997:578. ‘ 
19 
participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair 
terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity: all who are engaged in cooperation 
and who do their part as the rules and procedure require, are to benefit in an appropriate 
way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison (Rawls, 1996:16, emphasis 
added). 
The idea of cooperation includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms 
each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided that 
everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of social cooperation specify an idea of 
reciprocity or mutuality, all who do their part as the recognized rules require are to benefit 
as specified by a public and agreed-upon standard (Rawls, 2001:6, emphasis added) 
13. Reciprocity in this context is taken as a notion between the notions of 
altruism and self-interest (Rawls, 1996:54). An altruistic act is an action which we 
act solely for the interest of others, and a self-interested act is an action moved by the 
agent's own ends and affections alone. Reciprocity is the notion between these 
notions on the same spectrum: if we act reciprocally, on one hand we pursue our own 
rational advantages (Rawls, 1996:16, 2001:6) and on the other hand we constrain our 
pursuits by "public and agreed-upon standard" in the principles of justice. The 
"public and agreed-upon standard" is defined by moral commitments in public 
political culture (Rawls, 2001:26-27). 
P2 Goal of Participating in Society 
14. If society is taken as social cooperation, P2 is true because the purpose of 
cooperation is reciprocity. This entails that participants want to achieve some 
desirable goals. These goals give motive to participate. 
20 
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15. Cooperation means that the participants in the interactions have their own 
aims and strategy, and they were supposed to choose and implement their action 
jointly (Dixit and Malebuff, 1991:199, 223).^ Each actor bases on his information of 
other actors, including their possible knowledge, sets of preferences and possible 
actions etc, to decide his own actions and reactions. Thus, cooperation concerns 
inter-actions but not aggregation of independent actions. 
16. Cooperation exists only if the goal of participating in cooperation exists. 
Cooperation is the only way or better way that we can achieve our goal. When we 
find that it is more costly, difficult or impossible to achieve our goals alone, we have 
prima facie reason to cooperate with others. 
17. This situation is the same in social cooperation. As Rawls says in TJ, 
There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all 
than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. (Rawls, 1999:4，109) 
18. The goal of participating in social cooperation {the GoaP) exists in 
Humean-Rawlsian circumstance of justice {HCOJ). Circumstances of justice are the 
3 Acting jointly does not imply acting in the same way as participants may act complementarily 
when they aware others' possible actions. 
21 
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"normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary" 
(Hume, 1978:493-495; Rawls, 1999:109). HCOJ is a situation with moderate scarcity 
of different resources covering a wide range of situation (Rawls 1999:110), that is, 
neither abundant or extreme poverty of resources. If resources are abundant to such 
extent that you can get whatever you want, there is no reason for you to cooperate 
with others for more resources. If there is too less resources, it seems that you will 
take away others' shares instead of cooperating with them. HCOJ, on contrary, 
allows room for each participant to be better-off when they choose to cooperate. It is 
possible for rational being to have the Goal. 
P3 Social justice as Guidance of Social Cooperation 
19. Every participant wants to benefit from social cooperation but the social 
cooperation per se does not guarantee who will get what and how much. Therefore, 
principle as guidance on (re)distribution of social resources in social cooperation is 
required and finding the principle is an issue of socialjustice. 
20. Following Rawls, the issue of social justice is understood as the problem of 
finding principles: 
(fl) assigning rights and duties 
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(sl) in the basic institutions of society and 
(f2) defining the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens 
(s2) of social cooperation (Rawls, 1999:4). 
21. (fl) and (f2) are the functions ofjustice, that is, howjustice is useful to the 
social cooperators. (sl) is the site of justice, that is, where the principles of justice 
apply (Cohen, 2000:122). (s2) is the conception of society, that is, how we 
understand what society is. 
22. The three premises are not beyond doubt but they are indispensible to 
understand the Problem. I shall demonstrate the indispensability by elaborating the 
source of the Problem. 
« 
The Problem 
23. The problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators from social justice {the 
Problem) exists when not all beings are qualified to participate in social cooperation 
due to their inabilities. The Problem concems who are qualified to participate in 




24. "Qualified cooperator" means a party who is suitable to cooperate with 
for realizing the goal of participation. On the contrary, "unqualified cooperator" is an 
unsuitable party. 
25. Rational participants would select the qualified cooperators as their 
^ 
potential partners because being better-off is the goal. There are two possible sets of 
criteria of selection, varying in different practices of cooperation. They are 
effectiveness and relation. 
26. We use capacity to distinguish between effective and ineffective cooperator. 
"Effective candidate" mean the candidate who is capable of cooperating with others 
and making others easier or better to realize their goals of participating in 
cooperation. For example, if we want to win a relay race, we should choose the 
fastest partners. A lamed person, unfortunately, is classified as ineffective cooperator 
in this case. 
27. We can also use relation between cooperators to distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate cooperator in positive or negative sense. 
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28. If a relation is positive, it means that having a relation is a sufficient reason 
for an agent to "cooperate" with someone who is not able to cooperate in ordinary 
sense. For example, serious disabled people are also included in social "cooperation" 
in some humanitarian theories of justice even if they are not able to act, like a 
permanent vegetable. This is not cooperation in ordinary sense because if they are 
not able to act, it implies that they are unable to actjointly by definition. However, as 
a member of the species homo sapiens he is qualified to be included in social 
cooperation. Thus, “he is a member of our specie" is a sufficient reason to include 
him in the social ‘‘cooperation.” 
29. If a relation is negative, it means that it is an obstacle for cooperation to 
emerge. For instance, when there is conflict of interests between two beings because 
of their present positions, the cooperation between them will not be emerged even if 
they can be better off (in terms of other interests that are not conflicting) when they 
cooperate. 
30. It is nearly inevitable that there are some human beings who are unqualified 
to cooperate with others in social cooperation as a result of lacking in capabilities. 
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For example, the human beings who are physically and/or mentally disable are not 
possible to contribute to social cooperation when the goal is to produce something 
benefiting other human beings. As a result, they are excluded from social 
cooperation. 
Implications 
31. The exclusion from social cooperation implies the exclusion from social 
justice. Since the subject of social justice is about how to assign the rights and duties, 
burdens and benefits in social cooperation (Rawls, 1999:4), a qualified cooperator is 
also a being entitled to social justice, vice versa. Thus, if some beings are unqualified 
cooperators in social cooperation, they are also unqualified to be entitled to social 
justice. 
32. The exclusion from social justice also implies the exclusion from the stage 
of formulating the principle of social justice. Being entitled to social justice is the 
necessary and sufficient condition to participate in formulating principles of social 
justice in social contract theories. This is because the principles are the object of 
original agreement of those who is entitled to social justice (Rawls, 1999:10). As a 
principle of social justice is formulated by those engaged in social cooperation only, 
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and the necessary and sufficient condition of engaging in social cooperation is to be a 
qualified cooperator, a principle of social justice is formulated by qualified 
cooperators only. 
33. The outcome of exclusion is in practice nearly inevitable because there is 
usually someone who is classified as unqualified in the process of selection. 
Although in selection we aim to choose qualified but not to exclude candidates in the 
pool primarily, excluding the unqualified is almost an inevitable result. This is 
because in principle it is possible that all candidates are qualified and as a result no 
one is excluded. In practice, however, classification of the unqualified is usually 
inevitable as not all candidates in the pool are who we want. As the outcome of 
exclusion almost inevitable, if this is a problem, this is because someone, who is 
supposed to be qualified, is weeded out in social contract theories. 
34. The beings weeded out are those who are economic-unproductive thus 
unable to contributed to the goal of participating in social cooperation {the GoaV). 
These beings may include human beings with impairments and disabilities, human 
beings in other poor nations, and animals P^ussbaum, 2006: 103-104, 249-250, 
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333-335).4 Although there may be other reasons that these beings are regarded as 
unqualified, being economic-unproductive is a sufficient reason to exclude them. The 
problem, as I will explain in Part II, is these beings, who are usually taken as the 
least advantaged, are being excluded from social justice. 
35. The exclusion is not just intuitively unappealing. For Nussbaum, it is 
problematic because the reason of exclusion is based on wrong understanding of the 
goal in mutual advantage in narrow economic terms. Her criticism and solution 
4 As Nussbaum says, 
In both the egoistic and the moralized versions of the social contract, though, the 
idea that the parties are roughly equal in power and capacity plays a very important 
structural role in setting up the bargaining situation. ... [T]he idea is that people will 
get together with others and contract for basic political principles only in certain 
circumstances, circumstances in which they can expect mutual benefit and in which 
all stand to gain from the cooperation. To include in the initial situation people who 
are unusually expensive or who can be expected to contribute far less than most to 
the well being of the group would run contrary to the logic of the whole exercise 
G^Tussbaum, 2006:103-104). 
Either Rawls will have to admit that the principles and the circumstances that bring 
society together to form a second-stage contract are very different from the Humean 
Circumstances of Justice, with their focus on rough equality and mutual advantage, 
or he will stand firm on those conditions. ... If, on the other hand, Rawls stands firm 
with Hume and with classical social contract doctrine, then he ought to say that 
India, Bangladesh, Turkey, and South Africa do not belong in the second-stage 
contract, much though his other criteria tell in favor of their inclusion. They are just 
too poor for richer nations to gain anything form treating them as rough equals 
OSfussbaum, 2006:249-250). 
In a very basic way, the whole idea of a contract involving both humans and 
non-humans is fantastic, suggesting no clear scenario that would assist our 
thinking. ... [T]he asymmetry of power between humans and nonhuman animals is 
too great to imagine any contract we might make with them as a real contract. 
Certainly, we cannot imagine that the contract would actually be for mutual 
advantage: for if we want to protect ourselves from the incursions of threatening 
animals we can just kill them, as we do. ... [T]his asymmetry power means that 
human seeking to make a contract for mutual advantage will simply omit them, as 




provided will be outlined in Part IL^ 
5 The criticisms of inadequacy of Rawls' theory to deal with those who have serious mental 
or/and physically disabilities can also be found in Kittay, 1997 and 1997a; Nussbaum, 2003:512-514. 
Arrow (1973)，Daniel (2003:256-259) and Sen (1995:28-29) also point out the problem of 
measurement of the least advantaged (cf. Hurley, 2003:133-145 on luck neutralizing approaches of 




36. In Part I, I have discussed what the Problem is and who are excluded from 
social cooperation. In this part, I shall elaborate why Nussbaum believes that the 
exclusion is a problem, and how the capabilities approach can solve the problem. 
Exclusion as a Problem 
37. Nussbaum's complaint is that social contract theorists, including Rawls, 
take the Goal as mutual advantage in a narrow economic sense only. That is, a 
cooperator is qualified only if he can make others better-off in terms of economic 
benefits. As a result, the unproductive beings in economic sense are classified as 
unqualified cooperator, and they are excluded from social justice. 
38. Nussbaum argues that Rawls faces the Problem when he perceives the 
goodness of people in terms of their rational plans of life?, and the Goal is to make 
6 Nussbaum makes this claim explicitly in the first chapter ofher Frontiers of Justice: 
The critical part of my argument will focus on Rawls, and, to a lesser extent, on 
other modem social contract thinkers. ... [W]hatever the subtleties and complexities 
of each individual thinker, the tradition has bequeathed to us a general image of 
society as a contract for mutual advantage (people getting something by living 
together that they could not get each on their own) among people who are "free, 
equal, and independent." It is this idea, deeply embedded in our political culture, 
that will be the target of my scrutiny CNussbaum, 2006:13-14). 
7 As Rawls says, 
[A] person's good is determined by what is for him the most rational long-term plan 
of life given reasonably favorable circumstances. A man is happy when he is more 
or less successfully in the way of carrying out this plan. To put it briefly, the good is 
the satisfaction of rational desire (Rawls, 1999:79-80). 
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them become better off in terms of the goodness mentioned. 
39. We need to have better means to realize our rational plans of life. The means 
are what Rawls called "primary (social) goods." They are necessary for all kinds of 
plans of life, including rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth, 
o 
and a sense of one's own worth (Rawls, 1999: 79). 
40. The Goal, therefore, is to produce and distribute the primary (social) goods 
among us for realizing our rational plans of life in a better way together. When we 
enter the social cooperation, we actjointly to produce these goods. And we share the 
products of our efforts to other cooperators. As a result, we will be better off as we 
can better realize our rational plans oflife. 
41. The primary (social) goods can be understood as economic as the existence 
of the goods involves labor. We need to produce and ensure these certain capabilities 
are effective. Some of them are produced only when we are productive, like income 
Q 
As Rawls says, 
[P]rimary goods •.. are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever 
else he wants. Regardless of what an individual's rational plans are in details, it is 
assumed that there are various things which he would prefer more of rather than less. 
With more of these goods men can generally be assured of greater success in 
carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends may 
be (Rawls, 1999:79). 
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and wealth; and some of them are effective only when all of us comply with the 
social and political institutions, for example, we respect and do not violate others' 
rights protecting their liberties and opportunities. 
42. The unqualified cooperators, however, are unable to produce the primary 
(social) goods. To ensure the effectiveness of the goods, many disabled people can 
contribute unless they violate others' right unintentionally, for example some 
mentally disordered people cannot control themselves and harm others. Many 
disabled people, however, cannot contribute to produce the goods because they are 
unable to participate in economic activities. The unqualified cooperators, we can say, 
are unproductive in term of primary (social) goods. 
43. As the Goal is defined in this way, some unproductive members, no matter 
whether they are persons or not, should be excluded from social cooperation and/or 
in the state of formulating the principle of socialjustice.^ 
9 As Nussbaum says, 
Here we can see the naked face of the contract idea. Moralize the starting point as 
we may, the bottom line is that the whole point of departing from the state of nature 
is to reap benefits from mutual cooperation, and the benefits are defined by all such 
theorists in a quite familiar economic way. Such a picture of cooperation is 
intimately linked to the idea that we must restrict the initial group of bargainers to 
those who have "normal" productive capacities CNussbaum, 2007:118-119). 
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44. The implication of exclusion of these unqualified cooperators, however, is 
not that their well beings would not be affected by the principle of socialjustice. 
(i) First, it is possible for these unqualified cooperators to be influenced by a 
principle of social justice even if they do not formulate it, for example animals, 
well beings are affected when they are treated as parts of natural resources in a 
principle of socialjustice. 
(ii) Second, being excluded from social justice does not imply being harmed or 
ignored. Even though unqualified cooperators are not entitled to equal social 
justice, their well beings may be considered for other reasons, for example 
distant strangers' well beings can be considered in the name of humanitarian 
reasons. 
45. If the exclusion is a problem, it is not because the well beings of the 
unqualified cooperators have not been considered but because of other reasons. 
46. For Nussbaum, the exclusion of the unqualified cooperators is a problem 
because these beings should be included at the stage of formulating the principle of 
socialjustice. As Nussbaum says, 
...[T]he omission of people with disabilities from the initial choice of political principles 
has large consequences for their equal citizenship more generally, through the structure 
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that is characteristic of social contract theories. ... Even if their interests can be taken into 
account deliberatively or at a later stage, we naturally wonder why this postponement is 
necessary, and whether it is not likely to affect the fully equal treatment of such citizens -
even if it is not in and of itself a form of unequal treatment (Nussbaum, 2006:18, emphasis 
added). 
In other words, the disabled persons are fellow citizens among us and we should treat 
them as equals. They should be taken as qualified cooperators in the beginning. 
47. The inclusion presumes other conceptions of qualified cooperators and 
goodness. The participants, regardless of their economic productivity, can be 
benefited from cooperating with those who are classified as unproductive in social 
contract theories. These conceptions are reciprocity between cooperators in complex 
form and Aristotelian conception ofhuman goodness which I will explain. 
48. For Nussbaum, mutual advantage or reciprocity should be understood in a 
complex form (Nussbaum, 2006:133-134). Even if the disabled are unproductive, it 
does not imply that we are not beneficial when we interact with them in social 
cooperation. Our life is enriched when we interact with them, like we can leam how 
to care others and respect others' dignity. These non-economic retums are important 
for us to have our good life and it worth treating the disabled as cooperators of social 
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49. The non-economic retums presume a conception ofhuman goodness which 
is different from social contract theories. Following Aristotle, Nussbaum presumes 
that human are social and political animals and we cannot have a good life without 
interacting with others in social and political spheres. As Nussbaum says, 
[T]he capabilities approach ... uses a political conception of the person that views the 
person, with Aristotle, as a political and social animal, who seek a good that is social 
through and through, and who shares complex ends with others at many levels. The good 
of others is not just a constraint on this person，s pursuit of her own good; it is part of her 
good. ... The person leaves the state of nature ... not because it is more mutually 
advantageous to make a deal with others, but because she cannot imagine living well 
without shared ends and a shared life. Living with and toward others, with both 
benevolence and justice, is part of the shared public conception of the person that all 
affirm for political purposes (Nussbaum, 2006:158, emphasis added). 
The core idea is that of that human being as a dignified free being who sharps his or her 
own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or 
pushed around by the world in the manner of a "flock" or "herd" animal. A life that is 
really human is one that is shaped throughout by these human powers of practical reason 
and sociability CNussbaum, 2000:72, emphasis added). 
1° As Nussbaum says, 
The question seems to be the wrong one to start from, and the wrong account of the 
primary basis for social cooperation. ... It includes, in the &st instance, what John 
Stuart Mill called "the advantage ofhaving one of the most universal and pervading 
of all human relations regulated by justice instead of injustice" - only here we are 
taUcing not about marriage and the family, as Mill was, but about the relation of care 
in which all human beings in some ways, at some times, and to some degree stand. 
It includes, that is, the advantage of respecting the dignity of people with mental 
disabilities and developing their human potential, whether or not this potentiality is 
socially "useful" in the narrower sense. ... It includes new insight about the dignity 
of the aging and of ourselves as we age. And of course it includes the value of all 
the aforementioned interactions and relationships for people with mental disabilities 
themselves, who without special social support would live, as they once did, 
isolated and stigmatized lives CNussbaum, 2006:129). 
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In other words, to pursue our goodness, we do not simply acquire the economic 
benefits as many as possible. Instead we must engage in our community and pursue 
the shared ends and lead a shared life with others. Even if these beings are 
unproductive, we cannot live a good life if we do not live with them. This is 
because we are social and political animals. Thus, for our goodness, we should take 
care of them and provide some conditions for them to participate in social 
interactions. 
50. The inclusion of the unproductive beings requires modification of the 
goods for distribution (= what is (re)distributed in a principle of social justice). We 
should ensure that the unproductive canjoin our social interaction and we show our 
caring and respects to them as ends. Thus, we should provide certain conditions to 
ensure that they acquire capabilities for social interaction and lead their lives. The 
provision of these necessary capabilities should be included in the principle of social 
justice. 
51. As a result, the principle of social justice will be different from that of 
social contract theories when the unproductive are included. As social contract 
theories are formulated by the economic-productive one, they may not suit the need 
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of the unproductive. Another conception of social justice should be provided. The 
principle of social justice of Nussbaum's capabilities approach, on the other hand, is 
suitable for productive and unproductive. 
Capabilities Approach 
52., Capabilities approach is a theory of social justice focusing on central 
human capabilities as the goods of distribution and its principle of social justice is 
applicable to at least all human beings." 
53. “Human capabilities" is defined as “what people are actually able to do and 
to be (Nussbaum, 2000:5, 2006:70).，，By human capability we refer to the ability that 
a human has, for instance, we are able to speak due to our faculty. By functioning we 
refer to the activation of the ability, for example, speaking is functioning the ability 
of speaking. An example is the difference between an incommunicative person and a 
mute. The former is the one who have the capability of speaking but do not or 
11 Nussbaum agrees that the present capabilities approach cannot solve the problem of social 
justice concerning nonhuman animals but it has potential to do so. As she says, 
Doing justice to the claims of nonhuman animals requires major further 
development of the approach, but I shall argue that an approach basically 
Aristotelian in spirit is well placed to give good guidance in this area, and guidance 
better than that supplied by either Kantian or Utilitarian approaches. The approach is 
animated by the Aristotelian sense that there is something wonderfiil and worthy of 
awe in any complex natural organism — and so it is all ready, in that spirit, to accord 
respect to animals and recognize their dignity CNussbaum, 2006:93-94). 
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seldom function it. The latter is the one who do not have the capability of speaking. 
We can have a capability without functioning it, not vice versa. 
54. The capabilities approach focuses on capabilities but not functioning. The 
principle of social justice of the capabilities approach (the Principle) is to ensure 
that the subjects that the Principle is applied to (Subjects) can acquire certain 
capabilities. In other words, the central human capabilities are taken as the basic 
entitlements of all Subjects. However, they should have opportunities to choose 
1 o 
whether these capabilities function or not in their life projects. 
55. The reason of focusing on capabilities instead of functioning is that we 
should respect the autonomy of the Subjects, that is, we should let them choose their 
own lives. ^^  We should provide or guarantee that they have certain human 
capabilities as the necessary conditions for proper functioning. Whether the Subjects 
12 As Nussbaum says, 
Where adult citizens are concerned, capability, not functioning, is the appropriate 
political goal. ... Citizens must be left free to determine their own course after that. 
CNussbaum, 2000:87, emphasis in original) 
13 As Nussbaum says, 
The reason for proceeding in this way, is, quite simply, the respect we have for 
people and their choices. Even when we feel confident that we know that what a 
flourishing life is, and that a particular function plays an important role in it, we do 
not respect people when we dragoon them into this functioning. We set the stage and, 
as fellow citizens, present whatever arguments we have in favor of a given choices; 
then the choice is up to them (Nussbaum, 2000:88). 
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will function the capabilities is subjected to their plans oflife. 
56. Not all but central human capabilities are taken as the goods of distribution 
in the capabilities approach. There are two senses of centrality of the human 
capabilities chosen, one is importance and one is universality. 
57. First, some human capabilities are central in the sense that a life without 
these capabilities is a life without human dignity (Nussbaum, 2000;71, 2006:75). In 
other words, having these capabilities are important to lead a dignified life. And to 
define what human dignity is, it is necessary to refer to a conception of person. Here 
we can see the relation between the notion of central human capabilities and 
Nussbaum's Aristotelian conception of person as social and political animals. The 
central human capabilities are the necessary means for the Subjects to realize a 
dignified life justified by an Aristotelian interpretation of person and human dignity. 
Although the content of the central human capabilities list is subjected to revision 
and it may not exhaust all important political values fNussbaum, 2006:75-76), the 
principle to guide the formulation of the list is not doubted based on the idea of 
Aristotelian conception of person and its implications on a dignified life." 
14 The list of ten central human capabilities in the Frontier of Justice includes life, bodily health, 
bodily integrity, sense, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, ability to live 
with concem for and in relation to other species, and control over one's environment (Nussbaum, 
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58. Second, some human capabilities are central in the sense that these 
capabilities can be the object of an overlapping consensus among people who 
otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the good. In other words, 
protecting these capabilities is universally accepted in our political agreement. They 
can be served as the basis of agreement because these capabilities are important in all 
kinds of life fNussbaum, 2000:74). Although the justifications of the importance of 
these capabilities are based on an Aristotelian conception of person and human 
dignity, it does not imply that Nussbaum's capabilities approach is not free of any 
specific metaphysical grounding fMussbaum, 2000:5). Instead for Nussbaum these 
capabilities can generate consensus in a broad cross-cultural background and in a 
pluralistic society fNussbaum, 2000:74-75). Although the significance of central 
human capabilities is justified by an Aristotelian account of person, the significance 
can also be acceptable by those who do not share this account of person fNfussbaum, 
1993:260-266; 2000:76). They can provide their own interpretations, nevertheless 
they can agree that these capabilities are significant for a dignified life. 




justice is applied to all human beings, regardless the beings are productive or not. 
Thus, all human beings are the Subjects, and the goods of distribution served as the 
basic entitlements are important and acceptable to all of them. As a result, no one is 
excluded from social justice due to their inabilities. 
Implication 
60. As the number of Subjects of the capabilities approach is increased, a 
corresponding account of motivation is required to show it is reasonable for the 
Subjects to endorse the principle of social justice of the capabilities approach. This is 
because it is uncertain whether the goods produced by interacting with the 
unproductive beings are sufficient to motivate people to accept and comply with the 
Principle that requires us to provide/ensure the central human capabilities for the 
unproductive. Using cost and benefit analysis, it seems costly for rational people to 
provide the central human capabilities to all Subjects for having the goods when we 
interact with them. Thus, a more convincing account of motivation in justifying the 
Principle is required” 
15 As Nussbaum says, 
Clearly it is more demanding to build strong benevolence and a commitment to 
justice into the foundations of a theory of than to remain agnostic about these 
matters. Rawls is correct on this point. But if the weaker assumptions do not handle 
the problem, we need stronger assumptions CNussbaum, 2006:159). 
In brief, as the content of "mutual advantage" is extended to non-economic terms, the original 
account ofmotivation adopted in social contract theories is no longer sufficient to sustain the modified 
principle. As a result, a new account of motivation is adopted. 
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61. The account of motivation provided in the capabilities approach is 
compassion. That is, if we are compassionate with other Subjects, it is reasonable to 
claim that we should accept and comply with the Principle. I will elaborate 




62. In Part III’ I will elaborate Nussbaum's understanding of compassion as 
the account of motivation {Compassion) and its justificatory role in the capabilities 
approach. 
Emotion 
63. Nussbaum explains that compassion, as one kind of emotion, can be 
understood in a cognitive-evaluative view. 
64. Nussbaum analyses all kinds of emotions, including compassion in a 
cognitive-evaluative view.^^ Accordingly, to have emotion of an object, we must 
have "the thought of an object" (cognitive) and "thought of the object's salience or 
importance" (evaluative)." That is, when we say ‘agent X has emotion Z,, it means 
16 As Nussbaum says, 
•.. I shall argue that emotions always involve thought of an object combined with 
thought of the object's salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve 
appraisal or evaluation. I shall therefore refer to my view as a type of 
‘cognitive-evaluative view, and sometimes, briefly, as type of 'cognitive' view. But 
by 'cognitive' I mean nothing more than 'concerned with receiving and processing.' 
I do not mean to imply the presence of elaborate calculation, of computation, or 
even of reflexive self-awareness CNussbaum, 2001:23). 
17 The object of emotions is intentional object (Solomon, 1984:59-63), that is, the object which a 
mental state or its expression is about (Blackbum 2005:188). In other words, an intentional object is 
the intention or object of propositional attitudes or acts (Grayling, 1997:15), for instance, when we say 
'thinM)elieve/consider/guess/wish' about 'something', the 'something' is an intentional object. 
The object of emotions as an intentional object is not necessarily the object exists in reality 
although it may have basis in reality. Unlike ‘an apple tree over there,，the object of emotions is never 
simply an object in the world or reality. And it is possible that the object of emotions is not an object 




Agent X has thought(s) of an object Y of emotion Z, and he thinks an object Y is 
important in some senses and to some ex t en t , 
65. 'Thought of an object of emotion’ means that when someone has emotions, 
it embodies ‘not simply ways of seeing an objects, but beliefs — often very complex -
about the object (Nussbaum, 2001:28).' That is, we do not simply accept the 
appearance ofan object passively. Instead we judge whether we should accept, reject 
or make no judgment on the appearance as being the things are (Nussbaum, 2001:37). 
To put it simple, when we have emotion of X, we do not simply see X as Y, we also 
believe X is Y. 
66. We can understand emotion as cognitive by using the concept of 
propositional perception. There are three modes of perception (‘what X sees') (Audi, 
2003:17). The first mode is simple perception, that is, what they perceive of an object 
(‘X sees an image，）. The second mode is objectual perception, that is, what they 
Thus, the object ofemotions is subjective because it is the object in our world ofexperience (Solomon 
1973:19). ‘ 
18 
The analysis of emotions does not imply that there is something common to all emotions. 
Instead different emotions are linked together under the concept of emotion by overlapping family 
resemblances (Gordon, 1999:259). That is, there is nothing common to all instances of the concept 
‘emotion，but 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing (Wittgenstein, 
2001:27).' Loosely speaking, what can be said is ‘common, between different emotions, as what the 
analysis indicates, is the framework used to understand what we mean when we say someone has one 
kind of emotion. 
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perceive an object to be (‘X sees an image, and X thinks the image is Y'). The third 
mode is propositional perception, that is, what they perceive an object as (X sees an 
image, and X thinks the image is Y, and Y has meaning to X due to X's beliefs). It is 
the third mode that Nussbaum concerns when she analyses emotions and she argues 
that it is not easy to separate ‘seeing X as Y' from 'believing X is Y.'^ ^ 
67. We can understand emotion as evaluative because emotions are concerned 
with value. When someone has certain emotions，he sees his object as invested with 
value or importance CNussbaum, 2001:30-31), for example i f X and Y see the same 
image Z, and the image have significant to X but not to Y, X will have emotion to Z 
and Y will not. 
68. For Nussbaum, the value or importance of objects of emotions is 
eudaimonistic. It means that objects appear "to make reference to the person's own 
19 For example, consider "We feel happy when we see a box with ribbon and an envelop is put on 
our table." In this case, the simple perception is "a box with ribbon and an envelop is put on our 
table,” the objectual perception is "a present with a card." These stages are in visual level. When we 
feel happy when we see "a present with a card," this is because we see and believe "someone send us 
a present with a card. Great!" This is propositional perception involving beliefs, and we will have 
entire different message if we hold another set ofbeliefs, for example "I wonder who left this stufFon 
my table" or "Oh no, my present to someone is failed to deliver and it retums." 
The example shows that the object of emotion as intentional object may be opaque. That is, 
these intentional objects are lacking in substitutivity of identity, which means that 'the substitution of 
a new singular term that names the same object leaves the predication true (Quine, 1960:143)., In the 
example mentioned, if we feel happy when we misbelieve "a box with ribbon and an envelop is put on 
our table" as "a present with a card" instead of "an undelivered present", it is right to say "we are 
happy with receiving a present with a card" but wrong to say "we are happy with receiving an 
undelivered present." This is because although the object that the intentional objects refer to is the 
same, the intentional objects and the emotions caused are different. 
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flourishing" and it is ‘seen as important for some role it plays in the person's own 
life O^ussbaum, 2001:30-31, emphasis in original).' Thus, an object of emotions is 
important to the subject in the sense that it is a significant part of your well being. 
69. There are two levels of importance of an object of emotions to a person's 
well being. First, the agent who thinks an object is important in the sense that he 
ascribes intrinsic values to it. Thus, he takes an object of emotions as an end instead 
of an instrument. Second, an object is important if it is valued as “constituents of a 
life that is my life and not someone else's, as my actions, as people who are in some 
relation with me (Nussbaum, 2001:32, emphasis added).,, Ifthe value ofthe object of 
emotions is eudaimonistic, it implies that the object is "important in my own 
conception of what it is for me to live well (Nussbaum, 2001:33).” 
70. Nussbaum uses the cognitive-evaluative framework to analyze 
compassion. 
Compassion 
71. Compassion is defined as ‘a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness 
of another person's undeserved misfortune 0^ussbaum, 2001:301).' This definition, 
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however, has yet to be complete in Nussbaum's cognitive-evaluative view of emotion 
as it indicates only the cognitive component, which is the awareness of another 
person's undeserved misfortune. The evaluative component, however, is missed but 
essential to Nussbaum's understanding of compassion?^ Thus, a complete definition 
of compassion should be: 
Agent X is compassionate with Y i f X believes Y is (1) suffering (2) undeservedly, and he 
thinks Y's undeserved suffering is (3) important to his well being in some sense and to 
some extent. 
72. From the definition of compassion, we can see that there are three 
/^  1 
components of compassion , including: 
(i) suffering22 
20 As Nussbaum says, 
… I shall insist that in love and compassion the object must ultimately be seen as a 
part ofthe person's own scheme of ends: a eudaimonistic judgment must ultimately 
be formed in order for the emotion to occur CNussbaum, 2001:55) 
21 By 'components' I simply mean ‘part of a whole., I do not mean that these components are 
distinct or separated from each others when we understand emotions because the relations between 
these components help us to distinguish one kind of emotion from the others. Thus, I do agree with 
Solomon's claim that 'it is so seriously wrong with the analysis of emotions into 'components' 
(Solomon, 1993:117)’ if 'components' mean distinct or separate parts o fa whole. 
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We should make a distinction between suffering and pain. 
These two concepts usually have the same meaning in our ordinary language. For instance, 
according to Oxford English Dictionary, suffering means ‘the bearing or undergoing ofpain, distress' 
or tribulation' or 'a painful condition.' And pain means ‘mental or physical or bodily suffering' or 'the 
state or condition ofconsciousness arising from mental or physical suffering.' 
However, it is better to draw a distinction between these concepts because we can say someone 
is painful but not suffered, for instance, a flagellant, and we can say someone who is suffered but not 
painful, for instance, a mentally handicapped child. 
There are two senses of the feeling of pain. The first sense is physical and the second sense is 
personalized. 
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(ii) the denial of desert and 
(iii) eudaimonistic judgment. 
73. Suffering and the denial of desert are cognitive requirements in the sense 
that you know or believe that the object has these properties when you are 
For the physical pain, I mean that the physiological pain and the psychogenic pain. The former 
is the pain in body and associated with tissue pathology (Cassell, 2004:262). The latter is the pain 
solely caused by psychological difficulties. (Cassell, 2004:262). These two senses of pain are 
classified as physical pain in the sense that these pains are sensation, that is, people can feel these 
pains. 
For the personalized pain, I mean the pains which are sensation originally but they are 
personalized according to our different beliefs of the meaning of pain. As Cassell says, 
The pain is personalized as all the aspects of the pain experience, including the pain 
itself, enter into the creation of meanings which, like all meanings, include not only 
the physical sensation (pain in this instance) but also emotion evoked, cognitive 
attempts to understand the significance of the pain, and ever transcendent thoughts 
such as pain as punishment (Cassell, 2004:267-268). 
In other words, the personalized pain is what we experience instead of what we feel. The 
difference between experience and feeling in this context is there are beliefs embedded in our 
experiences but not in our feelings. Thus, there are cognitive elements in our experience ofpain but 
not in our feeling of pain. These elements have impacts on our feeling. Cassell uses an example of 
wounded soldiers to illustrate this point: 
During the Second World War, Hemy Beecher, an anesthesiologist, observed that 
soldiers, who severe wounds promised the end of combat and retum home, seemed 
to experience less pain than men who knew that despite their wounds they would 
have to retum to combat. We know this now as the phenomenon of secondary gain. 
Secondary gain is an example of a shift in meaning (Cassell, 2004:267). 
In other words, the change of meaning of pain causes the change of the experience of pain. 
Although there is nothing changed physically and psychologically, we may 'feel' more or less painful 
ifthere is a change ofthe interpretation of the meaning of our pain. 
These two senses ofpain are usually the sources of suffering. For instance, a patient with cancer 
ofthe liver that had spread widely is suffered from his terribly pain undoubtedly. Also a soldier who 
has no hope to retum home also experience serious suffering from his wound and his despair 
seriously. 
However, it is obvious that many sufferings are not caused by pains. For instance, a person who 
lost his beloved parents is usually regarded as the one who is suffered. However, we can see that he is 
notpainfUl in any sense. He may be sad, despair, angry or grief etc. but there is no reason to say that 
he is painful. On the contrary, pain caused by delivery is undoubtedly one ofthe most painful feelings. 
However, we do not say mothers are suffered from deliver because in most case the birth ofher child 
is one of the happiest things for a mother. 
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compassionate with someone, and eudaimonistic judgment is the evaluative 
requirement in the sense that you evaluate the object of compassion as something 
significant to your life. 
Suffering 
74. Suffering, when applied to humans, is defined as: 
A human is suffered if and only if he is in a miserable situation and he feels suffered in 
normal condition. 
75. According to the ordinary usage of suffering, there are two dimensions of 
suffering. One is "objective" while another is psychological (Mayerfeld, 1999:11-16); 
and the definition above includes both dimensions. In the "objective" or 
obj ective-evaluative dimension, someone is suffered if and only i fhe is in a situation 
counted as calamity or misfortunate. It is objective because someone is in a 
miserable situation as a matter of fact; and it is evaluative because that the situation 
is evaluated as a situation of calamity or misfortunate. The psychological dimension 
of suffering is ‘a state of feeling bad overall, or disagreeable overall feeling 
(Mayerfeld 1999:14).'^^ A person has a state of feeling bad overall means after 
23 As Mayerfeld says, 
I specific overall feeling, because good and bad feelings may be experienced 
simultaneously, so that the presence of one or a few bad feelings does not indicate 
suffering ifthey are outweighed by positive feelings occurring at the same time, nor 
does the presence of one or a few good feelings indicate happiness if they are 
outweighed by simultaneous negative feelings (Mayerfeld, 1999:14-15) 
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weighting his feelings occurred, he feels bad. 
76. These two dimensions cannot be separated. If someone is in a miserable 
situation but he does not feel bad overall, or if someone is not in a miserable situation 
but he does feel bad overall, he is not counted as a sufferer. For example, a person, 
who feels despair because he has no idea what he eats today, should not be counted 
as suffering; and a very poor person, who can just maintain his basic human needs, 
sincerely believes that he lives happily should also not be counted as suffering. 
77. In the definition of suffering, normal condition means the condition without 
any abnormal obstacle for him to know his situation. The abnormal obstacles can be 
natural or artificial. 
78. An example ofhaving natural abnormal obstacle is a child who is bom to be 
mentally handicapped. He is a human lacking in normal intelligence. The standard of 
‘normal intelligence, is set by comparing with other children. Thus, lacking in 
normal intelligence means he has lower intelligence compared with other children. 
However, for gillyflowers, the lacking in intelligence to know their situations should 
not be regarded as abnormal obstacle because no gillyflower can have such capacity. 
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79. In addition, an example of having artificial abnormal obstacle is a person, 
becoming a permanent handicapped as a result of car accident, is lacking in normal 
intelligence. However, for a non-philosophical student who cannot understand 
Heidegger's Being and Time, he should not be regarded as having abnormal obstacle. 
80. The emphasis on "normal condition" is to avoid the exclusion of some 
situations which are usually counted as suffering. For instance, a permanent 
vegetable should be counted as a sufferer even if he is lacking in the psychological 
dimension of suffering. This is because he is lacking in the capacity to know to feel 
or know he is suffered; and a self-deceived person in a miserable situation should be 
also counted as suffering even if he deceives himself that he is not in a miserable 
situation. 
Denial of Desert 
81. As I shall go into details of the concept of desert in Chapter 2, the meaning 
of "the denial of desert" will be provided in this chapter briefly. 
82. "The denial of desert" is defined as “the occurrence or mode oftreatment is 
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not what a person or thing deserves in virtue of some fact about him or it (Sher, 
1987:7)" or "nonblameworthy" in Nussbaum's words?^ Thus, it includes un-desert, 
not desert and partly-desert. 
83. The denial of desert is a component of compassion in two senses. We are not 
compassionate with those who deserve to be suffered, and we will not compassionate 
with those who we make them suffer. As Nussbaum says, 
...[C]ompassion requires blamelessness not only on the part of its object, but also on the 
part of the onlooker. It would be simply hypocritical to weep over a plight that you 
yourselfhave caused. In other words, the onlooker has to see the disaster as falling on the 
person from outside, so to speak; and she will be unable to do this if she believes either 
that the person has caused it or that she herselfhas caused it. (Nussbaum, 2001:313). 
Eudaimonistic Judgment 
84. Eudaimonistic judgment means that we judge the object of compassion as 
invested with value or importance OSTussbaum, 2001:30). The value and importance 
of the object of compassion is based on our life projects, that is, the object is 
important to our lives?^ I will come back to the examination of eudaimonistic 
24 As Nussbaum says, 
Insofar as we do feel compassion, it is either because we believe the person to be 
without blame for her plight or because, though there is an element of fault, we 
believe that her suffering is out of proportion to the fault. Compassion, then 
addresses itself to the nonblameworthy increment C^ussbaum, 2001:311). 
25 As Nussbaum says, 
. . . [ I ]n order for compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering 
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judgment as a component of compassion in chapter 3. 
85. Each of these components is the necessary condition (and the combination 
of them is the necessary and sufficient condition) of being compassionate with 
someone (Nussbaum, 2001:304-327); and the variation of the degree of these 
components causes the variation of the degree of compassion.^^ 
Justificatory Role of Compassion 
86. Compassion plays a significant role injustify the Principle as reasonable and 
rational beings will accept the Principle when they are compassionate with the 
Subjects in the capabilities approach. I shall first explain what the justificatory role is 
and why compassion can play the role. 
ofanother as a significant part ofhis or her own scheme of goals and ends. She must 
take that person's ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make 
herself vulnerable in the person of another. It is that eudaimonistic judgment ... 
O^ussbaum, 2001:319, emphasis in original) 
26 The difference in the degree of compassion in the cognitive-evaluation view of compassion can 
be understood by the following equation : 
;7C=jcS+>^D+zE 
'C' stands for the degree of compassion, and 'S' stands for the degree of suffering, and 'D' 
stands for the degree of the denial of desert and 'E, stands for the degree of eudaimonistic judgment, 
'p, X, y, z' are values of these degrees. 
According to this equation, if there are differences in the values of 'x, y, z' in the judgments of 
an object made by two persons, there are also difference in the values of 'p'. 
And if either one of the values of x, y or z is zero or negative, the value of p must be zero or 
negative. That is, if when agentXjudge that (1) Y is not suffered, or (2) Y is suffered but he deserves 
it, or (3) Y is suffered undeservedly but he is indifferent to us, then X would not be compassionate 
withY. 
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87. By “justificatory role of compassion as motivation," it means that 
compassion as motivation is used to ensure the stability of a conception of social 
justice. The stability of a conception of social justice depends on a balance of 
motives of just and unjust actions when there is tension between them; and a 
conception of social justice is stable if and only if the former overrides the latter 
27 
(Rawls, 1999:398). In other word, when compassion plays a justificatory role in 
the capabilities approach, it means that reasonable and rational beings are motivated 
to accept the principle of social justice of the approach when they are compassionate 
with other Subj ects. 
88. An account of moral psychology of a conception of social justice is used to 
justify why the principle is accepted. An account of moral psychology illustrates why 
the principles of social justice is psychologically suited to human inclinations in the 
sense that it is good or desirable for citizens to apply and act upon such principles 
(Rawls, 1999:399). There are three parts in the account. The first part is to 
demonstrate the goodness of the principle, that is, why the principle is desirable to 
27 As Rawls says, a conception of (social) justice is stable if and only if: 
[W]hen institutions are just (as defined by this conception), those taking part in 
these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense ofjustice and desire to do their 
part in maintaining them (Rawls, 1999:398). 
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accept. The second part is to illustrate the possibility of acceptance of the principle to 
the Subject, that is, in addition to the goodness of the principle, why the Subject from 
the first person point of view should accept the principle. The third part is the 
connection between these parts, that is, if a Subject accepts a principle, this is 
because he recognizes the goodness of the principle per se and he inclines to accept 
the principle. 
89. , The desirability of a principle of social justice does not entail the inclination 
of a Subject to accept the principle, vice versa. As a principle of social justice, the 
principle is applied to all members in social cooperation and it (re)distributes benefits 
and burdens among them. If there is such a principle that (re)distribute benefits 
without burden, a thin account of motivation may be sufficient, for example persons 
incline to do what make him better off, or it is not necessary to argue for the 
desirability of a principle if a Subject inclines to accept regardless what its content is. 
These are, however, always not the case. Although the benefits (re)distributed 
according to the principle may be essential for all Subjects to lead a better life, the 
burdens that one owes to each other are nevertheless discouraging for a Subject to 
accept the principle. Thus, an account of human inclination is required to illustrate 
why a Subject should incline to accept the principle due to its desirability. 
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90. This is why Nussbaum tries to establish a reasonable political psychology in 
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the capabilities approach. To do so, Nussbaum adopts two approaches, one is to 
argue that the Principle is good for the Subjects, and the other is to argue if the 
Subjects are compassionate with others, they will be motivated to accept and comply 
with the Principle. 
91. Nussbaum tries to show how the capabilities listed can be the object of 
overlapping consensus for those who are compassionate when they leam the 
goodness of these capabilities?^ That is, if the Subjects know the central human 
28 
Nussbaum argues for the necessity of a reasonable political psychology in establishing an 
overlapping consensus. As Nussbaum says, 
In terms of contemporary philosophical categories, then, I shall be examining 
compassion in connection with a form of political liberalism, a political conception 
that attempts to win an overlapping consensus among citizens of many kinds, 
respecting the spaces within which they each elaborate and pursue their different 
reasonable conception of the good. Why should such a conception deal with 
emotions at all, it might be asked? The answer is, plainly, that any political 
conception needs to concem itself with citizens' motivations, both in order to ensure 
that the conception is feasible in the first place - does not impose impossible strains 
on human psychology - and also in order to ensure that it has a decent chance of 
being stable over time. It therefore needs a "reasonable political psychology," as 
Rawls says, one that is general enough to win broad approval and yet definite 
enough to assure us that our conception is not fatally flawed from the point of view 
ofhuman motivation. CNussbaum 2001:401-402, emphasis in original) 
We can see that there are two roles of the reasonable political psychology indeed. First, it 
establishes the overlapping consensus based on the shared account ofmotivation in thejustification' of 
the principle ofsocialjustice. Second, when the principle is applied, the account ofmotivation ensures 
the stability of social institutions guided by the principle. 
29 As Nussbaum says, 
...[T]he preference for the central human capabilities is not merely habitual or 
adaptive, but has much more the unidirectional structure of preferences formed by 
learning. ... [P]eople who once leam and experience these capabilities don't want to 
go back and one really can't make them go back. The delight and satisfaction that 
makes people unwilling to go backward is a very important sign that the conception 
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capabilities can help them to lead a dignified life, they “... don't want to go back and 
one really can't make them go back ... ^4ussbaum 2000:152-153).” In other words, 
the Subjects are delighted and satisfied with the goodness of the principle and they 
do not wish to accept the other institutions guided by a principle lacking in this 
goodness anymore. As a result, they will endorse the Principle and support the social 
institution guided by the Principle. 
92. The justification by goodness of the central human capabilities, however, is 
insufficient to show why the Subjects would endorse the Principle. This is because 
the Principle is applied to others as well, and they have to bear the corresponding 
costs. Thus, another approach of justification by describing the Subjects' moral 
psychology is required. 
93. For Nussbaum, compassion is an appropriate description of the Subjects' 
moral psychology for two reasons. One is negative on the false assumption ofmoral 
psychology of social contract theories, and the other is positive on the function of 
compassion injustifying the Principle. 
we are developing is likely to be a stable one, and that regimes that thwart central 
capabilities are likely to prove unstable. (Nussbaum 2000:152-153) 
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94. First, social contract theories are wrong in describing the Subjects' moral 
psychology. For theoretical parsimony, social contract theories omit the altruistic ties 
of citizens in the reality.^^ This is wrong because Subjects in social cooperation do 
not only care about their own interests, regardless their interests are "interests-in 
the-self' (that is, the interests which are egoistic) or 'interests of the self (that is, the 
interests concerning one self and they are not necessarily immoral and exclude the 
possibilities of being altruistic.) ^^  Instead the Subjects are also motivated to act 
according to the requirements of social justice or other moral/ altruistic reasons with 
o ^ 
referring to their interests. 
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As Nussbaum says, 
Hume's assessment of human beings is too bleak. Human beings are held together 
by many ties: by ties of love and compassion as well as ties of advantage, by the 
love of justice as well as the need for justice. Real people often attend to the needs 
of others in a way that is narrow or arbitrarily uneven. But education can do a great 
deal to make these ties deeper, more persuasive, and more evenhanded. ... [T]he 
changes we have seen in recent years toward the greater social inclusion ofpeople 
with impairments give us stronger evidence that the decent of human beings does 
aim at justice for its own sakes, frequently enough to make a large political 
difference CNussbaum 2006:157). 
31 For Rawls, pursuing "self-interest" as a goal of participating in social cooperation is 
"interest-of-a-self' but not "interest-in-the-self'. As Rawls says, 
[A]lthough the interests advanced by these plans are not assumed to be interests in 
the self, they are the interests of a self that regards its conception of the good as 
worthy of recognition and that advances claims in its behalf as deserving 
satisfaction (Rawls, 1999:110). 
For example on the distinction between these two types of interests is that ifbeing a moral saint 
is something good for an agent X, therefore X tries to be a moral saint. "The interest ofbeing a moral 
saint" is an interest of the selfbut not an interest in the self. As Rawls says, 
While these plans determine the aims and interest of a self, the aims and interest are 
not presumed to egoistic or selfish. Whether this is the case depends upon the kinds 
ofends which a person pursues. ... His dominant interests are in himself, not merely, 
as they must always be, interest of a self (Rawls, 1999:111). , 
In other words, having a conception of the good per se is non-moral. What is moral or 
immoral or amoral is the content of a conception ofthe good. 
32 As Nussbaum says, 
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95. Second, compassion can play the function of justifying the Principle. 
Subjects are motivated to accept and comply with the Principle because they are 
compassionate with others suffering from lacking in central human capabilities. The 
reasons are as follows: 
(i) Having the central human capabilities is the necessary condition of living a 
dignified life. 
(ii) For those who are lacking in these capabilities, they are suffered because they 
cannot live a dignified life. 
(iii) Assumed the sufferers do not deserve lacking in these capabilities, other 
Subjects would be compassionate with these sufferers; and 
(iv) These Subjects incline to do something to relieve others' sufferings because 
they are compassionate with these sufferers. 
(V) As the Principle would guarantee that every party can have these capabilities, 
accepting and complying with the Principle is a way to relieve sufferings caused 
by lacking in these capabilities. 
In the capabilities approach, the account of the benefits and aims of social 
cooperation is moralized, and socialized, from the very start. Although the approach 
does not employ a hypothetical initial situation, it envisages human beings as 
cooperating out a wide range of motives, including the love ofjustice itself, and 
prominently including a moralized compassion for those who have less than'they 
need to decent and dignified lives. CNussbaum, 2006:156-157) 
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(vi) As a result, compassionate Subjects incline to accept and comply with the 
Principle, ceteris paribus. 
96. The Principle provides the guidance on the Subjects' actions. The guidance 
is required to complement the insufficiency of compassion. As there is a diversity of 
understandings of the three components of compassion and different means to relieve 
others' sufferings, being compassionate (as a emotional status) alone cannot tell what 
a party should do exactly, and there is no guarantee that he would do in the right way 
(indeterminacy on right actions)(Nussbaum, 2006:91); and a Subject may be 
compassionate with someone but not others when he does not takes others as 
someone who is a significant part of his scheme of ends or goals even if he agrees 
that both of them are suffered and they do not deserve their suffering in the same 
degree (partiality of concems^^). 
33 The problem of partiality of compassion is defmed as the problem that we are not 
compassionate with beings A and B equally even if both of them are suffered undeservedly in the 
same degree. The reason is their sufferings are not important to us equally. 
To illustrate this problem, we can use the example provided by Goldie. As he says, 
If you judge that your son A is suffering and, separately, that B — 'an Indian or 
person wholly unknown to me', perhaps (Hume, Treatise, 416) — is suffering equally, 
presumably you will sympathize with A, your son, and be motivated accordingly. 
But even though you might sympathise with B to some extent, as a fellow human 
being, there is no requirement internal to the concept of sympathy that you 
sympathize equally with A and B or be just as motivated to help B as you are to help 
A. the partiality of our sympathies thus reflects the partiality of our wider 
dispositions of concem towards our nearest and dearest (Goldie, 2000:216, 
emphasis in original). 
In other words, the problem of partiality is a result of the uneven significances ofthe objects of 
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97. The indeterminacy and partiality of Compassion are complemented with the 
Principle when the Principle is taken as the guidance of action. When the Subjects 
are compassionate with sufferers and follow the guidance of Principle, they can be 
certain what they should do, that is, following the requirements of the Principle; and 
as the Principle is applied to all Subjects in social cooperation, they will be 
compassionate and be beneficial to all but not some sufferers only when they follow 
the Principle. 
98. In short, we can see Compassion and the Principle is mutually supportive in 
the capabilities approach. Compassion serves the justificatory role of the Principle in 
the sense that if the Subjects are compassionate with others, they would accept and 
comply with the Principle. And the Principle serves the role of guidance to the 
actions of Subjects as being compassionate alone may not make the Subjects act 
properly and impartially. 
compassion to us. Thus, to what extent someone's suffering is important to us partly determines to 




99. In this chapter, I have introduced the Problem that the capabilities approach 
addresses to and outline an overview of the capabilities approach. 
100. The Problem is some unproductive beings are unqualified to participate in 
social cooperation, and as a result, excluded from social justice in social contract 
theories. This is because social contract theories understand the goal of participating 
in social cooperation as mutual advantage in narrow economic terms. 
101. As an Aristotelian conception of person and goodness are adopted, the 
capabilities approach can include all unproductive beings, or at least all unproductive 
human beings, in the subjects of its Principle applied to. 
102. Compassion is the account of motivation of the capabilities approach in 
justifying its Principle due to the extended scope of the Subjects and more 
appropriate description of the Subjects' moral psychology. The Principle, in retum, 
provides the guidance on the Subjects' actions. As a result, a mutually supportive 




103. Instead of being mutually supportive, I will argue in chapter 2 and 3 that 
there are tensions between Compassion and the Principle. Thus, the mutually 
supportive relation does not exist under some circumstances. As a result, compassion 




1^^ Tension: Denial of Desert and the Principle 
The (capabilities) list shapes the judgment (of seriousness) in a particular way; for what it 
tells citizens is not only that certain calamities are particularly grave, but also that they are 
unjust, wrong. No citizen should have to suffer them, and all have a basic entitlement not 
to suffer them (Nussbaum, 2001:418). 
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals ofThoiight 
Purpose 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the tension between the denial of desert 
as a component ofcompassion and the Principle applied to all citizens (尸'Tension). 
2. I shall argue that there may be some subjects of the Principle applied to 
(=some citizens living in the social institution regulated by the Principle) who 
deserve to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities in some circumstances 
(D-Subjects), and other citizens would not be compassionate with D-Subjects, it is 
therefore unreasonable to expect that other citizens would be motivated to accept and 
comply with the principle of social justice of the capabilities approach {the 
Principle). Thus, in the cases of the existence of D-Subjects, taking compassion as 
the account of motivation of the capabilities approach {Compassion) will have 
tension with the Principle because citizen would not have sufficient motivation to 
accept and comply with the Principle applied to those who they would not be 
compassionate with. As a result, Compassion loses its justificatory role. 
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3. The crux of arguing for and against the tension between Compassion and the 
Principle is "which desert base is should be selected.，，That is, when we judge 
whether a Subject is D-Subject, the fundament question is according to what criterion 
we judge a Subject deserves to suffer. The criterion for judgment of desert is the 
desert base. I will argue there is no ground for the capabilities approach to eliminate 
the possibility of the existence of D-Subjects as long as there is no overriding desert 
base for or against the existence of D-Subjects, which means in some circumstance, 
some citizen deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities. As a result, 




4. In Part I，I will analyze the concept of desert and explain in what 
circumstances some Subjects prima facie deserve to suffer from lacking in central 
human capabilities (the existence of D-Subjects). In short, D-Subjects exist when 
they are retrospectively and morally responsible for their suffering. 
5. In Part II, I will demonstrate how the capabilities approach would respond 
to the problem of existence of D-Subjects. As the capabilities approach takes the 
central human capabilities as the basic entitlements of all Subjects, no Subject prima 
facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities (the impossibility 
of existence of D-Subject). 
6. In Part I and II, we can see there are two different sets of desert bases that 
can be adopted to argue for or against the existence ofD-Subjects. 
7. In Part III’ I shall argue that two approaches which aim to solve the 1^^ 
tension fail. 
(i) The first approach is to argue for the overridingess of a desert base. I shall argue 
66 
i 
that there is no ground to claim a desert base, regardless it is for or against the 
existence of D-Subjects is always overriding. It means it is unreasonable to 
claim that “all citizens deserve to suffer from lacking in central human 
capabilities in all circumstances'' or “all citizens deserve not to suffer from 
lacking in central human capabilities in all circumstances'' 
(ii) The second approach is to combine the two desert bases, which mentioned in 
Part I and II, generating opposite results. I shall argue we cannot combine the 
two desert bases. Thus, in some circumstances it is not unreasonable to claim 
that a Subject deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities and 





8. I will analyze the concept of desert in Part I, and show the possibility of 
existence ofD-Subjects. 
Definition 
9. The general form of the concept of desert is that “X deserves A in virtue of 
B" (Feinberg, 1963:73; Kleinig, 1971:84). 
(i) X is the subject deserving something (the deserving). 
(ii) A is the thing(s) that the deserving deserves (the deserved). 
(iii) B is the base(s) that the deserving (X) deserves the deserved (A) (the base(s) of 
desert) (Kleinig, 1971:85-89). In other word, the desert base is the criterion to 
judge whether a subject deserves something. 
10. The denial of desert means that “it is not the case ‘X deserves A in virtue of 
B，”. There are four possible forms of the denial of desert, including: 
(i) X is not the appropriate Subject deserving something or 
(ii) A is not the appropriate thing that X deserves or 
(iii) B is not the appropriate reason for X to deserve A or 
(iv) the hybrid form(s) of the possibilities mentioned. 
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11. "The denial of desert" has three senses in ordinary language, including 
un-desert, partly-desert and non-desert. 
(i) Un-desert means it is logically appropriate to claim that a Subject deserves A in 
virtue ofB; but there is no appropriate reason to claim that X deserves A. 
(ii) Partly-desert means it is logically appropriate to claim that a Subject deserves A 
in virtue ofB; but there is no sufficient reason to claim that X deserves A.i 
(iii) Non-desert means it is logically inappropriate to claim any Subject deserves A? 
12. I shall take the deserving (which is “some Subjects”）and the deserved 
(which is "suffering from lacking in central human capabilities") as constant because 
the primary aim of chapter 2 is to argue for the possibility of D-Subjects. The 
following arguments focus on whether there is any appropriate and sufficient desert 
base to claim that someone is a D-Subject. 
1 Assumed a student deserves to get a good grade if and only if in virtue of his industriousness, 
we can claim that: 
I f a student p cheats in the examination, he does not deserve to get a good grade, ceteris paribus. 
If a student q having studied three out of one thousand questions randomly before an 
examination, and fortunately only these three questions are examined, then he is partly deserved to get 
a good grade as a result of efforts and luck, ceteris paribus. 
2 For example, it is logically inappropriate to claim that the Big Bang deserves to happen. 
It does not mean that all events cannot be classified as the deserved, for instance, "Peters 





13. To consider what the appropriate and sufficient desert base(s) is, it is 
required to know what can be counted as an appropriate and sufficient desert base(s). 
14. In ordinary language, an appropriate base of desert usually refers to prior 
action(s) (including action of omission) or/and the characteristic(s) of a Subject 
deserving something.� For instance, a non-virtuous person should not deserve to be 
praised; and a person who did nothing particular (unintentionally) does not deserve 
gratitude (Feinberg, 1963:72). 
15. I will examine whether there is any prior action justifying the existence of 
D-Subjects as it is logically inappropriate to say that someone deserves to suffer from 
losing a capability in virtue of his characteristics primarily, for example, it is 
3 The dichotomy ofprior actions/characteristics sometimes is not so clear. For instance, we judge 
someone is good or bad by referring to his prior actions. Thus, if we say someone deserves to be 
praised because he is virtuous, we can also say someone deserves to be praised because he has done 
many good things (which is the reason why we judge he is virtuous). 
However, I will not discuss the ambiguity as I am going to fmd a sufficient condition to justify 
that a Subject deserves to be suffered. Thus, if there is any prior action that can serve the purpose, the 
dispute can be bracketed in the following discussion. 
Furthermore, it is not the case that only prior actions/characteristics are primary desert base. As I 
will demonstrate in Part II institution can also be a primary desert base, although it is difficult not to 
consider the relevant factors of prior actions/characteristics to judge whether someone deserves 
something in virtue of the institution, for example, even if every citizen deserves legal rights 
according to constitution, we still need to base on the characteristics of a subject to judge whether he 
is a citizen. 
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nonsense to say "a person deserves to suffer from lacking in his intelligence because 
he is a bad person". 
16. I shall argue a Subject is D-Subject if he is retrospectively and morally 
responsible for his suffering from lacking in central human capabilities.^ That is to 
say, if it is his voluntary prior action making him lacking in central human 
capabilities and suffers, and he has the moral responsibility to bear those 
consequences, he deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities. 
Retrospective and Moral Responsibilities as Desert Base 
17. An agent being retrospectively responsible for something means that he is 
the subject who is responsible for event-in-broad-sense, that is, anything that takes 
place in time and essentially involves some individual subject, taking place in the 
past typically (Zimmerman 1988:2). For example, an agent is retrospectively 
responsible for some voluntary actions that he has done. 
18. The retrospective responsibility, however, does not imply moral 
responsibility. For example, if I break a cup when I clean my table, I am 
4 By retrospectively and morally responsibility I mean someone has retrospective responsibility of 
something and there is moral implication from the responsibility. As I shall demonstrate in the 
following paragraph, it is not the case all retrospective responsibility has moral implication. 
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retrospectively responsible for breaking it because it results from my voluntary 
action. However, it does not imply that I am morally responsible for breaking the cup. 
For example, imagine that someone plays a trick on me and put the cup on the table 
suddenly while I am cleaning it. It is impossible for me to aware that there is a cup, 
and I break it unintentionally. In this case, it should be the one who put a cup on the 
table to be morally responsible for breaking it, as he is the one who set the trap. 
19. The situation is more complex when more information is added to the 
scenario. For example if someone needs to receive an urgent call and he does not 
realize that I am cleaning the table while he put the cup down. As a result, both ofus 
are not intentional to break the cup, but coincidently our actions make the cup 
become broken and both of us are partially-retrospectively responsible for breaking 
the cup. We usually take this case as an accident and no one should be blamed. 
20. In the case of losing central human capabilities, the situation is nevertheless 
complex while we consider the factors of intentionality and retrospective and moral 
responsibilities mentioned. Although the distinction between retrospective 
responsibility and moral responsibility are clear in principle, it is not easy to make 
judgment in real cases as the judgment may be completely different when more 
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details ofthe case are known. 
21. An easy way out is to find some possible scenarios that a Subject is both 
retrospectively and morally responsible for their suffering from lacking in central 
human capabilities. Fortunately as we are going to vindicate the possibility of 
existence of D-Subjects, one simple and common case is sufficient to provide that a 
Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities. 
22. There are at least four possible scenarios that a Subject is a D-Subject: 
(i) If a Subject's action is the direct cause of the loss of his central human 
capabilities, and he does the action intentionally, then he is a D-Subject.^ 
(ii) If a Subject's action is the indirect cause of the loss of his central human 
capabilities, and he is conscious that relatively there is a great chance that he 
will lose his capacities, and he still continues his action, then he is a D-Subject.^ 
(iii) If a Subject's action is the direct or indirect cause of the loss of his central 
5 For example, a Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from losing his capability of life if he 
commits suicide deliberatively. 
6 For example, a Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from losing his capability of health i fhe 
knows that there is a chance that smoking will cause cancer and he chooses to be a smoker. 
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human capabilities, and he knows the consequence of his action but he deceives 
himselfthat the consequence will not happen, and he continues his action, then 
he is a D-Subject/ 
(iv) Ifacitizen's action is the direct or indirect cause of the loss ofhis central human 
capabilities, and he is ignorant of it, and it is not costly or difficult for him not to 
be ignorant, then he is a D-Subject.^ 
23. I wish the four scenarios show that the existence of D-Subjects is common 
in nearly all kinds of society. Although they are not exhaustive, and we can have 
different judgment when more information is added, I wish from the four scenarios 
per se we canjudge that it is reasonable for us to assure that the D-Subjects also exist 
in a society regulated by the Principle. 
24. If a Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central human 
capabilities, it is unreasonable to claim that all other citizens should accept and 
7 For example, a Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from losing his mental capabilities, 
including the capabilities of senses, imaginations and thought, if he deceives himselfthat he will not 
be addicted to drugs and he continues to abuse drugs, 
g 
For example, a Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from losing his capability of living with, 
concem for and in relation to other species i fhe is the one polluting the environment and make many 
other species become extinct, and he can prevent the extinction to happen if he knows how to avoid 
pollution and it is not costly and difficult for him to know it. 
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comply with the Principle. The reasons are as follows: 
(i) It is not unreasonable to claim that some Subjects, who are living in the social 
institutions guided by the Principle, prima facie deserve to suffer from lacking 
in central human capabilities. 
(Justification: the four scenarios mentioned above.) 
(ii) It is unreasonable to claim that all other citizens should be compassionate with 
any Subject deserving to suffer from anything, including lacking in central 
human capabilities. 
(Justification: the denial of desert is the prerequisite of compassion, re. Part III 
of chapter 1 on compassion.) 
(iii) If all other citizens do not compassionate with D-Subjects, it is unreasonable to 
claim that they should have sufficient motivation to accept and comply with the 
Principle applied to D-Subjects in the capabilities approach. 
(Justification: re. PartIIIof chapter 1 on justificatory role of compassion) 
(iv) We can conclude that if there is at least one D-Subject exists, it is unreasonable 
to claim that all other citizens should have sufficient motivation to accept and 
comply with the Principle applied to all citizens, ceteris paribus. 
25. In short, if the existence of D-Subjects is proved, it is not reasonable to 
claim that all non-D Subjects should be motivated to accept and comply with the 
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Principle, ceteris paribus. 
Retrospective Responsibility as Pre-institutional Desert Base 
26. Before I examine the reply of the capabilities approach to the existence of 
D-Subjects, I shall explain the classification of the retrospective and moral 
responsibility when it is taken as a desert base. The classification is important 
because when retrospective and moral responsibility is a pre-institutional desert base 
in this situation, as I will argue, it is applicable to all Subjects living in all kind of 
social institution and shows that D-subjects are likely to exist in all kind of social 
institutions. 
27. Retrospective and moral responsibility as a desert base in the four scenarios 
mentioned is classified as a pre-institutional desert base.^ A pre-institutional desert 
base is a desert base which is not logically tied to institutions, practices and rules 
(Feinberg, 1963:71). In other words, it is not required to refer to any institutional 
setting when a claim that “X deserves Y in virtue of a pre-institutional base" is made. 
9 Retrospective responsibility as a desert base is not necessarily pre-institutional. For instance, X 
crosses a road without following traffic regulations consciously. As a result, he is fmed $1500. It is 
reasonable to claim that he deserves to be punished because he is retrospectively and morally 
responsible for his action of crossing the road without following the regulations. However, the amount 
o f fme is defmed by institutions. Thus, he deserves to be fined $1500 because he is retrospectively 
responsible for his action of violating the regulations. In this case, retrospective responsibility as a 
desert base is not purely pre-institutional. 
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28. Retrospective and moral responsibility as a desert base can be 
pre-institutional as it is not required to refer to any institutional setting when a claim 
that “X deserves Y in virtue of X,s retrospective and moral responsibility of his prior 
action” is made. The four possible scenarios of being a D-Subject mentioned above 
are the examples showing that it is not necessary to refer to any institutional setting 
to describe a Subject as a D-Subject 
29. The possibility of existence ofD-Subjects is applied to all social institutions. 
If retrospective and moral responsibility is pre-institutional, the Subjects in the four 
scenarios are D-Subjects no matter which society they are living. In other words, the 
possibility of existence ofD-Subjects applies to all kinds of society. As it is difficult 
(though not impossible) to find a society without at least one D-Subject, it is 




30. From the perspective of the capabilities approach, the existence ofD-subject 
is unacceptable. This is because as the Principle is applied to all Subjects (including 
D-Subjects), and citizens would be motivated to accept and comply with the 
Principle if and only if they would be compassionate with all others, but citizen 
should not be compassionate with D-Subjects, as a result they would not be 
motivated to accepted and complied with the Principle. Thus, the capabilities 
approach should show that it is impossible for D-subject to exist in the social 
institution regulated by the Principle. 
31. The capabilities approach could find its own support to argue for the 
impossibility of existence of D-Subjects. It could be argued when the central human 
capabilities are considered as the basic entitlements of all Subjects, it is not possible 
for any Subject to be D-Subjects. 
Outcome Oriented Approach 
32. The argument for the impossibility of D-Subjects can find its own supports 




33. The outcome oriented approach is an approach identifying the correct 
outcome in the very beginning; and a procedure that will achieve this outcome is 
designed as close as possible (Nussbaum, 2006:82).^^ The correct outcome is 
justified by moral intuitions and considered judgments which are independent from 
the procedure. It means that the rightness of the outcome has nothing to do with the 
procedure. The procedure is just a mean to produce the correct outcome and it can be 
varied when there are changes in circumstances affecting the generation of the 
correct outcome. 
34. The outcome oriented approach is contrasted with the procedural approach 
of social justice. In the procedural approach, the setting of procedure and stipulation 
of the conditions for formulating the principle of social justice are fundamental to 
generating a just outcome.u The outcome is varied according to different settings 
10 In particular, the outcome in a theory of social justice refers to "the state of affairs whereby at 
any time different individuals enjoy various resources, goods, opportunities, or entitlements (Miller, 
2001:93).” 
11 As Nussbaum says, 
. . . [ I ] t (procedural approach of justice) does not go directly to outcomes and 
examine these for hallmarks of moral adequacy. Instead it designs a procedure that 
models certain key features of fairness and impartiality, and relies on these 
procedures to generate an adequatelyjust outcome CNussbaum, 2006:81). 
Procedural theorists need to structure the contract situation in a tight and relatively 
determinate manner, so that it will generate a determinate set of outcomes - hence 
the need to specify the situation of the parties in a rather determinate way 
_ s s b a u m , 2006:87). 
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and stipulations. Most of the social contract theories are understood as the procedural 
approach of social justice. 
35. The capabilities approach is an outcome oriented approach as it starts with 
outcome of guaranteeing the central human capabilities as the fundamental 
• * • 12 entitlements of all citizens. The correct outcome of the capabilities approach is that 
all citizens can lead a life with an Aristotelian conception of dignity; and the 
procedure is designed and modified to guarantee that the outcome can be achieved as 
close as possible. As the central human capabilities are taken as the necessary 
conditions of leading a life with an Aristotelian conception of dignity, namely the 
necessary means to achieve the correct outcome, these capabilities are guaranteed as 
the basic entitlements of all Subjects in the Principe and social institution guided by 
the Principle. 
Basic Entitlements 
36. It is not possible for any D-Subjects to exist when the central human 
12 As Nussbaum says, 
The capabilities approach is like the criminal trial. That is, it starts from the outcome: 
with an intuitive grasp of a particular content, as having a necessary connection to a 
life worthy ofhuman dignity. It then seek political procedures that will achieve that 
result as nearly as possible, although it seems likely that such procedures will 
change over time and may also wary with the circumstances and history of different 
nations, _ s s b a u m , 2006:82). 
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13 • capabilities are taken as the basic entitlements of all Subjects, ceteris paribus. This 
is because if the central human capabilities are basic entitlements of all Subjects 
(Ts[ussbaum, 2001:418)^^ it implies that: 
(i) all Subjects prima facie deserve to obtain these capabilities and 
(ii) No one prima facie deserves to be lacking in the central human capabilities in 
all circumstance. 
37. Furthermore, if lacking in these capabilities will make any Subject to suffer, 
“central human capabilities as the basic entitlements of all Subjects" also implies that 
(i) No one prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking in the central human 
capabilities in all circumstances. In other words, the existence of D-subjects is 
prima facie impossible. 
13 As Nussbaum says, 
The capabilities approach ... specifies some necessary conditions for a decentlyjust 
society, in the form of a set of fundamental entitlements of all citizens. Failure to 
secure these to citizens is a particular grave violation of basic justice, since these 
entitlements are held to be implicit in the very notions of human dignity and a life 
that is worthy ofhuman dignity CNussbaum, 2006:155). 
14 As Nussbaum says, 
The (capabilities) list shapes the judgment (of seriousness) in a particular way; for 
what it tells citizens is not only that certain calamities are particularly grave, but 
also that they are unjust, wrong. No citizen should have to suffer them, and all have 
a basic entitlement not to suffer them QSfussbaum, 2001:418) 
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38. If no Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central human 
capabilities, it is reasonable to claim that all Subjects should accept and comply with 
the Principle. The reasons are as follows: 
(i) It is unreasonable to claim that some Subjects, who are living in the social 
institutions guided by the Principle, prima facie deserve to suffer from lacking 
in central human capabilities as the central human capabilities are the basic 
entitlements of all Subjects. 
(ii) It is reasonable to claim that all citizens should be compassionate with any 
Subject deserving not to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities. 
(iii) Ifall citizens are compassionate with Subjects suffering from lacking in central 
human capabilities, it is reasonable to claim that they should have sufficient 
motivation to accept and comply with the Principle applied to all Subjects in the 
capabilities approach. 
(Justification: re. PartIIIof chapter 1 on justificatory role of compassion) 
(iv) We can conclude that since the existence of D-Subject is impossible, it is 
reasonable to claim that all citizens should have sufficient motivation to accept 
and comply with the Principle, ceteris paribus. 
39. In short, ifthe existence ofD-Subjects is denied, it is reasonable to claim all 
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non-D Subjects should be motivated to accept and comply with the Principle, ceteris 
paribus}^ 
Basic Entitlement as Institutional Desert Base 
40. We can see that justifying the impossibility of D-Subject by appealing to 
central-human-capabilities-as-basic-entitlements {C-entitlement) is based on the 
social institution regulated by the Principle. This is different from the retrospective 
and moral responsibility as pre-institutional desert base because C-entitlement could 
be applied to judge whether the Subjects living in specific social institution regulated 
by the Principle is D-Subjects only. In other words, C-entitlement is an institutional 
desert base. 
15 I shall put a note on the relation between the concept of compassion and the appropriateness of a 
desert base. 
"When we are compassionate with someone, it implies that we judge someone is not 
blameworthy." The vindication of this statement involves what compassion is. 
We can have different reasons to justify why we judge someone is not blameworthy. This 
involves what an appropriate desert base is. 
These questions are logically independent. We can have (no) consensus on both questions, on 
the former and but not the latter, or vice versa. 
Furthermore, we can argue on the first question without involving the second one, vice versa. 
That is, when we judge whether the denial of desert is a prerequisite of compassion in general, we do 
not need to presume any conception of desert to judge whether someone deserves something in a 
particular case, vice versa. 
Part II of this chapter concerns the second question but not the first one. That is, this part 
illustrates how the capabilities approach could justify the impossibility of D-Subject by appealing to 
central human capabilities as basic entitlements ofall citizens. 
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rules, or other institutionalized authorities necessarily (Kleinig, 1971:85). It means if 
an agent X deserves Y in virtue of an institutional desert base, X deserves Y not 
merely because of X's prior action or characteristic primarily. Instead X deserves Y 
because there are some institutions prescribe that someone deserves Y if he has 
certain characteristics or/and action(s) performed, and X has certain characteristics 
or/and action(s) performed. 
42. Entitlement is an institutional desert base because institution is constitutive 
to entitlement. By definition, there is no entitlement without the setting of 
institutions. As Mcleod defines the concept of entitlement, 
S is entitled to x in virtue of F iff (if and only if) there is some social institution, I; a rule 
of I is that those who participate in I and have shall receive x; S participates in I; S has F 
(McLeod, 1999:192) 
In other words, when we decide what a Subject is entitled to something, we must 
refer the institution and its rules defining his entitlement. Therefore, if any form of 
entitlement is taken as a desert base, it is an institutional desert base. 
43. We note that two opposite conclusions can be drawn in Part I and Part 11. 
If retrospective and moral responsibility is chosen as the desert base, D-Subjects 
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would be possible to exist. It is then unreasonable to claim that all citizens should be 
motivated to accept and comply with the Principle, ceteris paribus. However, if 
central-human-capabilities-as-the-basic-entitlements is chosen as the desert base， 
D-Subjects would be impossible to exist. It is reasonable to claim that all citizens 
should be motivated to accept and comply with the Principle, ceteris paribus. 
44. The dispute, in short, is whether there is an all-thing-considered desert 
base justifying the existence/ un-existence of D-Subjects. That is, when we judge 
whether D-Subject exists, if we can find that there is a desert base overriding all 
other relevant desert bases for proving or disproving the existence, or after 
considering all relevant desert bases together we can prove or disprove the existence, 
we can have a firm answer on whether or not all Subjects deserve not to suffer from 
lacking in central human capabilities in all circumstances. 
45. In Part III, I shall argue that there is no such overriding desert base, and we 
cannot combine the two desert bases mentioned in Part I and 11. As a result, it is not 




46. This part will argue that it is not possible to have an all-thing-considered 
desert base justifying the existence/ un-existence of D-Subjects. And it is also not 
possible to combine the two desert bases to judge whether someone is D-Subject. As 
a result, the chance of existence of D-Subjects is always existed and the 1^^ Tension 
between Compassion and the Principle remains. 
Approaches to Vindicate/Refute the 1®^  Tension 
47. I shall first put a remark on the vindication of the 1^^ Tension by appealing 
to the chance of existence ofD-Subjects. 
48. To affirm the tension between Compassion and the Principle exists, (= in 
some circumstances Compassion and the Principle are incompatible) but not the 
incompatibility (= in all circumstances Compassion and the Principle are 
incompatible), it is not necessary to argue that D-Subjects exist in all circumstances. 
Instead it is sufficient to show that if we cannot eliminate the possibility of the 
existence ofD-Subjects, implying the condition that the tension between Compassion 
and the Principle always possible to exist, then the 1'^  Tension between Compassion 
and the Principle exists. 
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49. On the other hand, to vindicate the impossibility of existence of the 1^ ^ 
Tension, there are two approaches we can adopt. We can argue either: 
(i) Central-human-capabilities-as-basic-entitlements as desert base overrides other 
desert bases favoring the possibility of D-Subjects, that is, it is impossible for 
D-Subjects to exist all-factors-considered; or 
(ii) Two sets of desert base can be combined and, as a result, Subjects who are 
retrospectively (and morally) responsible for lacking in central human 
capabilities deserves to suffer from lacking in the central human capabilities 
partially. As a result, the component of the denial of desert exists and other 
Subjects should be compassionate with these Subjects deserving to suffer 
partially. 
50. I shall argue, however, that these two arguments fail to dissolve the 1^^ 
Tension as they cannot eliminate the chance of existence ofD-Subjects. 
i. Overridingness 
51. To argue for the un-existence of the 1^^ Tension, we can argue that if a 
Subject is entitled to all central human capabilities listed in the Principle, he should 
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not deserve to be lacked in these human capabilities, all-factors-considered. It 
implies that he does not deserve to suffer from lacking in these capabilities, 
all-factors-considered. In other words, 
central-human-capabilities-as-basic-entitlements {C-entitlement) as desert base 
overrides other desert bases favoring the possibility ofD-Subjects. 
52. The problem is that the capabilities approach cannot provide support for 
the overridingness of C-entitlement. For there is no ground to claim that we should 
always give priority to C-entitlement as an institutional desert base when it conflicts 
with other desert bases. There are two reasons for this claim. One is internal in the 
capabilities approach while another is external. 
Commitment to Autonomy 
53. The internal reason is that “no one deserves to suffer from lacking in 
central human capabilities as a result of their voluntary prior actions" violates the 
commitment to autonomy in the capabilities approach. 
54. Autonomy is taken as an important value in the capabilities approach. It 
can be proved when capabilities but not functioning is taken as the political goals 
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ONussbaum, 2000:87-88).As Nussbaum says, 
Where adult citizens are concerned, capability, not functioning, is the appropriate political 
goal. This is so because of the very great importance the approach attached to practical 
reason, as a good that both suffuses all the other functions, making them human rather 
animal, and figures itself as a central function on the list. It is perfectly true that 
functionings, not simply capabilities, are what render a life fully human, in the sense that 
if there were no functioning of any kind in a life, we could hardly applaud it, no matter 
what opportunities it contained. Nonetheless, for political purposes it is appropriate that 
we shoot for capabilities, and those alone. ... The reason for proceeding in this way is, 
quite simple, the respect we have for people and their choices. Even when we feel 
confident that we know what a flourishing life is, and that a particular function plays an 
important role in it, we do not respect people when we dragoon them into this fiinctioning. 
We set the stage and, as fellow citizens, present whatever arguments we have in favor of a 
given choice; then the choice is up to them (Nussbaum, 2000:87-88，emphasis in original). 
Although the social institutions provide central human capabilities to all Subjects, it 
is free for the Subjects to decide which capabilities are functioned according to their 
life projects. The Principle guaranteeing the freedom of Subjects to choose what 
capabilities to function shows the respect of the autonomy of Subjects. 
55. The priority of C-entitlement as desert base, however, may violate the 
significance of autonomy. As all Subjects has right to function or not function the 
capabilities, they should also have right to surrender the capabilities. Ifthe Principle 
guarantees that all Subjects should obtain these capabilities in all conditions, first it 
violates the right to surrender the capabilities, and second it may cause direct 
intervention on the Subjects' choices. 
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56. For example, in the example 2 of smoking in paragraph 22 (ii), if a Subject 
deliberately believes that the pleasure from smoking is more important to him than 
being healthy, he may choose to smoke and as a result forgo his capability of being 
healthy (as least he will be less healthy than not choosing to smoke). If we choose to 
uphold the Principle and insist that every Subject should have the capability ofhealth, 
we will interfere his smoking and violates his autonomy to be a smoker. The 
consequence of intervention is also followed in the example 1 of committing suicide, 
that is, we need to forbid a Subject to commit suicide if we want to ensure that he has 
the capability oflife. 
57. Nussbaum argues that the intervention is justifiable to protect the important 
central human capabilities, like health and bodily integrity fNussbaum, 
2000:93-95).16 The reason, in brief, is that these abilities are important to the 
Subjects in relation to all other capabilities. Or put it simply and clearly, they are 
16 As Nussbaum says, 
What should we say when adults, apparently without coercion, want to sign away a 
major capability in a permanent way? Frequently, though certainly not always, we 
will judge that interference is justified to protect the capability. Even those who 
favor legalizing suicide and even assisted suicide believe that these choices must be 
hedged round with legal procedures to prevent hasty decisions; and few support 
flatly permitting suicide for all unhappy or depressed people. •.. My own point of 
view is that health and bodily integrity are so important in relation to all the other 
capabilities that they are legitimate areas of interference with choice up to a point, 




fundamental for having a dignified life. Although there are disputes on some 
practical issues concerning permanent capabilities surrender, for instance, drug abuse, 
seat-belt and helmet laws, sales of organs etc., Nussbaum believes that these disputes 
should be settled in practical level as "much of this debate does not fall within the 
scope of basic principle, and should be left to the democratic processes of each 
nation ^s[ussbaum, 2000:95).，， 
58. However, the underlying principle of justifying the intervention does fall 
within the basic principle. Since the ultimate goal of the Principle is to ensure that all 
Subjects can lead a dignified life, and having central human capabilities and being 
autonomous to choose our life projects are both important to leading a dignified life, 
we need to judge which one should be overriding if they are in conflict. And the 
question is no doubt a fundamental one as it concems the coherence ofthe Principle. 
59. The judgment of overridingness is based on the concept of human dignity. 
As the purposes of having central human capabilities and having autonomy are both 
for a dignified life, we can judge which one is more effective to achieve this goal 
when they are conflicting. 
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60. The example of committing suicide can demonstrate surrendering life can 
be a better way to preserve human dignity in some occasions. If someone is so 
depressed that his life is meaningless, after deliberation he chooses to commit suicide 
as the last resort ofpreserving his dignity, that is, ceasing to live as a worthless being 
on earth, it is not unreasonable to say he chooses to end his life with dignity. But for 
Nussbaum, it is not permissible as the life is the fundamental significant capacity 
(which is listed one ofthe ten central human capabilities) and it should be overriding 
CNussbaum, 2000:93; 2006:76). 
61. However, this is wrong because living is not necessarily a better way to 
preserve our human dignity. Instead if someone deliberately judges that his life is 
worthless and he is doomed to be the toy of destiny, committing suicide is the way to 
demonstrate his autonomy (as the last resort to control the end ofhis life) and dignity 
(as the last resort to end a worthless life). It sounds permissive, but it is the last resort 
to demonstrate human dignity in this circumstance.^^ 
17 I do not mean that committing suicide per se is a way to preserve human dignity. Many people 
committed suicide for silly reasons or simply they were out of their minds. What I want to say is 
surrendering the capacity of life can be the last resort to preserve human dignity. Thus, it is not 
reasonable to prevent someone to commit suicide simply due to the significance oflife. 
It can be argued that Nussbaum can agree that life may be surrender when it is not worth living. 
As shown in her central human capabilities list, 
Life: Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living CNussbaum 
2006:82). ‘ 
However, Nussbaum seems also disagree that depression can be reason to justify committing 
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62. The examples above demonstrate that it is reasonable to claim that in some 
circumstances the significance of autonomy overrides the significance of capabilities 
as the former preserves human dignity more effectively. Thus, if the Principle 
requires all Subjects to have the capabilities without allowing the Subjects to 
surrender these capabilities for other goodness to them, it violates autonomy and 
even human dignity committed by the Principle. 
63. The overridingness of autonomy shows that it is reasonable to claim that 
someone deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities if they are 
retrospectively and morally responsible for it. In the example of committing suicide, 
it is reasonable for us to claim that the one committing suicide is retrospectively and 
morally responsible for the damages caused as the action is his deliberated choice, 
suicide. As she says, 
What should we say when adults, apparently without coercion, want to sign away a 
major capability in permanent way? Frequently, though certainly not always, we 
will judge that interference is justified to protect the capability. Even those who 
favor legalizing suicide and even assisted suicide believe that these choices must be 
hedged round with legal procedures to prevent hasty decisions; and few support 
flatly permitting suicide for all unhappy or depressed people CNussbaum 
2000:93-94). ‘ 
It seems that Nussbaum does not recognize there is linkage between the worthiness of life and 
desperation. Although we can judge whether a life is prima facie worthy living by considering the 
objective circumstances, like we canjudge whether a person is suffered by considering whether he is 
in a miserable situation (re. Part III of chapter 1 on suffering), we should not omit the subjective 
dimension of the subject, that is whether he deliberatively believes his life is worth living. He may be 
desperate when he believes his life is not worth living and chooses to end his life. 
In this case, we can see there is tension between inference of surrendering life as a central 
human capacity and preserving human dignity by committing suicide, and the capabilities approach 
has the burden of proof on why the former is always overriding. 
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Thus, it is also reasonable that he deserves to suffer from the damages caused if, 
unfortunately, he fails to die but becomes paralyzed. In other words, retrospective 
and moral responsibility as desert base overrides C-entitlement as desert base in this 
case and it affirms the existence ofD-Subjects. 
64. The overridingness of retrospective and moral responsibility as desert base 
brings to our attention that in our daily moral belief, responsibility plays a significant 
role on judging whether a Subject deserves something. We will move to the external 
criticism on the priority of C-entitlement as desert base. 
Moral Responsibility 
65. The external criticism is that "no one deserves to suffer from lacking in 
central human capabilities as a result of their voluntary prior actions" violates the 
belief that we should be morally responsible for our actions. 
66. In our daily moral belief, if someone is morally responsible for his action, 
it implies that he should bear the consequence of his action proportional to his 
responsibility. If a Subject is morally responsible for lacking in central human 
capabilities, he is also morally responsible for suffering caused by lacking in central 
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human capabilities. However, if we ensure that every Subject obtains the central 
human capabilities despites what they have done, it implies that some of them need 
not be responsible for their voluntary actions which result in their loss of central 
human capabilities. This is also unfair to others because they have to bear the costs of 
guaranteeing these irresponsible Subjects a certain degree of the central human 
capabilities. 
67. For example, in the example 2 of smoking in paragraph 22 (ii), i fwe have 
a duty to guarantee the smoker to be healthy, the medial costs may be very high and 
the costs will be shared by all Subjects no matter they are smokers or not. However, 
the smokers should pay for the costs as it is their responsibility if they want to smoke 
and they want to be healthy. It is unfair for the non smokers to bear the costs. 
68. The internal and external criticisms bring a question about under what 
condition the Principle should guarantee that the Subjects can obtain the central 
human capabilities. There are three possible ways on how the central human 
capabilities are guaranteed as the basic entitlements of all citizens, including: 
(i) All capabilities are equally guaranteed in all circumstances regardless of the 
Subjects' prior actions, like every player will have the same counters at the 
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beginning of the game, during the game and in the end of the game no matter 
how well they play; 
(ii) All capabilities are guaranteed in the beginning when the Subjects enter social 
cooperation, like every player has the same amount of counters in the beginning 
ofthe game, and how many counters they get at last depends on how well they 
play; 
(iii) All capabilities are guaranteed in the beginning when the Subjects enter social 
cooperation, and some capabilities are guaranteed in all circumstances, and 
some capabilities are guaranteed only under some circumstances. In brief, 
whether a capability is guaranteed depends on context. 
69. The internal and external criticisms presume the capabilities approach 
takes the first way that all capabilities are guaranteed in all circumstances regardless 
ofthe Subjects' prior actions. It is reasonable to make this presumption because the 
central human capabilities, as descried in the capabilities approach, are so important 
that they should not be lost (assumed there is no problem of voluntary-permanent 
surrender of central human capabilities mentioned) (Nussbaum, 2000:81).^^ The 
18 As Nussbaum says, 
The (central human capabilities) list is, emphatically, a list ofseparate components. 
We cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount ofanother one. 
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second way, however, allows that some capabilities are lost involuntarily during the 
social cooperation, for example, some capabilities may be lost as a result ofbad luck 
which is totally uncontrollable by the Subjects. This is unacceptable to the 
capabilities approach because it aims to promote at least a threshold level of all 
central human capabilities. The third way is also not acceptable to the capabilities 
approach in principle because some capabilities may be allowed to surrender 
involuntary or voluntary way during social cooperation. However, it violates the idea 
that all central human capabilities should not be traded-off or surrendered in 
principle.i9 Thus, due to the implausibility of taking the second and third ways, it is 
reasonable to assume that central human capabilities are the basic entitlements of all 
Subjects in all circumstances. 
70. If central human capabilities are the basic entitlements of all Subjects, the 
internal and external criticisms are both applied to the capabilities approach. Thus, as 
All are of central importance and all are distinct in quality. The irreducible plurality 
of the list limits the trade-offs that it will be reasonable to make, and thus limits the 
applicability of quantitative cost-benefit analysis. One may, of course, always use 
cost-benefit analysis; but if one does so in the weightings the fact that each and 
everyone of a plurality of distinct goods is of central importance, and thus there is a 
tragic aspect to any choice in which citizens are pushed below the threshold in one 
of the central areas CNussbaum, 2000:81, emphasis in original). 
In other words, the capabilities approach aims to provide at least a threshold level ofall central 
human capabilities. It implies that it is in principle not acceptable to the capabilities approach that 
some Subjects are lacking in some central human capabilities. 
19 Although Nussbaum, as the discussion on voluntary surrender of capabilities, may agree that 
some capabilities may be surrendered in practice due to complexity ofreality (Nussbaum, 2000:95), in 
principle Nussbaum insists that these capabilities should not be surrendered due to their significance 
to a dignified life. 
97 
i 
moral responsibility overrides other desert bases tojustify that some Subjects deserve 
to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities in some circumstances, it is 
reasonable to claim that it is not the case that C-entitlement as desert base is always 
overriding. 
Combination of two desert bases 
71. If it is not possible to argue that C-entitlement as desert base is always 
overriding, we shall consider the second possible argument, which aims to combine 
the two sets of desert bases so as to demonstrate that no citizen deserves to suffer 
from lacking in the central human capabilities. 
72. The combination is intuitively plausible as we usually do not consider one 
desert base only when we make judgment. When retrospective and moral 
responsibility is adopted as desert base，some Subjects are prima facie deserves to 
suffer from lacking in central human capabilities; and when C-entitlement is adopted 
as desert base, no Subject prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central 
human capabilities. However, to be conclusive we should judge whether a Subject 
deserves (not) to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities, 
all-factors-considered. In other words, the other appropriate desert bases should be 
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included in our consideration. 
73. The argument for combining two desert bases, that is, C-entitlement and 
retrospective and moral responsibility, is as follows: 
(i) To judge whether or not a Subject is a D-citizen, the two criteria, which are the 
two sets ofdesert bases, should be considered. 
(ii) If a Subject is retrospectively and morally responsible for his suffering from 
lacking central human capabilities, he is a D-Subject according to retrospective 
and moral responsibility as a desert base; and if 
central-human-capabilities-as-basic-entitlements is taken as the desert base, no 
one is a D-Subject; and if there are only two desert bases considered, then the 
following equation can be used to illustrate to what extent a Subject is a 
D-Subject: 
pD = (xR)/a + (yC)/b 
74. The equation can be understood as follows: 
(i) “D，，stands for to what extent a Subject deserves to suffer from lacking in the 
central human capabilities; 
(ii) "R" stands for to what extent a Subject has retrospective and moral 
responsibility oflacking in the central human capabilities; and 
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(iii) "C" stands to what extent a Subject is not being entitled to having the central 
human capabilities; and 
(iv) "p, X, / , are their values. 
(V) “a，b ” are the weight of two desert bases in consideration, for example, if they 
are equally weighted, the value of a and b is “2”. 
75. We can understand the values of the equation as follows: 
(i) As a Subject is either entitled or not entitled to have the central human 
capabilities, the value of '>C" can be either "l"(if not entitled) or “0” (if 
entitled). 
(ii) The value of “xR” and ''pD'' can be any number from “0” to “ 1 : 
(iii) A Subject is a D-Subject if and only if the value of “j?D” is “1”，that is, he 
deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities, 
all-factors-considered (as "jc»D" is ‘T，if and only if y C ' and "xR" are 1). 
Otherwise he is not a D-Subject because he partly deserves or does not deserve 
to suffer from his lacking in the central human capabilities. 
76. The equation favors the argument for the impossibility of existence of 
D-Subjects. This is because according to the equation, being a D-Subject is 
impossible in the capabilities approach. We can draw this conclusion from the values 
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of"xR", > C ” and >D”. 
(i) The value of "xR" can be any number from “0” to “1” as a Subject can 
retrospectively (and morally) responsible for his suffering from lacking in 
central human capabilities completely, partially or has no responsibility at all. 
(ii) The value of '>C" is always “0” as all Subjects are entitled to central human 
capabilities. Thus, they deserve not to suffer from lacking in the central 
human capabilities. 
(iii) As a result, the value of >D,, can never be “1” as '>C" is always ‘‘0”. It is 
because even when we take retrospective and moral responsibility seriously, for 
instance, the value of a is a very large finite number thus “xRy^ a” is 0.9, “pD，，can 
never be “1” as '>C" is always “0”. 
77. In short, it is only possible that some Subjects deserve to suffer from 
lacking in central human capabilities partially (when > D ” is large than “0” but 
smaller than “1”）or undeserved to suffer from lacking in these capabilities (when 
“jpD” is than "0") if two desert bases are combined. 
78. Although the argument on combination of two desert bases is appealing 
intuitively, it is problematic. This is because we should not show that Subjects are 
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only partially responsible for suffering from lacking in central human capabilities by 
combining the two desert bases leading to contradictory conclusions. 
79. The conclusions of the two desert bases are contradictory. If we take 
C-entitlement as desert base in the capabilities approach, it implies that no one prima 
facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities. If retrospective 
and moral responsibility is taken as desert base, it implies that a Subject, who is 
retrospectively and morally responsible for their suffering from lacking in central 
human capabilities, prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking in central human 
capabilities, that is, it is not the case that no one prima facie deserves to suffer from 
lacking in central human capabilities. 
80. If we combine these desert bases, we draw self-contradictory conclusion. 
That is, we draw the conclusion "no one prima facie deserves to suffer from lacking 
in central human capabilities" and “it is not the case that no one primafacie deserves 
to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities." The conclusion does not imply 
someone partially deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities. 
Instead it implies our premises, which are two desert bases having contradictory 
conclusions, cannot be combined at the very beginning. 
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81. In short, although it is intuitively appealing to combine the two desert 
bases because both ofthem concerned with whether someone deserves to suffer from 
lacking in central human capabilities, it is not the case that we should combine these 
desert bases. 
82. Ifthe approach of combining two desert bases fails, we should consider the 
priority and appropriateness of desert bases selected case by case. However, we can 
see the approach, as argued before, shows that in some cases priority is given to 
retrospective and moral responsibility. As a result, D-Subjects are possible to exist in 




83. In this chapter, I have argued that it is possible that some Subjects deserve 
to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities in the capabilities approach. This 
is because in some cases, retrospective and moral responsibility should be taken as 
the overriding desert base, and these Subjects are retrospective and morally) 
responsible for their prior actions causing their lacking in central human capabilities 
and suffering. As a result, it is unreasonable for other citizens to be compassionate 
with D-Subjects and it is unreasonable to claim that they should be motivated to 
accept and comply with the Principle applied to all Subjects. 
84. In short, as the chance of existence ofD-Subjects cannot be eliminated, the 
tension between the denial of desert as a component of compassion and the Principle 




2”d Tension: Eudaimonistic Judgment and the Principle 
Emotions contain an ineliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme ofgoals 
and projects. They see the world from my point of view. ... In short, the evaluations 
associated with emotions are evaluations from my perspective, not from some impartial 
perspective; they contain an ineliminable reference to the self (Nussbaum, 2001:52, 
emphasis in original). 
Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals ofThought 
Purpose 
This chapter aims to vindicate the tension between eudaimonistic judgment 
as a component of compassion and commitments of the capabilities approach, 
including the idea of the fact of reasonable pluralism and overlapping consensus (2"^ 
Tension). 
2. I shall argue that it is unreasonable to claim that all citizens should have 
eudemonistic judgment of all other subjects whom the principle of social justice of 
the capabilities approach is applied to (Subjects) as it contradicts with the 
commitment of the capabilities approach to the fact of reasonable pluralism. In 
addition, it is unreasonable to expect all citizens would have eudemonistic judgment 
ofall other Subjects by appealing to an Aristotelian conception ofwell being as this 
conception cannot be an object of overlapping consensus in a pluralistic society. 
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3. As a result, it is not the case that all citizens should be compassionate with 
all other Subjects because they do not have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subjects. Thus, the 2"^ Tension exists and compassion as the account of motivation in 





4. In Part I, I will provide an analysis of eudaimonistic judgment and its 
constitutive role in Compassion. 
5. In Part II, I will argue that Compassion contradicts with the commitment to 
the fact ofreasonable pluralism {Pluralism) in the capabilities approach. 
6. In Part III, I will defend for the coherence between Compassion and 
Pluralism by arguing that Pluralism should be taken as a brute fact instead ofamoral 
goal. In addition, I will provide a substantive argument that all citizens should have 
eudaimonistic judgment of all Subjects. 
7. In Part IV, I will show the defense fails because it contradicts with the aim 
ofthe capabilities approach to globalize the theory of social justice, that is, to extend 
the theory of social justice to all appropriate subjects, and violating the idea of 





8. In Part I, I shall analyze the concept of eudaimonistic judgment and 
demonstrate its constitutive role in Compassion. 
Eudaimonistic Judgment 
9. For Nussbaum, eudaimonistic judgment is a necessary component of all 
emotions. All emotions are concerned with value. When someone shows certain 
emotions toward an object, he sees his object as invested with value or importance 
(Nussbaum, 2001:30). The value or importance of objects of emotions is 
eudaimonistic. It means that objects appear ‘to make reference to the person's own 
flourishing' and it is ‘seen as important for some role it plays in the person's own life 
O^ussbaum, 2001:30-31, emphasis in original).' In other words, if we have emotions 
toward something, it means that we judge the object of emotion is important to us in 
terms of our well beings. 
10. There are two senses of importance of an object of emotion to a person's 
well being. 
(i) First, the agent thinks an object as important when he ascribes intrinsic values to 
it. Thus, he takes an object of emotion as an end instead of as an instrument. 
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(ii) Second, an object is important if it is valued as 'constituents of a life that is my 
life and not someone else's, as my actions, as people who are in some relation 
with me ^^ussbaum, 2001:32, emphasis added).' I f the value of the object of 
emotions is eudaimonistic, it implies that the object is ‘important in my own 
conception of what it is for me to live well ^S[ussbaum, 2001:33)., 
11. Eudaimonistic judgment, in short, is defined as follows: 
If an agent X has eudaimonistic judgment of an object Y, it means that the 
agent X takes the object Y as a significant part of his scheme of ends or 
goals.i 
12. We can see that the concept of eudaimonistic judgment is defined by a 
triadic relation composited by evaluating subject, evaluated object and term of 
evaluation. These components are understood as follows: 
1 I shall provide two supplementary accounts on the idea of judgment and the goodness of an 
object when it is important in eudaimonistic sense. 
"Taking p as q” is 2ijudgment means the subject does not see the appearance o f p only when he 
is making judgment. Instead he also assents p as q. It involves the process of reasoning (^ussbaum 
2001:37-38).Reasoning is defined broadly as "an ability in virtue of which we commit ourselves to a 
view of the way things really are CNussbaum 2001:38).，， 
"Taking p as a significant part of one scheme of ends or goals" is an eudaimonistic judgment 
means that the value o f p to a subject depends on the subject's conception of well being. Thus, it is 
conceptually possible that p is valuable according to different criteria of goodness but p is not 
significant to one's schemes of ends or goals, vice versa. 
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(i) Evaluating subject: it means an agent who has eudaimonistic judgment of an 
object. As an evaluating subject is the subject making ajudgment, it is assumed 
that all evaluating subjects have the power of reasoning to a certain degree. 
(ii) Evaluated object: it means an object that an evaluating subject has 
eudaimonistic judgment of. An evaluated object can be anything evaluated by 
an evaluating subject and taken as a significant object to evaluating subject's 
scheme of ends or goals. 
(iii) Term of evaluation: it means the criterion/criteria that an evaluating subject uses 
to evaluate different evaluated object(s). As mentioned, it is conceptually true 
that the term of evaluation is the conception of well being of an evaluating 
subject, that is, whether an evaluated object is taken as the significant part ofan 
evaluating subject's life projects. However, it is possible that there are different 
specific terms of evaluation due to the diversity of conceptions of well being 
and their justifications. 
13. There is no one-and-for-all argument for eudaimonistic judgment due to 
the triadic structure of the concept. As evaluating subject, evaluated object and term 
of evaluation are variable, the formulation of eudaimonistic judgment and its 
justification/ refutation are also variable. For example, the justification of why 
playing piano is important to a pianist is different from thejustification ofwhy a wife 
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is important to her husband. Thus, it is necessary to defme what form of 
eudaimonistic judgment that should bejustified. 
14. As the primary aim is to examine whether all citizens should have 
eudemonistic judgment of all other Subjects, the components of eudaimonistic 
judgment discussed below are set as follows: 
(i) Evaluating Subject: all citizens 
(ii) Evaluated Object: all other Subjects 
(iii) Term ofEvaluation: the evaluation of the importance of all other Subjects to all 
citizens in terms of all citizens' schemes of ends or goals. 
15. Term of evaluation is the core of the following argument. If we can find a 
term of evaluation which justifies all other Subjects are important to all citizens, we 
can also justify why all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subjects. 
Eudaimonistic Judgment in Compassion 
16. As mentioned in Part III of chapter 1, eudaimonistic judgment is a 
component ofcompassion. If an agent is compassionate with someone, it implies that 
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someone is a significant part of the compassionate agent's life project.� In other 
words, having eudaimonistic judgment of someone is the necessary condition of 
being compassionate with someone. 
17. The necessity of eudaimonistic judgment in compassion implies that all 
citizens should have eudaimonistic judgments of all other Subjects when compassion 
is taken as the account of motivation of the capabilities approach. ^ When 
compassion is taken as an account of motivation of the capabilities approach, it 
implies that all citizens should accept and comply with the Principle when they are 
compassionate with others. And to be compassionate with others, including all 
Subjects, it is necessary for all citizens to have eudaimonistic judgments ofall other 
Subjects. 
2 
As Nussbaum says, 
.. .[I]n order for compassion to be present, the person must consider the suffering of 
another as a significant part of his or her own scheme of goals and ends. She must 
take that person's ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, she must make 
herself vulnerable in the person of another. It is that eudaimonistic judgment ... 
(Nussbaum, 2001:319, emphasis in original) 
3 As Nussbaum says, 
The capabilities approach is able to include benevolent sentiments from the start in 
its account of people's relation to their good. This is so because its political 
conception of the person includes the ideas of a fundamental sociability and of 
people's ends as including shared ends. Prominent among the moral sentiments of 
people so placed will be compassion, which I conceive as including the judgment 
that the good of others is an important part of one's own scheme of goals and ends. 
Thus when other people suffer capability failure, the citizen I imagine will not 
simply feel the sentiments required by moral impartiality, viewed as a constraint on 
her own pursuit interest. Instead, she will feel compassion for them as a part ofher 
own good CNussbaum, 2006:91). 
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18. Having eudaimonistic judgment of someone has direct implication on the 
evaluated subject. When someone has eudaimonistic judgment of others, he is 
normatively required to act (in a certain way) for all others' well beings. 
19. It is odd to say that an agent X takes an agent Y as a significant part of X's 
scheme of ends or goal and X does not perform any action or omission for Y 
intentionally.^ The reason is as follows: 
(i) If X takes Y as a significant part of X's scheme of ends or goal, it means that Y 
is important to X's life project. 
(ii) If Y is important to X's life project, X should want Y to be good, ceteris 
paribus; 
(iii) Assumed that Y cannot (or rarely can) be good in his whole life ifothers do not 
act for Y’s well being, and if Y is important to X's life project, X should do 
something to make Y to be good, ceteris paribus; 
(iv) Assumed that X is able to make Y to be good, and if Y is important to X's life 
project, X should act and make Y to be good, ceteris paribus. 
(V) If X should act and make Y to be good, X should require himself to act and 
^ It is not required that the action or omission performed is costly or has great impacts. The point 
is the action or omission is performed for the sake ofsomeone whom an agent cares. 
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make Y to be good, ceteris paribus.; 
(vi) This requirement of action to make Y to be good, thus, is derived from Y,s 
importance to X's life project, ceteris paribus. 
20. In other words, if an evaluated object is important to an evaluating subject, 
the subject should act to make the object be good. Thus, it is the relation between 
evaluated object and evaluating subject that make the evaluating subject impose 
normative requirement on his actions toward the evaluated object. 
21. The imposition of normative requirement on actions is not difficult to 
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understand when X is substituted as ourselves and Y is substituted as the people who 
are important to us. For example, when we take our children as significant part ofour 
life projects, we are morally required to promote their well beings. If some parents 
claim that they take their children as a significant part of their life projects, but they 
do nothing particular for their children's sake, or they do something simply because 
they are forced to do so, their sincerity is doubtful. 
22. The normative requirement on actions from eudaimonistic judgment is the 
source ofthe tension with the commitment to the fact ofreasonable pluralism. I shall 




23. In Part II, I shall argue the normative requirement on actions from 
eudaimonistic judgment has tension with the commitment to the fact ofreasonable 
pluralism {Pluralism). As a result, it is incoherent for the capabilities approach to 
uphold “all citizens should eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects" and 
Pluralism. 
Impact on Life's Project 
24. The normative requirement on action derived from eudaimonistic judgment 
has direct impact on the content of evaluating subjects' life projects. Although it is 
not the case that if an evaluated object is important to the evaluating subject's life 
projects, the subject should do something/ a lot of things which is very costly or/and 
difficult to the subject for making the object to be good, it still will be very 
demanding if the number of evaluated object is large. 
25. As the evaluated objects are all other Subjects, it is reasonable to expect 
that the requirements of action on the evaluating subjects, that is, all Subjects, are 
also very demanding. For instance, to ensure that every Subject can lead a decent life, 
it is reasonable to expect that the scope of redistribution, including the types ofgoods 
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and their amounts, will be very large. We cannot simply pay more taxes because the 
redistribution in term of materials may not be sufficient. Instead we are required to 
act to provide these non-material goods, like caring and establishing a close 
relationship. As a result, it will be demanding if we need to provide these 
non-material goods to many, if not all, Subjects. 
26. For example, as being concerned are important to most ofus, we should let 
the neglected feel being concerned if we take them as a significant part of our life 
projects. We cannot do so simply by paying more taxes to show we care about the 
neglected. Instead, we should do something to show our concem of the neglected, 
like regular visits and greets. Thus, if “to be concerned" is taken as (re)goods of 
distribution in a principle of social justice, it imposes direct requirements on our 
actions. 
27. In addition, we should not formulate some kinds of conceptions of the 
good due to the demandingness of requirements. For example, we may not be 
permitted to live an isolated life as we should act appropriately to show our concem 
ofothers. Or we cannot lead a very luxurious life when the scope ofredistribution is 
extended. We can see how the demandingness of requirement from eudaimonistic 
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judgment has a direct impact on our lives. 
28. The impact on the evaluating subjects' life projects may lead to direct 
intervention on the formulation of their conceptions of the good. The reason is as 
follows: 
(i) In the capabilities approach, all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of 
all other Subjects, or it is unreasonable to claim that they should have sufficient 
motivation to accept and comply with the Principle; 
(ii) It is not the case that all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of all 
other Subjects after considering the burdens mentioned, for example, it may be 
too costly for them to forgo a form of life which is not permissible when the 
scope of redistribution is extended，and some of them choose not to have 
eudaimonistic judgment to all other Subjects; 
(iii) To ensure that all Subjects should do so, it is necessary to convince or coerce 
them to have eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. Thus, they should 
re-formulate their life projects which are not consistent with the normative 
requirements on action derived from having eudaimonistic judgment ofall other 
Subjects. 
(iv) An intervention may need to be introduced into all citizens' life projects, for 
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instance to educate or to coerce all citizens to have life projects which are 
consistent with the normative requirement on action derived from having 
eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects.^ 
29. In short, if all Subjects should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subject, invention may be required to reformulate some Subjects' conception ofthe 
good. 
30. The intervention, however, contradicts with the capabilities approach's 
commitment to the fact of reasonable pluralism {Pluralism). That is, if the 
capabilities approach commits to Pluralism, it is permissible for some Subjects not to 
have eudaimonistic judgment of some other citizens. 
31. I will draw this conclusion by three steps. First, I shall analyze the concept 
of Pluralism and its implication on citizens' life projects. Then I shall demonstrate 
the capabilities approach is committed to Pluralism. Finally I shall argue the 
commitment is inconsistent with the intervention ofany citizen's life project. 
5 What I mean is not coercion per se is wrong. Instead I mean intervention of a Subjects' life 
projects may be inevitable if we need to make sure that all Subjects would fulfills the normative 
requu-ement on action derived from having eudaimonisticjudgment ofall other Subjects. Coercion is 
one form of the intervention. 
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Fact of Reasonable Pluralism 
32. Pluralism is defined as the subsistence of diverse reasonable 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrine affirmed by reasonable 
citizens in the public culture of democracy as a result of free practical reasoning 
(Rawls 1996:36-37). The crucial part of this definition for the following argument is 
to understand what a "reasonable comprehensive doctrine" means. 
33. Whether or not a doctrine or conception is comprehensive depends on the 
scope that it applies. If it includes “what is of value in human life, and ideals of 
personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational 
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life 
as whole (Rawls 1996:13),” it can be taken as a comprehensive doctrine. An example 
ofa comprehensive doctrine is a life project. 
34. Whether or not a comprehensive doctrine is reasonable depends on the 
consistence and coherence between its different aspects, its priority of different 
values and the possibility of modification when there is sufficient and good reason 
(Rawls 1996:59). In short, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is an exercise of 
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theoretical and practical reason, and it is always subjected to revision with reasons. 
35. The diversity of life projects is implied in Pluralism. As people are free to 
exercise their practical reason to formulate their life projects, there is no guarantee 
that same or similar life projects are formulated, especially when the social 
institutions provide the conditions for them to do so. 
Commitment to Pluralism 
36. The capabilities approach commits to Pluralism in two different senses, 
including: 
(i) Taking Pluralism as a premise in the construction of theory and 
(ii) Promoting Pluralism in the list of central human capabilities. 
37. First, Pluralism is taken as a premise in the capabilities approach in the 
formulation of the Principle.^ In the design of the Principle, Pluralism is taken into 
6 As Nussbaum says, 
I believe that we can arrive at an enumeration of central elements of truly human 
functioning that can command a board-cross cultural consensus. Although this list of 
central capabilities is somewhat different in both structure and substance from 
Rawls，list of primary goods, it is offered in a similar political-liberal spirit: as a list 
that can be endorsed for political purposes, as the moral basis of central 
constitutional guarantees, by people who otherwise have very different views of 
what a complete good life for a human being would be (Nussbaum, 2000:74). 
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account for establishing an object of overlapping consensus among people with 
different conceptions of the good. Specifically, the object of overlapping consensus is 
the central human capabilities, which are the conditions that are free of any specific 
metaphysical grounding and important for living any kind of life worthy of human 
dignity ^sfussbaum 2000:76). Thus, it is agreeable by all citizens that these 
capabilities are important for living a life with human dignity. 
38. Second, the list protects and promotes the plurality of life projects. 
(i) It protects the plurality because the central human capabilities guaranteed in the 
Principle are the necessary conditions for all citizens to pursue their life projects. 
The central human capabilities are multiply realizable for all citizens as “each of 
the capabilities may be concretely realized in a variety of different ways, in 
accordance with individual tastes, local circumstances, and traditions 
ONussbaum2000:105)." 
(ii) It promotes the plurality because the Principle provides sufficient opportunities 
for all Subjects to function their central human capabilities according to their 
choices. As the Principle focuses on promoting capabilities but not on actual 
functioning, it leaves citizens to decide whether to pursue the relevant function 
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or not according to their conceptions of well being (Nussbaum 2000:87-88)/ 
As a result, Pluralism is reinforced by the capabilities approach. 
39. The implication of the commitment to Pluralism is that it is permissible for 
some Subjects to have diverse reasonable life projects. 
40. There is no guarantee that all reasonable life projects are the same or 
compatible with each other as the outcome of the exercise of theoretical and practical 
reason. I f a life project is one of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines, it is also an 
outcome of the exercise of theoretical and practical reasons. However, it is possible 
that different results are generated by practical reasoning even if it is assumed that all 
agents have equal capacity of reasoning. The possibility is rooted in the diversity of 
sources of values or life experiences. For instance, some values are overriding in an 
7 As Nussbaum says, 
Where adult citizens are concerned, capability, not functioning, is the appropriate 
political goal This is so because of the very great importance the approach attached 
to practical reason, as a good that both suffuses all the other functions, making them 
human rather animal, and figures itself as a central function on the list. It is perfectly 
true that ftmctionings, not simply capabilities, are what render a life fully human, in 
the sense that if there were no functioning of any kind in a life, we could har'dly 
applaud it, no matter what opportunities it contained. Nonetheless, for political 
purposes it is appropriate that we shoot for capabilities, and those alone. ... The 
reason for proceeding in this way is, quite simple, the respect we have for people 
and their choices. Even when we feel confident that we know what a flourishing life 
is, and that a particular function plays an important role in it, we do not respect 
people when we dragoon them into this functioning. We set the stage and, as fellow 
citizens, present whatever arguments we have in favor of a given choice; then the 
choice is up to them O^ussbaum, 2000:87-88, emphasis in original) 
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agent's system of evaluation, but it may not be the case ofanother agent. As a result, 
different priorities of values are generated. As the priorities of value shape the 
content of a life project, different incompatible but reasonable life projects are 
formulated. 
41. The diversity of reasonable life projects implies that it is not the case that 
all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. It is because a 
citizen's life project is reasonable even if he does not take all other Subjects as a 
significant part ofhis life project. 
42. For example, if a Subject believes that his relatives are extremely 
important to him, and it is not possible for him to take cares of his relatives and all 
other Subjects due to the limitations of time and resources, he has reason to give 
priority to promote the well beings ofhis relatives instead of all other Subjects who 
are strangers to him. This kind of life project, in other words, is reasonable but 
partial as the scope of caring is limited to closers but not all other Subjects. 
43. The partiality of a life project does not harm its reasonableness. In the 
example mentioned, it is not reasonable to claim that he leads an unreasonable life, 
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or his life is, from his point of view, worse than another person who acts like Mother 
Teresa. Although he is leading an ordinary life without (or with less) praises, he leads 
a life that he treasures withjustification. Even if moral saints are usually praised, it is 
not the case that these saints are leading better lives from his first person point of 
view. It is because the saints have sacrificed so many partially valuable things in their 
lives for promoting common good. He, however, can deliberately lead a life with the 
persons he treasures most. Thus, we have no reason to claim he should lead another 
form of life having eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects instead of his 
present one. 
44. The diversity of reasonable life projects, in short, implies that it is 
reasonable for a citizen to lead a partial life project. As not all Subjects are taken as 
the significant part of a partial life project, it implies that the diversity ofreasonable 
life projects implies that it is reasonable for a citizen not to take all other Subjects as 
the significant part ofhis life project. 
2"d Tension 
45. We can see the 2"^  Tension, which is the tension between the eudaimonistic 
judgment as a component of Compassion and the capabilities approach as a 
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conception of social justice committing to the fact of reasonable pluralism, exists. 
The details are as follows: 
(i) If eudaimonistic judgment is taken as a component of Compassion, and all 
citizens are compassionate with all other Subjects, it implies that 
All citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. 
(ii) If the capabilities approach commits to Pluralism, and the diversity of 
reasonable life projects exists, it implies that 
It is not the case that all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment ofall 
other Subjects. 
46. We can see that there is a tension for the capabilities approach to take 
compassion as an account of motivation while committing to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. 
47. To dissolve the 2"^  Tension, we need to argue that it is coherent for the 
capabilities approach to uphold Compassion and Pluralism if we are not going to 
forgo any one of them. I will argue for the coherence in Part I I I � 
125 
III 
48. To defend for the coherence between Compassion and Pluralism, I shall 
argue that the capabilities approach can take Pluralism as a brute fact instead of a 
moral goal. In addition, to argue that all citizens should have eudaimonistic 
judgments of all other Subjects, a substantive reason, which is based on the 
Aristotelian conception of well being, on the goodness of having eudaimonistic 
judgments of all other Subjects will be provided. 
49. The defense, however, fails as the capabilities approach aims to globalize 
the theory of social justice resulting in expanding the scope of the Subjects, and it 
violates the idea of overlapping consensus emphasized in the capabilities approach. I 
will demonstrate the failure mentioned in Part IV. 
Pluralism as Brute Fact 
50. The 2"d Tension does not exist if Pluralism is taken as a bmte fact. That is, 
to dissolve the 2"^ Tension, Pluralism can be taken into account as a fact instead o f a 
moral goal in constructing the capabilities approach. 
51. Pluralism is taken as both a bmte fact and a moral goal in the present 
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capabilities approach. In the two senses of commitment to Pluralism mentioned, we 
can see Pluralism is both taken as a premise in construction oftheory and as a moral 
goal that Pluralism should be protected and promoted. 
52. When Pluralism is taken as a premise, it can be understood as a brute fact. 
That is to say, as a matter of fact, there are diverse reasonable comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines affirmed by reasonable citizens in the 
public culture of democracy as a result of the work of free practical reason are 
subsist. 
53. When Pluralism is taken as a moral goal, it can be understood that we 
should protect and promote the diversity of these doc^ine� 
54. The 2"d Tension exists when Pluralism is understood as a moral goal. I fwe 
should protect and promote Pluralism, it implies that intervention of life project is 
morally impermissible. However, to ensure all citizens should have eudaimonistic 
judgment of all other Subjects, the intervention sometime is inevitable. As a result, it 
is inconsistent to uphold Compassion and Pluralism in the capabilities approach in 
some circumstances. 
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55. To dissolve the 2"^ Tension, Pluralism can be understood as a brute fact 
only. If Pluralism is taken as a bmte fact, it implies that it is possible for some 
citizens to formulate a partial and reasonable life projects. However, it does not 
imply that the fact should not be changed if we have reason to believe that it is 
morally desirable for every citizen to have eudaimonistic judgment ofothers. In other 
words, the capabilities approach can demonstrate that a non-partial and reasonable 
life project is more morally desirable than a partial and reasonable one and argues 
that all citizens should endorse it. 
56. This approach seems costly to the capabilities approach as the commitment 
ofPluralism is core to the capabilities approach. As the commitment ofPluralism has 
a significant role injustifying why capabilities but not functionings are concerned in 
the Principle, and why capabilities can achieve overlapping consensus, it may be 
arguable whether Pluralism should be taken at least as a moral goal. 
57. We can argue that this approach does not giving up Pluralism entirely. As 
Pluralism can be understood as a matter of degree, that is we can say that if 
reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines ofcitizens in 
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a society X are more diverse than another society Y, we can see society X that is 
more plural than Y in terms of the diversity. However, when these doctrines exist in 
both societies, it is still reasonable for us to say that these societies are plural in terms 
of the diversity. 
58. The following argument is based on an assumption that Pluralism is not 
given up completely. Although there is no diversity in the sphere of having 
eudaimonistic judgment, that is, all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of 
all other Subjects, citizens are still free to function their capabilities according to 
their life projects. Thus, Pluralism is not given up entirely as we can have 
philosophers and tycoons living in the same society and both of them should have 
eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. 
59. To argue why a citizen should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subjects, the moral desirability of a non-partial and reasonable life project should be 
demonstrated. That is, it should be argued in what sense it is good or/and right for a 
citizen to have eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects, or in other words, why 
all other Subjects are important to a citizen's life project. 
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60. The justification of the moral desirability of eudaimonistic judgment of all 
other Subjects can be found in the capabilities approach, that is，the Aristotelian 
conception ofwell being. Thus, we can try to solve the 2"^ Tension without appealing 
to an argument external from the capabilities approach. 
Aristotelian Conception ofWell Being 
61. The justification of the significance of all others is deducted from the 
Aristotelian conception of well being adopted in the capabilities approach. 
62. The Aristotelian conception of well being is a conception that human being 
is understood as social and political animal; and they cannot have well being without 
interacting with others in social and political spheres.^ Thus, an isolated form oflife 
project is not a desirable one as it cannot be a good life. Interaction with others in 
society is necessary for such a good life. 
8 As Nussbaum says, 
. . . [T ]he capabilities approach takes it start from the Aristotelian/ Marxian 
conception ofthe human being as a social and political being, who finds fulfillment 
in relation with others. ... The political conception of the person it uses includes the 
idea ofthe human being as "by nature" political, that is, as finding deep fulfillment 
in political relations, including, centrally, relations characterized by the virtue of 
justice. ... [I]t would be odd to imagine the human being flourishing outside a 
network ofsuch relations; such a notion may even be a contradiction in terms, since 
these relations seem a part of human flourishing. Thus, while contractarians 
typically imagine a being whose good is in effect apolitical, although this being will 
respect the constraints of law, the Aristotelian account insists that the good of a 
human being is both social and political CNussbaum, 2006:86). 
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63. The interaction with others, however, is not a pure exchange of interests. 
Instead it is a reciprocal relation between human beings.^ This is because for a 
citizen in an Aristotelian society, other Subjects are not the means to realize one's 
own goal ofparticipating in social cooperation. Instead others' well beings are part of 
a citizen's well being as they have shared ends and altruistic ties. Thus, benevolence 
and justice are constitutive in the reciprocal relation between all Subjects in social 
cooperation as these moral sentiments link all Subjects together. As a result, they are 
willing to have eudaimonistic judgment of others, and take others' goodness as a 
constitution ofhis goodness. 
64. The goodness of having eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects, in 
short, is based on an Aristotelian understanding on relation between well being and 
the reciprocal relation between Subjects in social and political life. It shows others' 
well beings are significant to our own. Thus, it is morally desirable to take others' 
well being as a significant part of our life projects. 
9 As Nussbaum says, 
[T]he capabilities approach ... uses a political conception of the person that views 
the person, with Aristotle, as a political and social animal, who seek a good that is 
social through and through, and who shares complex ends with others at many 
levels. The good ofothers is notjust a constraint on this person's pursuit ofher own 
good; it is part ofher good. ... The person leaves the state ofnature ... not because 
it is more mutually advantageous to make a deal with others, but because she cannot 
imagine living well without shared ends and a shared life. Living with and toward 
others, with both benevolence andjustice, is part ofthe shared public conception of 
the person that all affirm for political purposes QN[ussbaum, 2006:158). 
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65. The argument mentioned, however, misses a crucial difference between 
significance of others and significance of all others. Even if we agree that some of 
other Subjects' well beings are constitutive to our own well beings, it does not imply 
that all other Subjects' well beings are constitutive. 
Significance of Others 
66. The difference between significance of others and all others can be 
illustrated by the following examples of strangers. 
67. Y and C are citizens living in the same society, and C never knows Y 
before. But one day C meets Y occasional and C makes friend with Y. In this 
relationship, C leams a lot from Y and in retum enriches C's life. Thus, C takes Y as 
a significant part ofhis life project. In this example, although Y was stranger to C, Y 
becomes important to C when they become closers and Y enriches C's life. 
68. But not all strangers can enrich our life. For example, X and S are citizens 
living in the same society, and S never know X and will not know X in the rest ofS's 
life probably. It is odd to say that the well being of X, who is a stranger to S, is 
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constitutive to the well being of S even i f X is S,s fellow citizen. Although X and S 
may interact in social cooperation indirectly, for example they contribute to the social 
cooperation by playing their roles, still it can hardly say that this kind of interaction 
make X become a significant part of S,s well being. 
69. It is not difficult to find these strangers X in our life as it is not possible for 
us to know everyone in our society. It seems that our well beings have nothing to do 
with the well beings of these strangers who we may never know or recognize their 
existence. Thus, it sounds mysterious if we claim our well beings are bound together 
with these strangers. 
70. The mysterious binding with all others may be explained by 
re-understanding the relation between Subjects. We can see that a close relation is 
required to justify why others' well beings are significant to ours from the examples 
of stranger. Re-understanding or re-defining the relation between all Subjects is 
required. 
Significance of All Others 
71. Relation is crucial to justify the significance of all others. As mentioned, 
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the well being of a stranger has nothing to do with our well beings. However, if a 
stranger is actually a closer to us, and we endorse that our well beings are linked 
together for some reasons, it is reasonable for us to have eudaimonistic judgment o f a 
stranger. In short, we need to tum the strangers into closers and establish the relation 
of mutual concem. 
72. There are two possible ways to establish the relation of mutual concem. 
(i) Establishing brother/sisterhood of all Subjects: As it is difficult to convince a 
Subject that he should have eudaimonistic judgment of strangers, a direct way 
to tum these strangers to closers and, as a result, a Subject has reason to care 
about the ex-strangers' well beings. In other words, we can extend the circle of 
concem and includes all ex-strangers in the list of concem. 
(ii) Limiting the size of Subjects: The size of Subjects is crucial for the existence of 
the 2"d Tension. As the Principle applied to all Subjects including large number 
of people, it is not easy to argue all citizens should have eudaimonistic 
judgment ofall other Subjects as there are so many strangers. Thus, a direct way 
is to limit the size of Subjects to the extent that the relation between all Subjects 
is closer. 
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73. For instance, if the Principle is applied to those who are living in the same 
village, and these villagers have very close relationship, they should have sufficient 
motivation to accept and comply with it because it is reasonable for them to have 
eudaimonistic judgment of other villagers due to their close relationship. However, 
they may not have sufficient motivation to comply with the same Principle if the 
Subjects are extended. This is because some Subjects in the extended list are 
strangers which they do not concern. 
74. The approach of tuming strangers into closers, however, is conceptually 
possible but not-so-feasible due to the expansion of sovereignty of contemporary 
political authority. 
75. The difficulty ofthe first way of the approach caused by the actual size of 
contemporary sovereign. In contemporary society, as there are so many citizens 
living under the same sovereign, it is not feasible to establish a close relationship 
between all citizens. As there are too many strangers living in the same sovereign 
with us, it is not feasible for us to know or interact with them to establish a closer 
relation. 
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76. The difficulty of the second way is caused by the nature of a principle of 
social justice. As a principle of social justice is applied in the basic structure at the 
fundamental level, the numbers of Subject, which is at least all citizens of society, is 
inevitably large. Thus, it is not feasible for us to have a close relation with all 
Subjects. 
77. In short, the approach to tuming strangers into closers is not feasible in 
non-ideal situation as there are so many Subjects which are always strangers to us in 
reality. 
78. The difficulties in non-ideal situation, however, are not fatal to the 
capabilities approach because it can defend itself in the ideal situation. As the 
difficulties appear when the Principle is applied to the social institution, it does not 
harm the soundness injustificatory level. 
79. I shall argue in Part IV that there are two problems of the approach of 
tuming strangers to closers based on an Aristotelian conception of well being in the 
justificatory level of the capabilities approach, including: 
(i) The approach of tuming strangers into closers has tension with the aim of the 
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capabilities approach to extendjustice to "all those in the world who ought to be 
just ONfussbaum 2006:92)." 
(ii) Fundamentally, the justification using Aristotelian conception of well being 
cannot reach overlapping consensus among citizens with different conceptions 
of the goods. 
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80. I shall argue the defense based on an Aristotelian conception of well being 
in Part III fails because it violates the aim of the capabilities approach to be 
globalized and the idea of overlapping consensus. 
Globalizing Capabilities Approach 
81. The central aim of the capabilities approach is to “globalize，，(or extend) 
the Subjects, that is, including those who are excluded should be treatedjustly in the 
Principle.io 
82. The capabilities approach is proposed to deal with the three unsolved 
problems of social justice that the traditional social contract theories cannot handle 
satisfactorily, including the problem of doing justice to people with physical and 
1° Nussbaum claims the capabilities approach can be applied to solve the Problem of exclusion of 
unqualified cooperators in social cooperation discussed in Chapter 1. As Nussbaum says, 
The three unsolved problems ofjustice that are primary topics ofthis book are all, in 
different ways, problem of globalizing the theory ofjustice, that is, extendingjustice 
to all those in the world who ought to be treated justly. ... Starting from a 
conception of the person as a social animal, whose dignity does not derive entirely 
from an idealized rationality, the capabilities approach can help us to design an 
adequate conception of the full and equal citizenship of people with mental 
disabilities. •.. A version of the capabilities approach helps us to think well about 
what the goal of an international politics should be. ... Because social contract 
theories start from the allegedly crucial importance of human rationality, defining 
both reciprocity and dignity in terms of it, they deny that we have obligations of 
justice to nonhuman animals, and view such obligations as we might have as 
derivative and posterior. ... The capabilities approach, with its emphasis on a 
continuum oftypes ofcapability and functioning, provides guidance that is superior 
both to that ofcontract theories that ofUtilitarian as we seek to do better with these 
urgent issues ofjustice CNussbaum，2006:92-93). 
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mental impairments, the problem of extending social justice to all world citizens and 
the issues of social justice involved in the treatment of nonhuman animals 
CNussbaum 2006:1-5). These problems can be summarized as the problem of 
exclusion of unqualified cooperation in social cooperation (the Problem) as these 
beings are unproductive and, as a result, being excluded from social cooperation. 
83. The capabilities approach, as elaborated in Chapter 1, extends the Subjects 
that a principle of social justice is applied. As a result, the unproductive human 
beings can be also included and the size of the Subjects expands. 
84. We can see the inclusion of these unproductive beings fails due to the lack 
ofcorresponding motivation to sustain the Principle with extended Subjects. 
(i) As the capabilities approach aims to expand the size of the Subjects, it is 
inevitable that some Subjects, who are strangers to us, are included in the 
Principle. 
(ii) However, if the strangers are included, it is not reasonable to claim that all 
citizens should accept and comply with the Principle. This is because there is no 
reason for us to have eudaimonistic judgment of these strangers. 
(iii) As a result, it is not reasonable to claim that all citizens should be 
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compassionate with the strangers even if they are suffering from lacking in 
central human capabilities undeservingly, 
(iv) When compassion is taken as the account of motivation of the capabilities 
approach, it implies that it is not reasonable to claim that all citizens should 
have sufficient motivation to accept and comply with the Principle as they have 
no reason to be compassionate with the strangers in the Subjects. 
(V) The remedy, as suggested in Part III is to limit the size of Subjects. Thus, the 
strangers who are included to serve the aim of globalizing the capabilities 
approach will be excluded again, 
(vi) As a result, the unproductive are included at the beginning, and they are 
excluded again as Compassion cannot sustain the Principle with extended 
Subjects. 
85. In short, we can see the remedy of reducing the number of Subjects is 
conflicting with the aims of the capabilities approach of extending its Subjects. 
86. In addition, there is a more fundamental problem on using an Aristotelian 
conception of well being (the Conception) to justify all citizens should have 
eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. It is the problem that the Conception 
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cannot generate overlapping consensus which is important in the capabilities 
approach. 
Overlapping Consensus 
87. Overlapping consensus is committed in the capabilities approach when 
justifying the list of central human capabilities." That is, the Subjects can agree on 
the list even if they have different comprehensive reasonable conceptions of the 
12 
good. Thus, the Principle can generate acceptance and compliance from all 
Subjects even if the capabilities approach tries to extend its scope of application 
88. The Conception, however, cannot generate overlapping consensus when it 
11 As Nussbaum says, 
The (capabilities) list represents the result of years of cross-cultural discussion, and 
comparisons between earlier and later versions will show that the input of other 
voices has shaped its content in many ways. Thus it already represents what it 
proposes: a type ofoverlapping consensus on the part of people with otherwise very 
different views ofhuman life. By "overlapping consensus" I mean what John Rawls 
mean: that people may sign on to this conception as the freestanding moral core o f a 
political conception, without accepting any particular metaphysical view of the 
world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any particular 
view of the person or of human nature. Indeed, it is to be expected that holders of 
different views in those areas will even interpret the moral core of the political 
conception to some extent differently, in keeping with their different starting point 
CNussbaum, 2000:76, emphasis in original). 
12 As Nussbaum says, 
The capabilities are then presented as the source of political principles for a liberal 
pluralistic society; they are set in the context of a type of political liberalism that 
makes them specifically political goals and presents them in a manner free of any 
specific metaphysical grounding. Presented and commended by argument in this 
way, the capabilities, I argue, can become the object of an overlapping consensus 
among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions ofthe 
good CNussbaum, 2006:70). 
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is used to justify every Subjects should have eudaimonistic judgment to all other 
Subjects. 
89. The problem is the Conception cannot be justified without appealing to a 
controversial conception of person. The Conception implies certain life projects 
cannot contribute to human flourishing, for example an asocial or apolitical life 
project. Thus, these life projects are not good life and they should be modified. 
However, the asocial or apolitical life project is nevertheless reasonable as they are 
no doubt the legitimate outcomes of the exercises of theoretical and practical 
reasoning. To argue these life projects are wrong, the Conception needs to appeal to 
its understanding of person as social and political animals. This conception ofperson, 
however, is not free of metaphysical ground as the list of central human capabilities 
do. As a result, it cannot generate the overlapping consensus and should not be used 
tojustify why all Subjects should have eudaimonistic judgment ofothers. 
90. The problem is an issue of justification and not the outcome primarily. 
Although the significances of the central human capabilities are also justified by the 
Conception, we will agree on the list because we can agree on the significance of 
these capabilities even if we do not adopt the Conception. This is why Nussbaum 
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claims these capabilities are important to all forms oflife projects. On the other hand, 
we have no way to justify we should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subjects without appealing to the Conception. Since the Conception per se is not an 
object of overlapping consensus, its implications on a good life are also controversial 
as they are contradicting with some reasonable life projects. Thus, the Conception 
cannot generate overlapping consensus and it cannot be used to justify why a citizen 
should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects� 
91. The failure ofthe Conception implies it is not unreasonable for a citizen to 
have life project that does not take all other Subjects as a significant part. As a result, 
it is not unreasonable that a citizen should not be compassionate with those who are 
not significant to him even if they are suffering from lacking in central human 
capabilities undeservingly. Thus, it is not unreasonable that the Subject should not 





92. In Chapter 3, I have demonstrated the tension between eudaimonistic 
judgment as a component of compassion and commitments of the capabilities 
approach, including the idea of the fact of reasonable pluralism and overlapping 
consensus. 
93. As the capabilities approach commits to the fact of reasonable pluralism, it 
is not the case that all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subjects. 
94. Also since it fails to limit the number of Subjects due to the inconsistency 
with the aims of extending the capabilities approach to the unqualified cooperators, 
and it fails to justify that all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment ofall other 
Subjects without violating the commitment to overlapping consensus, it fails to argue 
that all citizens should be compassionate with all other Subjects and accept and 





Three Ways Forward 
On what grounds then do we distinguish between mankind and other living things and 
regard the constraints ofjustice as holding only in our relations to human persons? ... The 
natural answer seems to be that it is precisely the moral persons who are entitled to equal 
justice (Rawls, 1999:441-442). 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
Purpose 
This chapter provides the ways forward to the failure of the capabilities 
approach to solve the problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators in social 
cooperation (the Problem) due to the two tensions between compassion as its 
account ofmotivation (Compassion) and its principle of social justice (the Principle). 
2. There are three possible ways forward, including: 
(i) Dissolving the tensions between the Compassion and the Principle, 
(ii) Providing remedy to the Problem, and 
(iii) Dissolving the Problem. 
3. I shall argue that the first two ways forward fails as the two tensions are 
difficult to be dissolved in the capabilities approach and the remedy on the 
distinction between distributive justice and remedial justice justifies the exclusion 
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instead of remedying it. 
4. I shall argue the Problem does not exist in Rawls's theory as Nussbaum 
claims. The reason is that in addition to pursue our rational plans of life, we also 
want to establish a well-ordered society when we participate in social cooperation. 
Therefore, the unproductive are qualified cooperators in social cooperation and the 




5. In Part I, I will demonstrate the possible ways to dissolve the two tensions 
between Compassion and the Principle. And I will argue that these ways are difficult 
for the capabilities approach to adopt. Thus, I will examine other possible ways 
forward to the Problem instead of modifying the capabilities approach. 
6. In Part II, I will examine the remedy to the Problem provided by Samuel 
Freeman. The remedy is to distinguish distributive justice from remedial justice. The 
distinction, however, justifies the exclusion of the unproductive instead of being a 
remedy to the Problem. 
7. In Part III, I will argue that the Problem does not exist in Rawls's theory of 
social justice. In addition to realize our rational plans of life better, we choose to 
participate in social cooperation because we want to establish a well-ordered society. 
As a result, we have reason to cooperate with the unproductive and they entitle to 




8. An important aim of the capabilities approach is to solve the problem of 
exclusion of the unqualified cooperators in social cooperation (the Problem). 
However, the capabilities approach fails to do so as there are two tensions between 
its principle of social justice (the Principle) and compassion as its account of 
motivation (Compassion). If we can dissolve the tensions, it implies that we can 
solve the Problem. 
9. In Part I, I shall demonstrate there are two possible ways to dissolve the 
tensions. I shall argue that these two ways are difficult to be endorsed in the 
capabilities approach. 
Possible Dissolutions 
10. To argue for the dissolutions of the tensions, it is presumed that the tensions 
are dissolvable. The presumption, however, is not beyond doubt as we have seen the 
conditions of tensions, that is, some Subjects whom the Principle is applied to 
(Subjects) deserve to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities, and it is 
unreasonable that all citizens should have eudaimonistic judgment of all other 
Subjects, are not difficult to eliminate. Thus, the first step is to remove the doubt. 
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11. Dissolution is possible because in some but not all circumstances, the 
Principle and Compassion is incompatible only. In other words, the Principle and 
Compassion are conditionally incompatible. 
12. To remove the conditional incompatibility, we can argue that these 
unfavorable circumstances do not exist, or we can modify the Principle and/or 
Compassion so that they become compatible and mutually supportive in all 
circumstances. The former, as demonstrated in the chapter 2 and 3, is nearly 
impossible and we shall not consider. Instead we shall consider the modification of 
the Principle and/or Compassion to dissolve the tensions. 
13. There are at least six forms of modification which we can consider to 
dissolve the two tensions, which are as follows: 
Option Compassion The Principle 
A Modified Unchanged 
B Modified Modified 
C Unchanged Modified 
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D Forgone Unchanged 
E Unchanged Forgone 
F Forgone Forgone 
14. The degree of variation of the Principle and Compassion is different among 
these options. The answer can be only ‘yes，or ‘no’ when we consider whether the 
Principle/Compassion should be unchanged or forgone. However, we need to answer 
the question of"how" if the Principle/Compassion should be modified. 
15. These options, however, are not all plausible to be adopted in the 
capabilities approach. 
16. Option A and B are not plausible if the interpretation of compassion is 
assumed to be correct. This is because the two tensions will remain unless we show 
that "the denial of desert" and "eudaimonistic judgment" are not the components of 
compassion. In other words, in option A and B substantive amendments of 
Nussbaum's conception of compassion are required to dissolve the tensions. It is 
unlikely such amendments are acceptable in the capabilities approach, especially 
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when two out of three components are required to surrender.^ 
17. Option E and F are costly to the capabilities approach. The capabilities 
approach is defined by the Principle. To forgo the principle is to forgo the core of the 
theory. Obviously this is unacceptable to the capabilities approach. 
18. If option A, B, E and F are implausible, we shall consider option C and D as 
they are prima facie possible. 
Modifying the Principle 
19. Option C is to modify the Principle so that it can be sustained by 
Compassion sufficiently. 
20. Option C is addressed to the problem that Compassion cannot sustain the 
Principle when the conditions of tensions exist. As argued in Chapter 2 and 3, it is 
unreasonable to claim that a citizen should be compassionate with those who deserve 
to sufferfrom lacking in central human capabilities (D-Subjects) or who are not a 
1 Nussbaum may choose to forgo desert or eudaimonisitic judgment in her account of compassion. 
As a result, she needs to face one of the tensions only, and she may need to forgo other commitments 
in her capabilities approach. This is exactly the approach of Option B. 
This approach, however, may not be acceptable to Nussbaum. As I have argued in chapter 3, the 
conflicting commitments, like overlapping consensus and reasonable pluralism, are important in the 
capabilities approach. Thus, I shall not consider option B in the following discussion. 
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significant part ofhis life project {N-Subjects). As a result, it is not reasonable to say 
that he should have sufficient motivation to accept and comply with the Principle if 
compassion is taken as the account of motivation of the capabilities approach. 
Therefore, if we try to dissolve the tensions without modifying or forgoing 
Compassion, it is possible to modify the Principle and make it sustainable by 
Compassion. 
21. There are at least three different modifications to dissolve the tensions, 
including modification of the goods of distribution (that is, re-distribution of what), 
the object of distribution (that is, re-distribution from who) and the target of 
distribution (that is, re-distribution to whom). 
22. The modification of the goods of distribution, however, is irrelevant to the 
two tensions existed. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, it is not the case that a 
Subject is unwilling to re-distribute some goods of distribution to those who they are 
not compassionate with. Instead they are not willing to share anything to D-Subject 
and N-Subject, regardless what the goods of distribution is. 
23. The tensions, therefore, are caused by the inappropriate combination ofthe 
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object of distribution and the target of distribution, that is, it is unreasonable to 
expect the object of distribution should has sufficient motivation to accept and 
comply with the Principle if D-Subject and/or N-Subject is included in the target of 
distribution. Thus, the modification should focus on the object of distribution and/or 
the target of distribution. 
24. There are at least four types of modification, including: 
(i) Enlarging/reducing the target of distribution, or 
(ii) Changing the composition of the target of distribution, that is, some components 
0 
are replaced , or 
(iii) Changing the quality of the components of the target of distribution, that is, the 
components per se remain the same but the properties of the components 
changed^, or 
(iv) Hybrid modification of the three types mentioned above. 
25. The following argument will focus on changing the composition of the 
target of distribution due to its prima facie plausibility. There are three reasons for 
2 For example, ifthe original target of distribution is composited by 2 Xs and 3 Ys, the size ofthe 
target group is 5. Thus, to change the composition of the target of distribution, it may become "1 X 
and 4 Ys", or "3 Xs and 2 Ys" etc. The size of the target is remained as 5. Only the composition ofthe 
target group, which means the composition o f X and Y，is modified. 
3 For example, if the original target of distribution is composited by 2 Xs and 3 Ys, and X in the 
target is transformed to non-X, and, as a result, the composition is changed. However, it is not the case 




(i) Negatively, all changes of the quality of the components of the target of 
distribution, including make all Subjects deserve not to suffer from lacking in 
central human capabilities or make all Subjects have eudaimonistic judgment of 
all other Subjects, is not likely to succeed. The reasons have been explained in 
Chapter 2 and 3 when arguing the two tensions are difficult to dissolve. 
(ii) Positively, it is prima facie feasible to solve the two tensions by reducing the 
target of the Principle. When all Subjects are compassionate with other Subjects, 
they should have sufficient motivation to accept and comply with the Principle 
if the target of the Principle includes the non-D and non-N-Subjects only. 
(iii) Furthermore, the exclusion of D-Subjects and/or N-Subjects seems to be 
necessary due to the subsistence of the two tensions. As any one of the existence 
of the Subjects mentioned is sufficient to create the tension(s), they should not 
be included in the target of distribution. 
26. The reduction of the target of distribution, however, is very costly to the 
capabilities approach in application and justification level. Even if we do not 
consider the problem of violating the goal of globalizing the theory in the capabilities 
approach mentioned in chapter 3, it is still very costly to do so. The costs include that 
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the feasibility of the capabilities approach will be sharply reduced, and the nature of 
the capabilities approach as a theory of social justice will be in doubt. 
27. If desert and eudaimonistic judgment are considered, the application of the 
principle of social justice would become less feasible due to the increase of 
complication of implementation. There are two complications created. 
28. The first complication is caused by considering desert. Whether a Subject 
deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities depends on which 
desert base is adopted in the capabilities approach. As argued in Chapter 2, if there is 
no overriding desert base that should be adopted in all circumstances, whether a 
Subject deserves to have a central human capability will be context dependent. That 
is to say, when the Principle is implemented, the following formula including four 
variables should be considered: 
In circumstance ^,Jfdeserves to have central human capability(s) 7when a desert base Z 
is adopted. 
29. The result of consideration depends on the combination of the four variables, 
and these variables vary in different cases. When each Subject considers whether he 
should accept and comply with the Principle, he must make his own judgment on 
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whether all Subjects in the target of distribution deserve to suffer from lacking in 
central human capabilities case-by-case. In other words, the implementation of the 
Principle depends on case-by-case judgment heavily. 
30. The reliance on case-by-case judgment makes the Principle becomes uneasy 
to implement due to the difficulty of understanding the whole picture of each case. 
Even if it is possible to set up a mechanism including a huge set of rules covering all 
possible scenarios, it is nearly impossible to implement the Principle. As a principle 
of social justice, the Principle is applied to all citizens. However, if it is required to 
judge whether each citizen deserves to have a central human capability in every case, 
the Principle and its mechanism cannot function properly because a lot of time and 
resources for investigation are required. As a result, even if the implementation ofthe 
Principle is logically possible, it cannot work in practice. 
31. The second complication is caused by considering eudaimonistic judgment. 
Whether a Subject has eudaimonistic judgment on others depends on his conception 
ofthe good. I f a Subject is motivated to accept and comply with the Principle only if 
he has eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects in the target of distribution, 
whether these Subjects should be included in the target of the Principle depends on a 
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Subject's life project. 
32. The implication is that the Principle becomes complicated or nearly 
infeasible if the fact of reasonable pluralism is taken for granted. As the conception 
of the good of each citizen is a variable, and the freedom of deciding who is 
significant to them should not be violated, the target of distribution can never be 
constant. This is because citizens are free to change the objects that they have 
eudaimonistic judgment of. Thus, it is difficult to define a constant target of 
distribution in the Principle, and as a result, the scope of implementation is also 
difficult to define. 
33. Even if it is assumed that some Subjects in the target group of distribution 
are constant, namely some citizens could be reasonably assumed as significant parts 
of all other citizens, it is required to find out who these citizens are, and when the 
Principle is implemented. This process, however, is a costly and endless task given 
that the target of distribution in the Principle is variable. As a result, considering 
eudaimonistic judgment makes the implementation becomes extremely complicated 
(if not totally infeasible). 
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34. The modified target of distribution of the Principle according to citizens' 
conceptions of the good also contradicts with the nature of a principle of social 
justice. As a principle of social justice is a principle of guiding the distribution of 
burdens and benefits in a society, the target of a principle should at least include most, 
if not all, citizens in a society. If it is reasonable for a citizen not to take most of other 
citizens as a significant part of one's conception of the good, and, as a result, the 
target of distribution of the Principle includes those who are taken as significant by 
every citizen only, there are too many citizens excluded from the target of 
distribution. As a result, the target of a principle will become too limited, and it is 
odd (if not wrong) to take it as a principle of 5oc/a/justice. 
35. In short, the costs of considering desert and eudaimonistic judgment in the 
Principle show that modifying the target of distribution of the Principle is not a 
desirable way forward. Therefore, Option C is not a plausible dissolution of the two 
tensions. 
Providing Another Motivation 
36. As Option C is too costly for the capabilities approach and infeasible to 
dissolve the two tensions, Option D, which is to substitute Compassion by another 
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account of motivation, will be examined. 
37. Option D is to provide another account of motivation that can sustain the 
Principle. That is, instead of being compassionate with others, citizens are willing to 
accept and comply with the Principle if they have that motive(s). 
38. Option D is prima facie desirable as it has three advantages, including: 
(i) The modification of account of motivation does not affect the core of the 
capabilities approach. As the capabilities approach is mainly defined by the 
Principle but not its account of motivation, the foundation of the capabilities 
approach seems not to be affected even if compassion is not taken as its account 
of motivation. This is why Option D is better than Options E and F (and Options 
B & C as well if the goods of distribution are modified). 
(ii) Forgoing compassion as the account of motivation does not affect the accuracy 
of the interpretation of compassion. Even if compassion is forgone due to its 
tension with the Principle, it does not imply that the interpretation of 
compassion provided in Upheavals of Thought is inaccurate. In other words, 
forgoing compassion could dissolve the two tensions with refliting Nussbaum's 
own interpretation of compassion. This is why option D is better than option A 
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(iii) As Option D is focused on the account of motivation instead of the Principle, it 
does not have the problems of Option C mentioned due to the modification of 
the target of distribution. 
39. To adopt another account of motivation, we should find out what a 
qualified account of motivation is. To do so, first we need to understand the 
components of a principle of socialjustice. 
40. All principles of social justice include four components, including the 
subject of distribution, the goods of distribution, the target of distribution and the 
purpose of distribution.^ When we ask how the benefit and burden of society should 
be (re)distributed, it is necessary to understand the following components: 
(a) Goods of distribution: what is (re)distributed from 
(b) Subject of distribution: who 
(c) Target of distribution: to whom 
(d) Purpose of distribution: for the sake of what. 
4 The purpose of distribution per se is not a component that must be shown in a principle ofsocial 
justice. This is because it is not the case that the purpose of distribution is shown explicitly in a 
principle. However, it is necessary to have the purpose of distribution for the sake of formulating the 
principle. 
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41. An appropriate account of motivation should be coherent with the four 
components of a principle of social justice. To sustain a principle of social justice, an 
account of motivation should not be coherent with some parts of a principle only. 
Instead the principle as a whole should be coherent with its account of motivation. 
42. To select an account of motivation which is coherent with the principle of 
the capabilities approach, the four components of the Principle should be considered, 
which are as follows:^ 
Goods of distribution: central human capabilities 
Subject of distribution: every citizen 
Target group of distribution: every other citizen 
Purpose of distribution: to let every citizen lead a dignified life 
43. According to these components, we can articulate at least three criteria for 
selecting an appropriate account of motivation. 
44. The first criterion, derived from the subject of distribution as “all citizens，，， 
5 For simplicity and necessity to establish a base before extension, it is assumed that the Principle 
is applied in a single nation only. The trans-national issue, thus, is bracketed. 
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is that an appropriate account of motivation and its presumption(s) of humanity 
should be sharable by all citizens. 
45. The presumption(s) of humanity in an account of motivation should be 
sharable by all citizens because any account of motivation must base on an 
interpretation of humanity, especially on the psychology of human being. To explain 
why all citizens are motivated to accept and comply with the Principle, it is necessary 
to refer to the psychological structure of all citizens. Thus, an interpretation of the 
common psychological structure is required as the justification of effectiveness of the 
account of motivation. 
46. The interpretation of humanity should be understood and accepted by all 
subject of distribution. As the justification of an effective account of motivation, the 
interpretation of humanity is not merely provided as a description. Instead it is an 
interpretation articulating how a citizen understands his and others' psychological 
structure and justifying why he and others should be motivated to accept and comply 
with the Principle. In other words, it is necessary for a citizen to endorse such 
interpretation of humanity and, as a result, be influenced by the interpretation on his 
action. Thus, controversial interpretation should be avoided and a sharable 
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understanding ofhumanity should be provided. 
47. The second criterion, derived from the goods of distribution, is that the 
subject of distribution is willing to promote the well beings of others without 
distorting the freedom of others to develop their own conceptions of the good. The 
justifications are as follows. 
48. The subject of distribution should be motivated to promote the well beings 
of others due to the significance of the central human capabilities. As mentioned in 
chapter 1, these capabilities are important for all citizens to function for leading a 
dignified life. Thus, to promote the distribution of these capabilities is also to 
promote the well being, or at least to provide the conditions for other citizens to 
function a dignified life. Citizens accepting and complying with the Principle should 
understand that the purpose of their compliance is to promote the well being of all 
other citizens, and they are motivated to do so because of this purpose. 
49. The subject of distribution should also not to violate the freedom of other 
Subjects in the target of distribution to develop their life projects. I f the subject of 
distribution is motivated to promote the well being of others, it may be possible that 
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coercion is acceptable for the subject in the name of promoting others' well being. 
For example, some citizens, who may choose a worse life if they are free to do so, 
are coerced to lead a particular way of good life. However, as the fact of reasonable 
pluralism is taken for granted in the capabilities approach, the coercion should be 
avoided. 
50. The third criterion, derived from the subject of distribution, is that the 
appropriate account of motivation should make the subject of distribution to act 
according to the Principle indiscriminatinglj^. 
51. By "acting according to the Principle indiscriminatingly", it means that the 
subject of distribution distributes the goods to all Subjects in the target of distribution. 
Thus, if a subject of distribution is motivated to act according to the Principle, he will 
be willing to (re)distribute goods to all but not some objects of distribution 
designated in the Principle. The two tensions are the examples that an account of 
motivation will be ineffective if the motivated subject of distribution will act 
discriminately. 
52. As we have seen in chapter 3, Compassion fails to fulfill the criterion on 
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indiscrimination. It is not reasonable to claim that all citizens should have 
eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. As a result, they will only be 
compassionate with some but not all Subjects suffering from lacking in central 
human capabilities undeservingly. Thus, subjected to their eudaimonistic judgment, 
they act according to the Principle discriminately. 
Difficulty 
53. The third criterion on indiscrimination also creates a great difficulty not 
only to Compassion but also to the capabilities approach. 
54. The difficulty is that all types of emotion cannot be considered as an 
appropriate account of motivation in the capabilities approach. The reason is that for 
Nussbaum, by definition eudaimonistic judgment is a constitution of all kinds of 
emotions (Nussbaum, 2001:30-31).^ As argued in chapter 3, it is unreasonable to 
claim that a citizen would have eudaimonistic judgment of all other Subjects. It 
6 As Nussbaum says, 
. . . [W]e notice that something marked in the intentional perceptions and the belief 
characteristic of the emotions: they are concerned with value, they see their object as 
invested with value or importance. ... The value perceived in the object appears to be a 
particular sort. It appears to make reference to the person's own flourishing. The object of 
the emotion is seen as important for some role it plays in the person's own l i fe . . . . 
Another way of putting this point — to which I shall often retum - is that the emotions 
appear to be eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with the person's flourishing CNussbaum, 
2001:30-31). 
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implies that it is also unreasonable to claim that a citizen would have emotion, 
regardless what that emotion is, to all other Subjects because having eudaimonistic 
judgment of something is the necessary condition of having emotion of something. 
As a result, it is conceptually true that no emotion can be taken as the account of 
motivation in the capabilities approach. 
55. In short, the question of "what's left?" comes if all emotions are excluded 
due to the partiality of eudaimonistic judgment. 
56. The question of "what's left” creates a serious problem to the capabilities 
approach. According to the three criteria mentioned, an appropriate alternative 
account of motivation for the capabilities approach is a motive which is (i) not 
emotion and (ii) shareable by all Subjects that the Principle is applied to and (iii) the 
Subject who has the motive is willing to promote other Subjects' well being without 
violating their liberties to pursue their life projects. This motive, if not mysterious, is 
uncertain what exactly is. If the capabilities approach tries to justify the coherence 
between its Principle and account of motivation, a vivid motive fulfilling these 
criteria must be provided but it seems difficult for the capabilities approach to do so. 
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Back to the Problem 
57. We can come back to the starting point, which is the Problem the 
capabilities approach addresses to, if it is difficult for us to dissolve the two tensions 
in the capabilities approach. The problem is that some unproductive members are 
excluded from social justice due to their inabilities to contribute to the goal of 
participating in social cooperation. The capabilities approach is one of the ways to 
solve the Problem. If this way seems to be a dead end, we may try other ways out. 
58. This is why I try to examine two other solutions provided by Freeman in 
Part II and by Rawls in Part IIL 
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59. In Part II, I shall argue that Freeman tries to provide remedy to the 
Problem by drawing the distinction of distributive justice and remedial justice when 
he interprets Rawls' theory of socialjustice (Freeman, 2007). 
60. To solve this problem, Freeman proposes that we should draw a distinction 
between distributive justice and remedial justice. Freeman's core idea is that 
although we should care the unproductive in the name of justice, we do so in the 
name of "remedial justice，，instead of “distributive justice." To understand his idea, 
we need to understand what he means when he uses these concepts. 
61. Distributive justice, as Freeman understands, is an issue of a just or fair 
distribution of income and wealth in social cooperation (Freeman, 2007:86)/ The 
problem of distributive justice is to find the most appropriate principles specifying 
the fair terms of social cooperation among free and equal persons who cooperate 
with one another on grounds of reciprocity and mutual respect (Freeman, 2007:107). 
Thus, if we understand the problem of social justice as the problem of how to guide 
7 As Freeman says, 
Distributive justice is then made part of the larger question about how to fairly 
structure economic and property relations among social cooperative productive 
agents who regard themselves as free and equal, where each does his or her fair 
share in creating the social product (Freeman, 2007:449). 
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our social cooperation fairly, what we concerns is the problem of "distributive 
justice." 
62. Remedial justice, on the other hand, is an extension of the problem of 
distributive justice and it concerns with the duty of mutual aid, duties of assistance 
and rescue, and the duty of mutual respect for persons (Freeman, 2007:107). It is an 
extension because distributive justice is the precondition of remedial justice.^ We 
need to know what a just distribution is, then, we can extend the scope of just 
distribution to non-cooperative members in our society. This claim is more explicitly 
argued when Freeman interprets a distinction between social justice and 
humanitarian justice.^ The former concerns with the issue of fair distribution in 
social cooperation, while the latter concerns with provision of goods to the 
disadvantaged. 
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As Freeman says, 
For Rawls it is the role of democratic legislators (or any government) to decide what 
kind and how much in the way of special benefits are to be extended to the mentally 
and physically handicapped, once they know the level of resources and wealth 
available in society (Freeman, 2007:107). 
9 As Freeman says, 
What is the difference between humanitarian justice and social justice? One 
difference is that Rawls regards social justice as focused primarily upon discovering 
terms of social cooperation among people who are capable of taking part in 
cooperation and doing their fair share to sustain Principles of humanitarian 
justice, on the other hand, extend to human being generally, without regard to 
whether one stands in cooperative relations with them. They set forth the necessary 
minimum (Rawls does not say sufficient) degree of respect that we owe to members 
of the human species as such. (Freeman, 2007:287-288, emphasis in original) 
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63. Arguing remedial justice as an extension of distributive justice is a sensible 
solution if we stick to the original meaning of cooperation and its goal. If we choose 
to act jointly with someone, we should choose those who can act and achieve the 
goal. And if one of the goals of participating in social cooperation is to make 
everyone better off in terms of realizing their rational plans of life better by 
producing and distributing primary (social) goods, we should choose the potential 
partners who are productive. Thus, it is not unreasonable to exclude the unproductive 
from our social cooperation. Although we may have others reasons to take care of the 
unproductive, we do so not in the name of distributive justice. Thus, it seems that the 
distinction can maintain the original purpose of social cooperation without ignoring 
the well beings of the unproductive. 
64. Strictly speaking, remedial justice is not an extension of distributive justice. 
This is because the reasons for providing a fair distribution to non-cooperative 
members in our society are different from the reasons for providing a fair distribution 
to cooperative members. For the latter a fair distribution is required because we are 
in the relation of reciprocity and mutual respects. Although we are still in the relation 
ofmutual respect with the non-cooperative members, the element of reciprocity does 
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not exist because they are not productive. We can use other reasons, for example 
humanitarian reasons, to justify that we should ensure the unproductive to have 
sufficient primary (social) goods. However, the reasons behind these two kinds of 
justice are not the same. Instead of naming remedial justice as an "extension" of 
distributive justice, we should understand remedial justice as a special kind ofjustice 
based on different sets of reasons as its justification. 
65. The relation of non-extension reveals the difficulties of solving the 
Problem by appealing to the distinction between the distributive justice and remedial 
justice. The distinction has two difficulties, one is on inequality of entitlement to 
distributive justice caused and the other is on evasion of the Problem. 
Inequalities 
66. First, when productivity is taken as the basis of entitlement to distributive 
justice, itjustifles unequal entitlement to social justice instead of an equal one. 
67. I shall first explain the basis of equal entitlement to distributive justice is 
not equivalent to the basis of equal moral worth. This is because although Freeman's 
distinction between distributive justice and remedial justice may not affect the latter, 
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it justifies the inequalities of the former. 
68. The basis of being entitled to equal justice does not entail or imply the 
basis of equal moral worth, vice versa. We can illustrate this point by two examples: 
(i) Example of Marsian: In 3008, our scientists have the first communication with 
Marsians. They find that Marsians are almost the same as humans. The only 
difference is that they are living on Mars and we are living on Earth. Thus, a 
Marsian bears the same moral worth as humans. However, it does not imply that 
"he" should be entitled to equal justice because “he，，is not a member in our 
social cooperation. Thus, even if “he” should be treated morally, it does not 
imply “he” should be treatedjustly. 
(ii) Example of AI: In 3008, our scientists invent an almost perfect artificial 
intelligence robot qualified to be a cooperator in social cooperation�Its 
conception of the good and the sense of justice are programmed (but not 
determined) and it can judge what it should do according to its programs. 
Furthermore, as a robot it is well-equipped and becomes very productive in our 
social cooperation. The only difference between this robot and humans is that 
this robot is not as autonomous as humans in the sense that its conception of 
good and sense of justice are programmed. Thus, if autonomy is counted as a 
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criterion of the measurement of moral worth, it seems that it does have equal 
moral worth as humans. However, it is entitled to equal justice simply because it 
is a qualified cooperator. 
69. The distinction on equal entitlement of social justice and moral worth 
implies that we can have distinct criterion as their bases. As the former concerns with 
the issue of social justice, whether a subject entitles to equal social justice depends 
on his participation and contribution in social cooperation. The latter, on the other 
hand, concerns with how we judge the moral value of a being. There are overlapping 
spheres between social justice and morality, but it is not the case we must deal with 
the issue of basis of moral worth when we deal with the issue of basis of social 
justice, vice versa. 
70. For Freeman, the entitlement of social justice concerns with the capacity of 
productivity. This is because productivity is a prerequisite to contribute to the goal of 
participating in social cooperation and social justice is an issue concerning fair 
distribution ofbeneflts and burden in social cooperation. 
71. The difficulty of using productivity to decide the entitlement of social 
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justice is that productivity should be taken as a cardinal conception varying in 
different human beings instead of a threshold and potential concept. 
72. The capacity of productivity cannot be taken as potentiality because many 
disabled are productive potentially but unproductive indeed. If the capability of 
productivity is taken as potentiality, these people should be included in social 
cooperation. This is what Freeman seems not to accept. ^^  From Freeman's 
understanding of difference principle, the disabled who are lacking in capacity of 
productivity indeed should be excluded from social cooperation. Even if they are 
productive potentially, it seems that Freeman's position is that they still should not be 
included in social cooperation because they are unable to cooperate indeed. Thus, it 
is inconsistent to uphold that having capacity of productivity potentially is one of the 
bases of equality in Freeman's interpretation. 
73. Having capacity of productivity cannot be taken as a threshold concept as 
� Freeman's position on this issue is explicit when he interprets the productive dimension of 
Rawls' difference principle. As Freeman says, 
[T]he difference principle focus initially on the side of production, not consumption. 
This is because of Rawls' focus on social cooperation in the production of wealth 
among members of a democratic society that he is able to insist upon reciprocity in 
its final distribution as specified by the difference principle. As a principle of 
reciprocity the difference principle is not suited to deal with problems of meeting 
people's special needs. We could always spend more upon those who are especially 
handicapped, and to apply the difference principle to their circumstances would 
severely limit if not eliminate the share that goes to the economically least 
advantaged (currently, unskilled workers at the minimum wage) who contribute to 
production (Freeman, 2007:448). 
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well. This is because the level of difference in this capacity affects the outcome of 
how successful the goal of realizing a rational plan of life can be achieved. The 
reason is that how successful we are in realizing our rational plans of life depends on 
how many primary social goods we can acquire in distribution. And the amount of 
primary social goods used for redistributive purposes depends on how productive we 
are. Thus, i fwe are more productive, the chance of realizing our rational plans of life 
successfully will be greater. Therefore, if we are instmmentally rational, we will 
judge that the productive persons are more important than those who are less 
productive. Thus, instead of justifying equality, capacity of productivity seems to 
justify inequality between cooperators. 
74. The justification of the inequality has a direct impact on the principles 
chosen. The impact is that we need to justify why parties should still be treated as 
equals in the stage of formulating the principle of socialjustice as they are unequal in 
terms of productivity. The inequalities of productivity are not arbitrary as 
productivity is a significant criterion to judge whether we are qualified cooperators 
and how productive we are. In other words, the level of productivity affects the 
realization of our goal of participating in social cooperation directly. Thus it is 
unreasonable to discredit these inequalities simply in the name of accident or 
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contingency. However, if parties are treated as unequals, the principles chosen may 
not be egalitarian principles. For example, we may accept a meritocratic principle 
and our legitimate expectations are defined by our productivity. 
75. In short, the distinction between distributive justice and remedial justice 
justifies inequality of entitlement to distributive justice. As the capacity of 
productivity is the necessary and sufficient condition of being entitled to distributive 
justice，if some beings are more productive, it is reasonable for us to claim they 
should entitle more as they contribute more in cooperation. On the other hand, the 
beings who are less productive should entitle less. Furthermore, it is, unfortunately, 
reasonable for us to claim those who are unproductive should not entitle to have 
anything in distributive justice (but, of course, not in remedial justice). Thus, it 
justifies the Problem instead of solving it. 
76. It may argue that the distinction between distributive justice and remedial 
justice that justifies the Problem is fine. This is because the unproductive can be 
taken care of in the name of remedial justice. Although the principle of distributive 
justice may not be an egalitarian one, the unacceptable inequalities may also be 
rectified in the level of remedial justice. In other words, the inequalities in 
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distributive justice do not cause the less-productive or unproductive to be worse off 
finally. 
77. The distinction between distributive justice and remedial justice as solution 
to the Problem is problematic because it evades the Problem instead of solving it. 
The Problem is that the unproductive are excluded from social cooperation due to 
their inabilities but we should include them instead.^^ As members of our society, 
the unproductive should be qualified to participate in formulating the principle of 
social justice at the very beginning. Freeman's distinction between distributive 
justice and remedial justice, however, justifies that the unproductive should be 
excluded in the stage of formulating the principle of social justice as they do not 
entitle to equal justice due to their inabilities to cooperate. 
78. Again we can see the crux of the Problem is the criterion/criteria of 
qualified participants in society (or cooperators in social cooperation). For those who 
take the exclusion as a problem, like Nussbaum, they think that the unproductive 
“ As Nussbaum says, 
. . . [T]he omission of people with disabilities from the initial choice of political 
principles has large consequences for their equal citizenship more generally, through 
the structure that is characteristic of social contract theories. ... Even if their 
interests can be taken into account deliberatively or at a later stage, we naturally 
wonder why this postponement is necessary, and whether it is not likely to affect the 
fully equal treatment of such citizens - even if it is not in and of itself a form of 
unequal treatment QSfussbaum, 2006:18). 
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should be included because they are qualified according to certain criteria. On the 
other hand, for those who disagree the exclusion is a problem, like Freeman, they 
think the unproductive should be excluded due to their inabilities. Both sides agree 
the unproductive's well beings should be considered, but they disagree on the issue 
that in which sphere their well beings should be considered. 
79. We can find the criteria of qualified cooperators in social cooperation that 
can include the unproductive in Rawls' theory of social justice. That is to say, for 
Rawls the unproductive are entitled to equal social justice if they are moral persons. I 
shall elaborate this idea in Part IIL 
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80. In Part III，I shall argue Rawls does agree that the unproductive are 
qualified to be included in social cooperation. This is because we have shared goals 
with the unproductive in participating in social cooperation. The shared goal is that 
we want to establish in a well-ordered society, and the unproductive is able to 
contribute to the goal. As a result, they are qualified cooperators. Thus, unlike 
Nussbaum's criticism or Freeman's interpretation, the Problem does not exist in 
Rawls' theory of socialjustice. 
81. The root of the problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperator from social 
cooperation (the Problem) is the goal of participating in social cooperation (the 
Goal). This is because whether a being is a qualified cooperator depends on whether 
he can contribute to realize the Goal. When the realization of our rational plans of 
life better is taken as the sole goal, those who are productive in terms of primary 
(social) good are qualified cooperator. The unproductive, therefore, should be 
excluded from social cooperation. 
82. For Rawls, however, the realization of our rational plans of life better is not 
the sole goal of participating in social cooperation. This is because having a rational 
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plan of life is just one side of our moral personality, which is the capacity ofhaving a 
conception of the good. We, as a moral person, also want to establish a well-ordered 
society when we participate in social cooperation due to our capacity of having a 
sense of justice. The goals of participating in social cooperation, in other words, are 
tied with our moral personality and its moral powers. 
83. I shall elaborate Rawls,s understanding of moral personality. For Rawls, 
the moral personality is defined by two moral powers. As he says, 
Moral powers are distinguished by two features: first they are capable of having (and are 
assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and 
second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a 
normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a 
certain minimum degree (Rawls, 1999:442). 
84. The moral personality is used to explain why we choose to enter social 
cooperation. In other words, for Rawls we have two Goals instead of one. 
85. The first one is the non-moral but morally permissible goal, which is to 
pursue our rational plans of life. As having the capability of having a conception of 
the good, that is, we can have, revise and rationally pursue a conception of the good 
(Rawls, 2001:19), is part of our moral identity, we are motivated to function such 
capacity. It explains why we want to purse our rational plans of life better and serves 
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as the reason for us to participate in social cooperation. 
86. The case is the same in the realization of our capacity of having a sense of 
justice. The capacity of a sense ofjustice is "the capacity to understand, to apply, and 
to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that 
specify the fair terms of social cooperation (Rawls, 2001:18-19).” If we have a strong 
sense of justice, it means that we have “an effective desire to comply with the 
existing rules and to give one another that to which they are entitled (Rawls 
1999:274-275).,’ In other words, if we have a sense of justice, we want to have a 
society guided by fair principles ofjustice. 
87. The realization of our capability of having a sense of justice makes us 
pursue a well-ordered society in social cooperation. For Rawls, we enter social 
cooperation not just because we want to realize our rational life plan better. Instead 
we also want to have a fair system of social cooperation. And a fair system of social 
cooperation is established if we are living in a well-ordered society. That is, 
[I]t is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same 
principles ofjustice, and (2) the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally 
known to satisfy these principles. ... Among individuals with disparate aims and purposes 
a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire 
forjustice limits the pursuit of other ends (Rawls, 1999:4-5). 
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88. In short, having a well-ordered society is one of our ends to enter social 
cooperation. It implies that we enter social cooperation not only for pursuing our 
interests but also for pursuing a well-ordered society per se. 
89. We can see that our goals of entering social cooperation are defined by our 
moral personality. We want to pursue our interest because we have our conceptions 
of the good; we want to have a well-ordered society because we have a sense of 
justice. And we have our conceptions of the good and a sense of justice because we 
are moral persons. Entering social cooperation, thus, is a better way for us to realize 
our moral personality; realizing our moral personality is a reason (and perhaps the 
most important reason) why we enter social cooperation. 
90. Nevertheless, the motivations of entering social cooperation are not 
separated from the reasons. We have reasons to do so because we want to do so. If 
we want to do so, it implies that we have motive to do so. Thus reasons and 
motivations of entering social cooperation are coincident in Rawls's theory. 
91. The goal of having a well-ordered society makes the unproductive be 
classified as qualified cooperators. For Rawls, parties in social cooperation are free 
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and equal beings (Rawls, 1999:12). People are free in a sense that they have two 
moral powers mentioned (Rawls, 1999:442). They are free because they can be free 
to form their own conceptions of the good and act according to their senses of justice. 
And if they have these moral powers, they should be taken as equal beings and 
entitle to equal justice (Rawls 1999:442).^^ As an unproductive has two moral 
powers as well, he should also be classified as qualified cooperator and entitles to 
equal justice. 
92. However, for Rawls “having two moral powers" here does not mean that 
they have these powers actually. Instead if someone has these moral powers at least 
to a minimum level potentially, he is qualified to be regarded as a moral person” 
93. This interpretation of the basis of equality, as Rawls notices, is often 
proved troublesome. The trouble is rooted in using capacity as the basis of equality. 
12 As Rawls says, "... [T]he capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being 
entitled to equaljustice. (Rawls, 1999:442)" 
13 As Rawls says, 
One should observe that moral personality is here defined as s potentiality that is 
ordinarily realized in due course. ... When someone lacks the requisite potentiality 
either from birth or accident, this is regarded as a defect or deprivation. There is no 
race or recognized group of human beings that lacks this attitude. Only scattered 
individuals are without this capacity, or its realization to the minimum degree, and 
the failure to realize it is the consequence of unjust and impoverished social 
circumstances, or fortuitous contingencies. ... Once a certain minimum is set, a 




There are two different problems but their sources are the same. Capacity is a 
cardinal variable that we can measure what level of a capacity we have on a spectrum. 
That is, in addition to “have or have not a capacity," we can say how strong or weak 
a capacity that we have. When we take a capacity as the scale of equality, two people 
are unequal if one of them has stronger capacity than the other one. Thus, instead of 
providing a basis of equality, we provide a basis of inequality as a result of the 
difference of capacity indeed. 
94. That's why Rawls proposes two solutions for this problem. 
(i) First, two people are equal if they have capacity X at a minimum level (Rawls, 
1999:443). That is, Rawls tries to define the basis of equality as a threshold 
concept. 
(ii) Second, two people are equal if they have capacity X potentially. That is, a 
person has capacity X potentially mean that it is empirically possible for him to 
realize this capacity even ifhe does not do so at last. Thus, it avoids the problem 
of difference in the level of realization. 
95. However, these solutions are not sufficient to solve all problems of taking 
capacity as the basis of equality. Even if Rawls adopts such thin basis of equality, 
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someone is still not qualified as a moral person even i fhe is a human. 
96. Rawls notices this problem and he mentions three possible problematic 
cases. 14 However, he admits that he cannot establish the basis of equality in the case 
of permanent moral handicapped. And he also admits his theory of social justice 
cannot handle the problem of treatment to animals (Rawls, 1999:448).^5 
97. The exclusion, as I think, is well grounded. The Problem concerns with the 
unproductive, who should be included in the stage of formulating the principle of 
social justice, are excluded. Rawls' solution of using two moral powers to define 
basis of equal entitlement to social justice is successful to include most of them. The 
rest are those who are not able to participate in formulating a principle. It is 
reasonable for us not to include animals or non-person humans in formulating a 
14 As Rawls says, 
A full discussion would take up the various special cases of lack of capacity. That of 
children I have akeady commented upon briefly in connection with paternalism. 
The problem of those who have lost their realized capacity temporarily through 
misfortune, accident, or mental stress can be regarded in a similar way. But those 
more or less permanently deprived of moral personality may present a difficulty. I 
cannot examine this problem here, but I assume that the account of equality would 
not be materially affected (Rawls, 1999:446). 
15 As Rawls says, 
. . . [W]e should recall here the limits of a theory of justice. Not only are many 
aspects of morality left aside, but no account is given of right conduct in regard to 
animals and the rest of the nature. ... But it does not follow that there are no 
requirements at all in regard to them, nor in our relations with the natural order.... 
They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to 




principle of social justice as they cannot express their ideas on the issue of social 
justice, or they can but persons cannot understand. Of course we should consider 
their well beings in formulating the Principle, but it does not imply the exclusion is a 
problem. 
98. In short, as the exclusion sometime is inevitable in process of selection, the 
point is whether the exclusion isjustiflable. 
99. The inclusion of the unproductive as qualified cooperators shows that the 
Problem does not exists in Rawls' theory of social justice. Although Rawls takes the 
realization of our rational plans of life as a Goal, he also claims that we have the 
Goal to pursue a well ordered society. Thus, if a being is qualified to contribute to 
one of these goals, they are qualified to participate in social cooperation. As Rawls 
says, "... [T]he capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being 
entitled to equal justice. (Rawls, 1999:442, emphasis added)” It is the moral 
personality but not just productivity served as the basis on entitlement to equal 
justice. The inclusion of unproductive as qualified cooperators also implies that they 
are entitled to participate in the formulation of the principle of social justice. Thus, 
Nussbaum's criticism is not valid to Rawls, and we do not need to adopt Freeman's 
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100. In this chapter, I have examined three ways forward to deal with the 
problem ofexclusion of unqualified cooperators in social cooperation. 
(i) It is difficult for the capabilities approach to dissolve the two tensions by 
modifying its principle or finding an alternative account of motivation. 
(ii) Freeman's distinction on distributive justice and remedial justice justifies the 
exclusion of unqualified cooperators in social cooperation instead of providing 
remedy to the Problem. 
(iii) Rawls’ adoption of two moral powers as basis of entitlement of equal justice is 
the most plausible to dissolve the Problem. Thus, the Problem does not exist in 




. . .[T]he simplicity of the contract view of the basis of equality is worth emphasizing. The 
minimum capacity for the sense of justice insures that everyone has equal rights. The 
claims of all are to be adjudicated by the principles ofjustice. Equality is supported by the 
general facts of the nature and not merely by a procedural rule without substantive force. 
Nor does equality presuppose an assessment of the intrinsic worth of persons, or a 
comparative evaluation of their conceptions of the good. Those who can give justice are 
owedjustice (Rawls, 1999:446). 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
Purpose 
In this “Conclusion”，I shall provide a review of my thesis, including: 
(i) summary of the core arguments; 
(ii) theoretical implications of these arguments; 
(iii) possible directions for further research; and 





2. In chapter 1，I have outlined the background of the thesis, which is the 
problem of exclusion of unqualified cooperators in social cooperation (the Problem) 
in social contract theories and how the capabilities approach attempts to deal with the 
Problem. 
3. Nussbaum claims that the Problem exists in social contract theories when 
we take pursuing our rational plans of life better as the sole goal of participating in 
social cooperation for the sake of reciprocity. To achieve this goal, we need to 
produce certain primary (social) goods in our social cooperation. These goods can 
only be produced by those who are productive. Thus, the unproductive are excluded 
from social cooperation as they cannot contribute to the goal. As the subject of social 
justice is about how to assign the rights and duties, burdens and benefits in social 
cooperation (Rawls, 1999:4), the unproductive are also excluded from social justice. 
4. For Nussbaum, the capabilities approach does not have to face the Problem. 
This is because the capabilities approach takes reciprocity in a complex form. We can 
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benefit from the interaction with the unproductive according to an Aristotelian 
conception of person, that is, we are social and political animals and we cannot lead a 
good life without participating with the unproductive. As a result, for all of our 
goodness, we should take care of these unproductive and provide some conditions for 
them to participate in social interactions. 
5. These conditions are the central human capabilities provided by the 
principle of social justice of the capabilities approach (the Principle). These 
capabilities are important for all citizens to lead a dignified life. In the Principle, 
these capabilities at a threshold level are taken as the basic entitlements for all 
citizens. 
6. We have effective motivation to accept and comply with the Principle 
because we are compassionate with those who are suffering from lacking in these 
capabilities undeservingly. We would be compassionate with someone who suffers 
undeservingly when we take him as a significant part of our life projects. Since a 
person cannot lead a dignified life without these capabilities, and the Principle would 
guarantee that every party can have these capabilities, we would accept and comply 
with the Principle when we are compassionate with others. This is because it is an 
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effective way to relieve sufferings caused by lacking in these capabilities. 
7. The mutually supportive relationship between Compassion and the 
Principle is then established. We accept and comply with the Principle because we 
are compassionate; the Principle in retum tells us what we should do. 
Two Tensions 
8. In Chapter 2 and 3, I have argued there are two tensions between the 
Principle and Compassion, therefore, the mutually supportive relation is in doubt. 
9. The l$t Tension arises between the denial of deserts as a component of 
compassion and the Principle applied to all citizens. 
10. When a subject that the Principle is applied to {Subject) is a subject who 
deserves to suffering from lacking in central human capabilities {D-Subject), for 
example when they are retrospectively and morally responsible for their loss in 
central human capabilities, it is unreasonable to claim that we should be 
compassionate with him. As a result, it is unreasonable to claim that we should 
accept and comply with the Principle applied to D-subjects as well. 
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11. There is no overriding reason that D-Subject does not exist in all 
circumstances. We may argue that as central human capabilities are the basic 
entitlements of all Subjects in the capabilities approach, no citizen prima facie 
deserves to suffer from lacking in these capabilities. However, in some cases a 
Subject still deserves to suffer from lacking in central human capabilities when he is 
retrospective and morally responsible for the actions, for example they surrender 
their central human capabilities voluntarily. Furthermore, we cannot combine the two 
desert bases, including central human capabilities as the basic entitlements of all 
Subjects and retrospective and moral responsibility, to vindicate the existence of 
D-Subjects is impossible. This is because they lead to contradicting results. 
12. Thus, it is not possible to eliminate the chance of existence of D-Subjects, 
and the 1^^ Tension, therefore, exist. 
13. The 2"d Tension exists between eudaimonistic judgment as a component of 
compassion and commitments of the capabilities approach, including the idea of the 
fact of reasonable pluralism and overlapping consensus. 
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14. When there is a Subject whom we should not have eudaimonistic judgment 
of (N-Subject), it is unreasonable to claim that we should be compassionate with him. 
As a result, it is unreasonable to claim that we should accept and comply with the 
Principle applied to N-Subjects as well. 
15. Since the capabilities approach is committed to the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, there is no guarantee that there will be no N-subject because the life 
projects of citizens, which are the outcome of exercise of theoretical and practical 
reasoning, are plural and incommensurable. 
16. A solution is to take the fact of reasonable pluralism as a brute fact and 
argues that we should have eudaimonistic judgment of all Subjects. However, to do 
so we cannot appeal to the Aristotelian conception of well being because it cannot 
generate overlapping consensus. Specifically, this conception is not agreeable by 
someone who has an asocial or apolitical conception ofthe good. 
17. Another solution is to limit the Subjects to those beings who all citizens 
have eudaimonistic judgment of. This solution, however, fails because it contradicts 
with the goal of globalizing the capabilities approach, that is, to extend the scope of 
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the application of the Principle to all appropriate Subjects. 
18. Thus, it is not possible to eliminate the chance of existence of N-subjects. 
The 2"d Tension, therefore, remains. 
19. Since the two tensions exist and make the Principle and Compassion 
become incoherent, the capabilities approach cannot successfully solve the Problem. 
Ways Forward 
20. In chapter 4, I have demonstrated three ways forward to solve or dissolve 
the Problem. 
21. The first one is to dissolve the tensions in the capabilities approach by 
modifying the target of distribution in the Principle and finding an alternative 
account of motivation. However, 
(i) the former is difficult as it makes the application of the Principle become 
extremely complicated when desert and eudaimonistic judgment are considered; it 
also violates the idea of the Principle as a principle of social justice because the 
scope of the target of distribution is too narrow when eudaimonistic judgment is 
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considered; and 
(ii) the latter is also difficult as no emotion can be considered as an alternative 
account of motivation. This is because all emotions that include eudaimonistic 
judgment will create the 2"^ tension. 
22. The second one is to distinguish distributive justice from remedial justice. 
For Freeman, the unproductive are excluded in distributive justice due to their 
inabilities to contribute to social cooperation, but their well beings are considered in 
remedialjustice. 
23. As a matter of fact, the distinction justifies the exclusion. Therefore, it is 
not a remedy to the Problem indeed. In addition, it does not solve the Problem 
because the unproductive are excluded when the principle of social justice is 
formulated due to their disqualification of entitlement to equal socialjustice. 
24. The third one is taking moral personality defined by two moral powers as a 
basis of entitlement to equal social justice. That is, for Rawls, as there are two goals 
of participating in social cooperation, including pursuing our rational plans of life 
better and establishing a well-ordered society, a being who have the capacity of 
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having a conception of the good and the capacity of having the sense of justice to a 
minimum level potentially is entitled to equal social justice because he can contribute 
to the Goal. The unproductive, as a result, are qualified to participate in social 
cooperation. 




26. There are two theoretical implications on the capabilities approach and the 
Problem that social contract theories may face. 
27. First, an alternative account of motivation is required if the capabilities 
approach aims to extend the scope of application of the Principle. The capabilities 
approach tries to deal with the Problem by including the unproductive in the 
Principle, and modifying the goods of distribution so that these goods are suitable for 
all Subjects. The consequence, however, is that it creates a problem on establishing a 
mutually supportive relation between the Principle and its account of motivation. 
This is because when the scope of application of the Principle is extended, a 
corresponding account of motivation should be provided to explain why all citizens 
would still be motivated effectively to accept and comply with the Principle. 
However, as argued in chapter 4 compassion and other emotions cannot serve this 
purpose due to the partiality of eudaimonistic judgment. Thus, to reestablish the 
mutually supportive relation between the Principle and the account of motivation, a 
theoretical reconstruction may be required for the capabilities approach. 
28. Second, social contract theories do not necessarily exclude the least 
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advantaged in social cooperation. For Nussbaum, social contract theories seems to 
face the Problem inevitably due to their understanding of society as social 
cooperation and the goal of participating in social cooperation (the GoaP) in narrow 
economic terms. However, it is not necessary that all social contract theories must 
commit to the Goal what Nussbaum complaints. Social contract theories can modify 
the Goal to include the unproductive in the social cooperation without contradicting 
with their understanding of society. 
29. The success of Rawls's theory of social justice to dissolve the Problem 
provides an example to other social contract theories. Although social contract 
theories share the conception of society as social cooperation, the difference in the 
Goal as the criterion of qualified cooperator is the crux explaining why Rawls's 
theory, unlike other social contract theories, does not have to face the Problem. It 
shows that it is possible for social contract theories to avoid the Problem to happen 




30. There are two possible directions for further research from the two 
theoretical implications mentioned. 
31. The first direction is on the relation between the scope of application of a 
principle and the account of motivation in a theory of social justice. Although this 
thesis only demonstrates the tensions between the principle of social justice and 
compassion as the account of motivation in the capabilities approach, it is reasonable 
to estimate that other theories of social justice may face a similar problem on the 
ineffectiveness of their accounts of motivation. This is because the subject of a 
theory of social justice is, by definition, society and all citizens, any account of 
motivation of a theory of social justice should be effective enough for a citizen to 
accept and comply with a principle of social justice applied to all other citizens. Thus, 
every theory of social justice has burden to proof why its account of motivation can 
sustain its principle of social justice. This involves further researches on the relation 
between socialjustice and moral psychology. 
32. The second direction is on the conception of society and its purposes in 
social contract theories. It is intuitive appealing that society is understood as social 
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cooperation and we enter social cooperation for the sake of reciprocity. The Problem, 
however, reveals that this conception of society and its purpose may contradict with 
our conviction that the least advantaged must not be excluded from social justice. 
Although the contradiction is not inevitable, as what Rawls's theory of social justice 
does, it shows that the assumption that “all members in society are normal and fully 
cooperative" in social contract theory is sometimes problematic. Thus, it worth 
reconsidering the conception and purpose of society mentioned when we construct a 
theory of socialjustice under the framework of social contract theory. 
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Limitations 
33. There are two limitations of this thesis: 
(i) As this thesis examines how the capabilities approach deals with the Problem 
and why it is not succeed, and how Rawls's theory of social justice can dissolve the 
Problem, I have not closely examined in Frontiers of Justice, whether Nussbaum's 
criticisms to other social contract theories on the Problem are fair. This is because 
these examinations are not the main purposes of this thesis. 
(ii) The ways forward provided in the chapter 4 aims to examine possible ways out 
when the two tensions exist between the Principle and Compassion. It provides 
direction instead of providing a complete solution to the two tensions and the 
Problem. As suggested in Possible Directions, further researches on social justice 
and moral psychology may contribute to the first way forward on the dissolution of 
the tensions between the Principle and the account of motivation in the capabilities 
approach, and a comprehensive analysis of Part III of A Theory of Justice can enrich 
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